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In early research on land grabbing, the initial focus was on foreign companies 
investing abroad, with a particular focus on those based in countries such as China, 
Gulf States, South Korea, and India. In recent years, it has become evident that the 
range of countries land investors originate in is far broader, and includes both North 
Atlantic - and EU-based actors. In this study, we offer both quantitative and qualitative 
data illustrating the involvement of EU-based corporate and financial entities in land 
deals occurring outside of the EU. This study also analyses the global land rush within 
a human rights framework, examining the implications of particular land deals 
involving EU-based investors and their impact on communities living in areas where 
the investments are taking place. The research presented here builds partly on 
Cotula’s 2014 study on the drivers and human rights implications of land grabbing, 
but differs in that it focuses explicitly on particular cases of possible, actual or 
potential human rights abuses and violations, in the context of activities involving 
European corporate and financial entities. In our conclusions, we offer a series of 
recommendations on how the EU can more effectively address these issues.   
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1 Key messages 
(i) European Union-based corporate and financial entities are important actors in land deals in 
countries outside the EU, contributing to and/or are responsible for human rights abuses. 
Available data shows that the involvement of EU actors in land grabbing is significant in scale and 
extent, but it is difficult to precisely quantify the level of their involvement. The reality is more fluid 
and complex than what available databases tell us partly because: (a) land grabbing cannot be 
understood in a static, technical and restrictive way; (b) land grabs are multi-layered and complex 
processes, in which a land deal involves many actors via investment webs implicating diverse 
types of public and private actors (which cannot be clearly separated), and “nationality” of land 
deals is never a straightforward issue; and (c) EU actors are involved in land grabs and related 
human rights violations at different points in investment webs. In the process, immediate 
outcomes, broader implications of particular land deals, and land grab-related human rights 
violations can occur in a variety of political and economic settings, aside from the iconic scenario 
where land deals violently expel rural villagers from their land.  
(ii) There are five key mechanisms of institutional platforms through which land grabbing that 
leads to human rights violations or threats of violations occurs, namely: (a) EU-based private 
companies (1) involved in land grabbing through various forms of land deals; (b) Finance capital 
companies from the EU, including public and private pension funds, involved in land grabbing; (c) 
Land grabbing via public-private partnerships (PPPs); (d) EU development finance involved in land 
grabbing; and (e) EU companies involved in land grabbing, which are taking advantage of EU 
policies and gaining control of resources through the supply chain. A full understanding of these 
mechanisms is necessary for tackling the human rights challenges in contemporary land grabbing. 
(iii) The human rights abuses, violations and impacts of land grabs involving EU actors directly 
point and relate to the EU’s and EU Member States’ (MS) extraterritorial human rights obligations. 
For each of the different mechanisms, they have to ensure compliance with their human rights 
obligations by: (a) Respecting human rights and doing no harm through direct or indirect 
interference, (b) Protecting human rights, especially through accountability and regulatory 
mechanisms for corporate and financial actors, and (c) Fulfilling human rights, by creating a 
conducive environment for the realisation of human rights. The EU and EU MS also must ensure 
accountability and remedy mechanisms, as part of their obligations to protect and fulfil. 
(iv) The EU has consistently responded to such a human rights challenge within, and in relation to, 
land deals through a variety of policies and initiatives. However, the EU’s response to land 
grabbing, by acts and by omissions, has not always been in line with the EU’s and EU MS’ human 
rights obligations. It has fallen short on all three aspects of human rights obligations, namely, 
respect, protect and fulfil. The EU has been reluctant to acknowledge its extraterritorial obligations 
in this regard and at times even tends to obstruct efforts at the international level to regulate and 
hold corporations accountable through binding regulations. 
(v) There is ample evidence to show that business self-regulation and corporate social 
responsibility schemes are insufficient and inadequate for addressing human rights issues in the 
context of land grabbing. They fail to protect people from human rights abuses and do not ensure 
accountability of states, legal liability for involved corporate actors, and access to effective 
1 A company that has its headquarters, is registered or domiciled in and/or carries out substantial business activities in 
one or more EU Member States.   
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remedies for the affected individuals and communities. In some cases, companies use these 
schemes to avoid accountability.  
(vi) The EU and EU MS have an important role to play to stop land grabbing and address related 
human rights abuses and violations according to their existing international human rights 
obligations. The multi-layered character of land grabs, the involvement of different EU actors, and 
the different mechanisms of land grabbing require a set of regulatory actions by different bodies 
in the EU and MS. 
2 Introduction: Framing human rights in relation to the 
contemporary global land rush 
The recent convergence of multiple crises – food, fuel, energy, climate, environmental, and 
financial – alongside the rise of newer vibrant hubs of economic production, investment, trade and 
consumption – i.e. BRICS countries and other powerful middle-income countries (MICs) – has 
brought the issue of land back to the centre stage of development policy discourse. The implicit 
and explicit assumption is that there is a solution to all these crises and to meeting newer and 
increasing demands for natural resource-based goods and services. The solution promoted by 
some powerful actors lies in seizing what is considered to be empty, under-utilized, marginal, and 
available lands, and putting these into efficient and productive use – as long as there are 
appropriate regulatory institutions in place (see World Bank, 2010; Deininger, 2011). This is seen as 
a win-win proposition that both generates profits for corporations, and addresses the interest of 
national governments to generate both gainful livelihoods and/or employment for their citizens, 
as well as taxes. These assumptions and goals have partly led to and/or legitimized the already on-
going contemporary global land rush – or 'global land grabbing' (2), as it is commonly referred to 
in the media. 
The target lands are those in the grey area of property systems, which are thus easily claimed by 
the state. In completing the process of land deal-making, the central state and corporations seem 
to be engaged in orchestrating a narrative that tries to frame the acquisition of such types of lands 
– a narrative that claims that the current ways of resource use and property systems are either 
destructive or inefficient, or both. This evokes an era of climate change issues, as well as a variety 
of mitigation and adaptation initiatives, and the need to produce more food to feed the growing 
population (3). Thus, the lands usually targeted are those used by farmers engaging in shifting 
cultivation, pastoralists, artisanal fisher peoples, and forest dwellers relying on collecting non-
timber forest products for their livelihoods.  
The property systems in these communities are usually customary tenure. Many of the people 
implicated in such types of land are indigenous peoples or are coming from ethnic or minority 
groups. These are spaces where the state usually does not have a history of strong presence. In the 
dominant narrative, it is thus the national governments and corporations that define what is 
destructive or inefficient – for example, shifting cultivation contributes to climate change because 
of regular field/forest burning, is an inefficient use of scarce resources because it inherently uses 
land extensively, and the subsistence orientation that generally characterises a large part of the 
production system. The same applies to pastoralist communities. Converting them to sedentary 
2 In this study, we will use the terms land grabs, (large-scale) land investments, and land deals interchangeably, although 
we are using the term land grabbing from a specific definition discussed further below.  
3 Borras et al. (2016a) argue this in the context of Myanmar. 
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agriculture evokes the idea that it is a win-win solution: poor people get their land, sometimes 
even with formal private titles, while the remainder of the pastoralist or shifting cultivation areas 
are then taken over by the state. Or, entire communities are just as easily relocated, since shifting 
cultivation and pastoralist fields are often categorized as state-claimed “empty” land. 
The state plays a key role in completing a land deal process, by generating a hegemonic narrative 
on why large-scale land deals are necessary and desirable, by defining what marginal and available 
land is, by reclassifying, rezoning, and quantifying such lands, by expropriating these so-called 
marginal and available lands, and through (re)allocation or dispossession processes. In many 
countries where large land investments occur, only the central state usually has the absolute 
authority to take the necessary legal and administrative steps in land deal making. In some 
societies, these steps are done in collaboration with a junior partner, namely, traditional village 
level chiefs who tend to easily follow the wishes of the central government. In order to govern, it 
resorts to simplifying complex social relations into something concrete and legible – such as 
resource access and claims expressed by people in formal cadastre records, defined, executed and 
maintained by the central states (see Scott, 1998). It deploys its coercive apparatus to pursue its 
goals and enforce its will in this context, via police, military, courts, and in some cases, 
paramilitary/militia (4). 
Furthermore, communities in most rural societies are heterogeneous in terms of social class, 
ethnicity, gender and generation. There are dynamic social relations in which a variety of social 
divides occur. When land deals are executed on the ground, they affect various social groups 
within the affected communities – not in a uniform way, but in a highly differentiated manner, so 
that some benefit, while others lose (see Borras and Franco, 2013). Hence, from the outset, in many 
cases, some sections of the community support a land deal while others oppose it. It is rare to see a 
solidly unified affected community that either completely supports or completely opposes a land 
investment. Finally, these various social groups may apply different, and often competing, 
meanings to land: as an economic resource, community heritage and territory, and so on. 
Monetizing the 'value' of land is only one perspective in defining the meaning (and value) of land, 
and the insistence of using just one definition for land in relation to socially differentiated peoples, 
is a common fault-line that divides key actors from communities involved in land deal processes. 
It is the pre-existing social structures and institutional conditions, within which the land being 
coveted and the people being affected are embedded, that largely shape the politics of land deals 
(who gets which land, how, how much, why and for what purposes?), and whether the processes 
and outcomes of any particular deal is likely to result in some form of violation of human rights (of 
some segments) of the affected communities. Meaning, human rights cannot be seen from a 
technical, politically neutral context, as they are deeply embedded within the broader context of 
pre-existing resource politics and dynamic social relations – both within the directly affected 
community and beyond. 
It is important to have a clear, however imperfect, definition of what we mean by ‘land grabbing’ 
or ‘land deal’ in this study, in order for us to establish the institutional backdrop against which we 
examine human rights. In this study, we define land grabbing as 'control grabbing', following 
Borras et al. (2012: 851): 
4 For an emblematic large-scale case that demonstrates how the state and corporations frame marginal and available 
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Contemporary land grabbing is the capturing of control of relatively vast tracts of land and other 
natural resources through a variety of mechanisms and forms that involve large-scale capital that 
often shifts resource use orientation into extractive character, whether for international or 
domestic purposes, as capital’s response to the convergence of food, energy and financial crises, 
climate change mitigation imperatives, and demands for resources from newer hubs of global 
capital. 
When land deals that have the character of a land grab (based on the definition offered above) are 
carried out in settings where the process, immediate outcomes, and broader, long-term 
implications are such that they effectively deny land/natural resource-dependent people from 
exercising or gaining access to land, water and forest to use for livelihoods or spaces to live in, 
human rights issues may arise. When they do, they must be taken seriously. It is important to 
situate our discussion of human rights in this more nuanced definition because it also eschews a 
commonly accepted definition that a land investment is only considered a land grab when it 
expels people from the land. As we will explain below, while land grabbing that expels people 
from the land is a common occurrence, it is not necessarily the only path in which central states 
and corporations pursue resource 'control grabbing' wherein possible human rights violations and 
abuses can occur. 
It is important to understand how and why human rights abuses and violations occur in order to 
stop and prevent them from happening again, or to seek redress when these are committed 
(wherever possible in the form of restitution, otherwise through adequate compensation and 
reparation). It is important to go back to the structural and institutional conditions discussed 
above – where land deals are carried out in variegated conditions – making the contexts within 
which human rights violations occur highly differentiated, requiring different treatments in terms 
of stopping and preventing present and future violations, or to seek redress for violations 
committed.  
There are at least four broad contexts: First, where the land is needed but the people’s labour is 
not, as Li (2011) frames it, the deal will most likely expel people from the land. When they are 
already expelled, the key human rights demand is to 'restore' their rights to land. This can come in 
policy forms such as restitution (5).  
Second, where the land is needed, and so is cheap labour, people are likely to be incorporated into 
the emerging business enterprise. The potential human rights issue centres around the terms of 
the incorporation of the people: who gets inserted into labour or contract farming schemes, why, 
how and under which conditions?  
Third, where poor people still have access to their resources or territory (a place to live and not just 
a resource to exploit), but such access is being seriously threatened by land deals. The potential 
human right issue here is for poor people to have the right to have rights in protecting themselves 
from getting expelled from their land or from having their access to resources (land, water, forest) 
blocked. In this context, the human rights obligation of states is to 'protect' existing but fragile 
resource/territorial access and the villagers' rights to benefit from that access (6).  
5 A secondary alternative is to compensate for their expulsion. This approach can however set a dangerous precedent, as 
companies and states can be drawn into abusive practices, since they can then simply compensate for the expulsion. 
6 Ribot and Peluso (2003) argue this in their discussion of the theory of access. 
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Fourth, where poor people have long been expelled from their land, either due to extra-economic 
coercion or through everyday forms of social differentiation, but they were not absorbed into 
productive sections of the economy in either rural or urban spaces (7). The potential human rights 
issue here is their right to have rights in terms of (re)gaining access to land/resources/territory, in 
order to be able to at least feed themselves, have a decent place to live, and make a living. 
Redistributive land reforms and restitution are common policy imperatives in this context. We 
argue that it potentially constitutes human rights violations (or at least there are compelling moral 
and ethical issues) in settings where a mass of people desperately need land to live and work, but 
such lands are instead allocated to corporate entities engaging in labour-saving enterprises to 
produce goods not needed and which could not be afforded by the poor local population.  
The discussion on four broad contexts of potential human rights issues within, and in relation to, 
the contemporary global resource rush, situates our understanding of human rights not just in the 
process or outcome of a specific land deal. It compels us to understand both land deal making 
processes, as well as the immediate outcome and broader, long-term implications of such land 
deals. It brings us closer to understanding specific human rights abuses by specific corporations 
and/or human rights violations by government/state agencies, but without deviating from the 
broader application of human rights, both society - and system-wide. It leads us from deploying 
human rights instruments only for very defensive and reactive engagements (seeking redress for 
human rights abuses already committed), to using these in proactive (including preventive) ways 
as well (the right to have rights, and how to make rights real, as Cousins (1997) puts it). 
The broader discussion above consciously frames human beings and social relations as units of 
inquiry, making them visible and legitimate, positioning their right to have rights in the otherwise 
problematic structural and institutional conditions they are in. This is to prevent a technical 
interpretation of what are otherwise deeply political meanings of human rights instruments and 
other (global) governance instruments, such as free, prior, informed consent (FPIC) (8). The broader 
framing offered also nearly always implicates the central state in the host country as party to land 
deals implicated in various forms, shades and degrees of human rights violations (see Wolford et 
al., 2013).  
Finally, this framing avoids a situation where concerned international (inter-)governmental and 
non-governmental groups who want to stop and prevent human rights violations in land deals 
could – at best – win a case here and there, but losing the broader challenge of human rights 
system-wide and worldwide. The framework being offered in this study situates the particular 
cases of land deals within a broader institutional challenge of: "respect, protect, promote, restore, 
advance" in terms of affected people's human rights in relationship to resource politics (see 
Franco, Monsalve and Borras, 2015). This means: 'Protect' existing resource/territory access where 
they still exist but are threatened; 'Promote' resource/territorial access for those who do not have 
it; 'Restore' resource/territorial access for those who were (violently) expelled from their land by a 
land deal; and 'Advance' the human rights interests of wage workers/contracted farmers in the 
emerging land deal enterprises. Due to the grey area status of land being coveted, affected 
communities are generally declared to have no right to have rights. The first and most 
7 Li (2010) argues this by referring to the rise of 'surplus populations' in relation to current global resource grabs. 
8 In Myanmar, when villagers complained about a mining company destroying the water and soil resources in the village, 
the company and the government dismissed the claim simply by stating that, according to government records, the 
village does not exist, and the villagers are thus not a legitimate party to any case (Borras et al. 2016b). See also a critical 
and relevant discussion on Free Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC) by Franco (2014). 
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fundamental right then is to respect/protect/recognize their right to have rights, as a fundamental 
human right.  
Having explained how this study frames human rights in the context of global land rush, we now 
turn briefly to the specific context of this study. During the earliest wave of research on land 
grabbing, the initial focus was on foreign companies, with emphasis on a set of foreign players 
(China, Gulf States, South Korea, India, and others). We now know that the range of countries such 
investors originate in is far broader, and includes North Atlantic-based investors (and EU-based 
actors). The study done by Cotula (2014) for the European Parliament is instructive about the 
drivers of land grabbing and how and why human rights are implicated in such land deals. Based 
on a broad, scoping study, Cotula outlines some of the important institutional bases through 
which human rights can be violated, while offering a set of useful recommendations on how these 
can be prevented. Our present study partly builds on Cotula's study, and differs in one important 
way: we will be focusing explicitly on particular cases of possible, actual or potential human rights 
abuses and violations in the context of activities by European corporate and financial entities 
involved in land grabbing outside the EU. 
3 European corporate and financial entities involved in 
land grabbing outside the EU 
3.1 Data and research methods 
The relevant data and information used for this study speak directly to the four broad contexts 
discussed above, as well as for the processes, outcomes and implications of land deals. The most 
common, and rather casually, used database on land grabs is the Land Matrix (see Land Matrix, 
2016; Anseeuw et al., 2013). The Land Matrix is an important database, but is both limited and 
flawed in relation to the purposes of the present study (9). While quantification is relevant and 
important, it is generally limited because: (a) it is not possible to capture the complete picture of 
the extent of what is happening on the ground (10), and (b) it is susceptible to capturing and 
projecting an erroneous perspective of reality. A large part of the methodological problem is how 
one defines 'land grabbing' that, in turn, brings the issue of what should be included and excluded 
from quantitative data. The Land Matrix restricts its data to four criteria, which includes land deals 
that: (i) “Entail a transfer of rights to use, control or ownership of land through sale, lease or 
concession; (ii) have been initiated since the year 2000; (iii) cover an area of 200 hectares or more; 
and/or (iv) imply the potential conversion of land from smallholder production, local community 
9 Overall, data in the Land Matrix appears to be very incomplete. Cambodia serves as a good example, as it is likely one of 
the only countries in the world where data availability from government and civil society organizations (CSOs) is very 
extensive and well documented. The Land Matrix highlights 104 transnational land deals, most of which are so-called 
economic land concessions (ELCs), covering 798 207 ha. However, the human rights organization LICADHO documented 
274 cases of ELCs with exact boundaries covering 2 120 817 ha. The latest official data underpin that the LICADHO data is 
highly realistic. A 2015 report by the Cambodian Government (Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, MAFF) 
comes to a total of 230 ELCs covering 1 934 896 ha, with an additional 23 withdrawn licenses. Thus, more than half of the 
existing ELCs granted in the last 15 years (most of which were granted after 2008), and more than half of the affected 
land area is not included in the highlighted data of the Land Matrix. Only by resetting the default filters in a subpage will 
the Matrix show 169 deals covering 1 632 000 ha. The hectares discrepancy would be even higher, if Special Economic 
Zones (SEZs), mining concessions and REDD+ pilots were added – all schemes that frequently lead to the loss of access 
to land and forest by rural villagers in Cambodia. 
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use or important ecosystem service provision to commercial use” (Land Matrix, 2016). We see this 
as too focused on land deal procedures, and an approach that misses a lot of important political 
and economic dimensions of current land grabbing cases (11).  
Another fundamental flaw of the Land Matrix methodology is its overly foreign company-centric 
unit of tracking. Land deals that seemingly have no link to foreign entities are excluded from the 
main tables, headlines and messages (12). Furthermore, there is a tendency in the Land Matrix to be 
too technical and procedural in its treatment of land tenure – excluding pervasive forms of land 
grabs that come in the form of contract farming/outgrower schemes. Land Matrix data excludes 
such deals, arguing that, “as the land used by contract farmers outside the area of a land 
acquisition does not change its tenure status, we do not include this land in our aggregate figures 
of land acquisitions.” This will effectively exclude a significant number of affected communities 
and lands worldwide (see also chapter 4.1).  
In addition, conservation and climate mitigation schemes, such as REDD+, which affect a vast 
number of people in similar ways as regular agricultural land concessions do (13), have been 
excluded from the Land Matrix. While the Land Matrix tends to focus on the extent of land deals 
almost always measured through the number of hectares affected, it fails to dig deeper into the 
political economy of financial actors and transactions that are less, and not immediately, traceable 
via newspaper reports (14). In addition, the Land Matrix excludes failed land deals (15). This is 
problematic because in many cases, even when a land investment has not been pursued any 
11 Highlighting this, in its re-launch in June 2013, the Land Matrix decided to “temporarily exclude deals based on mining 
and logging concessions”, and overall the Land Matrix argues that concessions that could provoke conversions in land 
use and tenure security over large areas, but are unlikely to ever do so over the entire surface of the concession – such as 
logging and mineral concessions – are now excluded. This means that even if substantial land is transferred and land 
control has changed, the Land Matrix excludes it from its data, as they do not see this as a “demand for land”. An 
example: the largest and well known ELC in Cambodia, the Pheapimex concession covering 315 000 ha, is not included 
in the Land Matrix data. It is unclear under which criteria this exclusion happened. The key is that the overall 
announcement of the concession holder to plant eucalyptus did not go beyond its initial stage, and over 10 years of 
logging has been seen as the most relevant activity. Then, in the past 3 years, numerous sub-concessions were given to 
single investors (with sugar cane and cassava as the dominant crops), and thus this initial transfer of rights has been 
central in recent land conflicts.  
12 The numbers exclude deals that seemingly have no transnational involvement. The easily accessible figures are also 
usually those picked up by media and academics. In the overall data set one has to change the default filter setting and 
add “domestic deals” in order to see all deals. For Cambodia, this increases the number of deals from 1 423 to 1 964 and 
the land size from 61 875 217 ha to 139 900 495 ha). Illustrative examples include the Amliang sugar cases in Cambodia 
(Phnom Penh Sugar and Kampong Speu Sugar), which are only found (headed under the L.Y.P. Group) once one resets 
the default filter setting under the table mode. This is despite the fact that it is well documented, and that the Australian 
ANZ bank has been involved via a 40 Mio USD loan – a fact which points to the problem of pretending that there is a 
sharp division between transnational and domestic land deals. 
13 See Fairhead et al.’s (2012) discussion of the concept of 'green grabbing'. 
14 The Land Matrix thus has limited information regarding the role of shareholders, companies and financing actors. 
Despite its strong messages regarding the top countries involved, the identification of countries involved (particularly 
those in the EU) is very limited. For example, Hoang Anh Gia Lai (HAGL) is a Vietnamese company that grabbed land in 
Cambodia and Laos through its subsidiaries. Deutsche Bank is a key shareholder of HAGL that held shares worth 4.5 
Million USD in 2013 (see Global Witness 2013). Such complex shareholding structures are not captured by the database. 
The case of Cobe Agrivision (Zambia) does not show the links to Norfund (which holds 21 % of the shares of the mother 
company Agrivision Africa), BMZ, KfW and Deutsche Bank, which gave a loan via AATIF fund (see Box 6 of this study). 
15 Again, this data is not excluded altogether but is excluded from the main tables and headlines, which are easily 
accessible and commonly used by the media, development practitioners and academics. 
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further (for various reasons), such a process is likely to have already impacted the affected 
communities (16).  
The Land Matrix is not the only relevant database. The NGO GRAIN maintains a database via 
crowdsourcing (Farmlandgrab.org). The difference between the Land Matrix and GRAIN's initiative 
is that the latter tends to stay away from making claims about the precise extent of land 
deals/grabs based on its specific definition. The purpose of GRAIN's databanking is to track cases 
as they emerge or get spotted in real time – whether it actually exists or is just on-paper in media 
reports – in order to alert potentially affected communities, their allies and other public interest 
groups, and to mobilize them to track and monitor potential harm that such investments may 
cause in local communities (see GRAIN, 2013). This method then is, in a way, less controversial and 
problematic as compared to the Land Matrix, and has proven to be more useful to human rights 
watchdogs (17).  
This study will use all available databases – but is conscious of the limitations and flaws of these. 
We will supplement its use with data and information that we have gathered through the long 
standing work of FIAN International on this issue, specifically documenting potential and actual 
cases of human rights violations in and in relation to land grabs. We will also use published 
academic works as well as research conducted by NGOs to further support our study (18). 
3.2 A partial and indicative overview of land grabbing data  
A few countries have received much of the media spotlight with regard to the global land rush, 
namely, China, the Gulf States, South Korea and India. There has been comparatively less 
examination of the role that EU Member States play in the global land grab (19), likely partly 
because many EU-based investors and companies have multiple foreign subsidiaries that make it 
difficult to trace their roots directly to the EU. However, companies registered in the EU are 
engaging in numerous land deals, that, when aggregated, add up to vast amounts of land in 
developing countries. As shown in Annex 1, companies registered in France and the United 
Kingdom have been involved in 40 to 124 land deals, respectively – as a result, gaining control of 
629 953 to 1 972 010 hectares of land in various countries outside the EU. Corporations registered 
in Belgium, the Netherlands and Italy are not far behind, with 20 to 21 deals each, involving a total 
of 251 808 to 615 674 hectares of land. Overall, the Land Matrix data alone reports 182 EU-based 
companies being involved in 323 land deals outside of Europe (see Figure 1). These deals are 
found in 52 countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America and have contracted a combined total of 
5 837 504 hectares of land (see Figure 2) for a wide range of purposes – including agriculture, 
16 For example, while the UK-based ProCana company pulled out of its 30 000 ha sugarcane investment in southern 
Mozambique, the damage caused by the recasting of social relations and access to land was already done, and had far-
reaching impacts on local communities (see Borras et al. 2011).  
17 Furthermore, data banking with real time interactive mapping is also central to human rights oriented tracking, such 
as the series of interactive maps constructed by the human rights organization LICADHO in Cambodia. Its value is that it 
provides not only a list of cases, but also satellite generated maps situating a particular land case in relation to others. 
Finally, EJOLT Atlas is another database initiative focused on environmental conflicts. The value of this type of mapping 
is that it focuses on resource conflicts where human rights issues are pervasive. It is the least developed of all the known 
databases, perhaps partly because of the inherently fluid character of what it aspires to track: conflict (Martinez-Alier 
2016). 
18 For a vibrant scientific debate about methodology in tracking and quantifying land grabs, please refer to the following 
exchanges: Scoones et al. (2013), Edelman (2013), Oya (2013), Anseeuw et al. (2013), Rulli and O'Dorico (2013).  
19 Some notable exceptions include: Borras and Franco (2011) and Borras et al. (2012), among others. 
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livestock, biofuel production, forestry for carbon sequestration, and conservation projects (see 
Annex 2). 
 
Source: Own elaboration using calculations made from Land Matrix data (2016) 
 
Source: Own elaboration using calculations made from Land Matrix data (2016) 
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The number of companies involved is significant and is unevenly distributed across the EU. France 
is the home base of 17 companies involved in a variety of land deals. The Netherlands has some 18 
companies operating, either directly or indirectly, in countries outside Europe – from Ethiopia to 
Brazil to Cambodia. While sixty companies based in the United Kingdom are operating in 30 
different countries worldwide (see Annex 3 for more company-specific data). In terms of regional 
trends, and again with all the caveats discussed earlier, Figure 3 highlights the spread of land deals 
across the regions of the world that EU companies are targeting – with investments in African 
countries comprising 60 % of all recorded land deals, while those in Asia and Latin America 
combined comprise 40 %. When this data is further divided by sub-region, countries in West, 
Central, and East Africa together account for 55 % of all land EU land deals, suggesting that these 
areas offer the most appealing investment conditions for EU-registered companies. When looking 
into the officially declared intended use of the land involved in these deals (see Annex 1), the most 
immediately visible similarity across all three regions is that the broad category of 'agriculture' 
(which includes biofuels and food crops) is the most prevalent. 
 
Source: Own elaboration using calculations made from Land Matrix data (2016) 
The aggregated data provides us with a broad overview of countries in the EU where some of the 
investing companies are registered, which sectors of the industry they are engaged in, and which 
regions outside the EU they are investing in. This is relevant – as long as the caveats and warning 
about using the data are observed. However, this is just a precursor to our intention of looking into 
their human rights impact. Here, it is important to come back to the four broad contexts discussed 
above, with attention to process, outcome and implications. In Box 1 and Box 2, we present two 
illustrative cases. Combined, the two cases demonstrate all the features of the four broad contexts, 
while also illustrating that land grabs do not necessarily – and in reality rarely – fit into ideal types. 
Rather, multiple contexts discussed above can be at play in one particular case, as shown in Boxes 
1 and 2. 
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Box 1: The case of Germany-based Neumann Kaffee Gruppe 
In August 2001, the inhabitants of the four villages Kitemba, Luwunga, Kijunga and Kiryamakobe 
(approximately 4 000 people) in Mubende District, Uganda, were violently evicted from their 2 524 
hectares of land, on which they had been living for years. Supported by the local authorities, the 
Ugandan army inflicted violence on the community. The eviction took place after the Germany-
based company Neumann Kaffee Gruppe (NKG), negotiated with the Ugandan government about 
the lease of the land for the establishment of a coffee plantation. The agreement with the 
Ugandan investment agency included a clause that the land had to be uninhabited and former 
inhabitants were to be compensated. After the eviction, and without compensation to the 
evictees, the land was leased to Kaweri Coffee Plantation Ltd., a 100 % subsidiary of the NKG. The 
establishment of the coffee plantation on the cleared land was supported by the German 
development agency GIZ (then GTZ) and the African Development Bank (AfDB), which currently 
has 7 EU MS in its board of directors.  
In August 2002, 2 041 of the displaced persons sued the Ugandan government and Kaweri Coffee 
Plantation Ltd. for damages. When the trial was rejected, the victims initiated a formal complaint 
against the NKG as the parent company at the German National Contact Point (NCP) for the OECD 
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises in 2009. In its concluding observations, the NCP concluded 
in 2011 that NKG had acted in good faith in assuming to have leased the property free from claims 
from third parties. However, in a judgment of 28 March 2013, the High Court in Kampala 
demanded that the lawyers of Kaweri Coffee Plantation Ltd. pay compensation for damages 
amounting to EUR 11 million. It also harshly criticized the German investor for its disregard of 
human rights. Kaweri Coffee Plantation Ltd. appealed against the judgment in December 2013. 
Since then, provision of justice has been delayed. Germany neglected the human rights of the 
affected people by not assessing the human rights impacts before providing financial support to 
the plantation. Furthermore, Germany has not ensured that victims of human rights abuses have 
access to effective remedies. By financially supporting the project through the GIZ and AfDB, 
Germany also breached its obligation to respect the human rights of the affected people (CorA-
Netzwerk et al., 2014; CESCR, 2015; FIAN, 2016). 
Box 2: The case of Swedish-owned EcoEnergy 
On 9 May 2013, a Swedish-owned company, EcoEnergy, reportedly received a certificate of 
occupancy from the Tanzanian government, granting it a 99-year lease over 20 374 hectares of 
farmland in Bagamoyo district, located 70 kilometres north of Dar Es Salaam, the capital city of the 
country. The company is developing a 7 800-hectare sugar plantation and processing facility, and 
is planning to source sugar from outgrowers farming a further 3 000 hectares of land. The 
plantation aims to produce around one million tons of sugar cane per year for food and energy 
consumption (according to a 2015 report, production is expected to begin in 2016). The land 
acquired by EcoEnergy comes from the former state farm known as Razaba, which was established 
in 1976 as part of former President Nyerere’s collectivisation policies, and abandoned in 1993. 
According to research carried out in 2015, project investment may reach USD 500 million, financed 
mainly by the African Development Bank, the International Fund for Agricultural Development 
(IFAD), and other development banks – although precise details are not available. The Swedish 
International Development Agency (Sida) is reportedly providing a loan guarantee to the project 
worth USD 17.5 million.  
EcoEnergy’s project is part of the G7 New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition, a public-private 
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partnership in 10 African countries enabling private sector investment in key sectors of agriculture. 
Launched in 2012, it involves 180 transnational and African corporations that plan to invest USD 8 
billion in agriculture in 10 African countries. In Tanzania, the EU, as well as the British, French, 
German, Japanese, Russian, and US governments fund the New Alliance. Besides the direct support 
it receives from the African Development Bank, IFAD and Sida, the project is also part of the 
Southern Agricultural Growth Corridor of Tanzania (SAGCOT) a public-private partnership, which 
aims to put 350 000 hectares under profitable production to serve regional and international 
markets. The founding partners of SAGCOT include transnational agrifood corporations, 
foundations, and various donor governments – including several EU MS – support the initiative.  
EcoEnergy and the Tanzanian government claim that the sugar project will bring many benefits to 
the local communities, but research has highlighted numerous problems with it. In the first phases 
of the project, approximately 1 300 people – mainly farmers – will lose some or all of their land 
and/or their homes. There will be further displacements in subsequent phases, which could affect 
hundreds of people according to estimates. The company EcoEnergy has promised compensation 
in cash or alternative land to affected farmers. However, local people complained about the quality 
of the land being offered as compensation and the lack of binding commitments from the 
company. In addition, research found that affected people have not been offered the choice of 
whether to be resettled or not, but rather only whether they want to receive compensation in cash 
or land for being resettled.  
The project foresees the establishment of an outgrower programme in which 1 500 smallholder 
farmers would use village land to form 25 to 35 ‘block farms’ where, on average, 50 farmers will 
plant sugar cane and supply sugar to the company at an agreed price. Yet, interviews indicate that 
many farmers in the area are unaware of the details of this model, which presents potential risks to 
local smallholder farmers and involves a major shift in livelihoods and food security in the area. 
Under the outgrower scheme, each group of 50 smallholder farmers is expected to create its own 
outgrower company, which will have to take out loans of at least USD 800 000 – a sum that is 30 
times the minimum annual agricultural salary in Tanzania. According to company estimates, it will 
take seven years for the outgrower companies to pay back their loans before they can make a 
profit. Until this break-even point, the farmers’ only earnings would be from their farm labour, 
which will be low since agricultural minimum wage in Tanzania is only USD 44 a month. The 
outgrowers are also likely to have little bargaining power when obtaining loans from the banks 
and in setting the price at which they sell their sugar to the company (ActionAid, 2015) (20). The 
foreseen outgrower scheme and existing power asymmetries between the company and the 
communities also entail the risk for communities to lose autonomy by transforming their 
livelihoods into a dependent relationship with the company. 
3.3 Understanding investment webs 
One aspect that is directly linked to financial investors and indirectly linked to most private 
companies is the issue of financing and shareholding of actors, which often reveals complex, 
cascading relations. This means that in one land deal, multiple actors may be involved, and thus 
certain but distinct responsibilities and related accountabilities can be attributed to them. Indeed, 
“behind most large-scale agricultural projects is a web of global actors that make the project 
20 Schiavoni et al. (2016) looked into the impact of SAGCOT and its various mechanisms of land deals and outgrowing 
schemes, paying particular attention to its impact on the 'right to food'. 
18 
 
Land Grabbing and Human Rights: 
The Involvement of European Corporate and Financial Entities in Land Grabbing Outside the EU 
possible. These actors include banks and companies that are funding the project, and the 
companies that are buying the produce being grown or processed by it. All of these actors are 
necessary to the project’s success, and all are aiming to earn a profit from it in one way or another” 
(Blackmore, Bugalski and Pred, 2015).  
This is very relevant in order to understand the dynamics of land grabbing and vividly illustrates 
some of the mentioned problems arising from certain forms of data banking, in as much as it can 
obscure relevant actors – including those based in the EU. The discrepancy between the data 
discussed above and the involvement of financial actors can be highlighted by the case of DWS, 
the fund managers of Deutsche Bank AG. A 2010 study found that “in the case of DWS […] at least 
EUR 279 500 000 is invested through their funds in companies directly acquiring agricultural land. 
These companies actually hold a minimum of 3 057 700 hectares of agricultural land in South 
America, Africa and Southeast Asia alone” (FIAN Germany, 2010). However, the data from the Land 
Matrix only points to 300 000 hectares acquired by German actors.  
When looking at the investment chains of land deals, there are different types of actors: business 
managers of the agricultural project; parent companies who (fully or partially) own the business 
managing the project (subsidiary or local branch); investors/shareholders who invest money in a 
company in return for shares; lenders who make loans to a project or a company (commercial 
banks, investment banks, multilateral development banks/IFI, investment funds (hedge funds, 
pension funds, private equity funds); governments who offer land to the business managing the 
project and allow a company to be registered and operate in their country or region; brokers who 
play a role in helping to secure business deals and communicating between or supporting 
different actors involved; contractors who carry out certain jobs on the ground on behalf of the 
project; and buyers who buy the produce grown or processed by the project (trading companies, 
processor/manufacturer, retailer) (see Fairbairn, 2014; Clapp, 2014; Isakson, 2014; Blackmore et al., 
2015). These actors are not always based in one single country, which makes attributing 
accountability to one state inadequate. EU actors can come in at different points of the investment 
chain – or web. The case of Feronia Inc. (Box 3 and Figure 4) is illustrative of this. 
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Box 3: Feronia Inc. 
Feronia Inc. is a Canadian company registered on the Toronto stock exchange. All of its operations 
are carried out in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) through its subsidiary Feronia JCA 
Limited that is, in turn, registered in the Cayman Islands (GRAIN, 2015). Feronia JCA Limited holds 
76 % of Congolese Feronia Plantations et Huileries du Congo (PHC) and 80 % of Feronia PEK sprl. 
Feronia claims to legally control some 117 897 hectares of land in the DRC through both 
companies (107 897 and 10 000 hectares respectively) (21). As of March 2015, Feronia Inc.’s largest 
shareholders were the African Agriculture Fund (AAF, 32.44 %) and CDC Group Plc. (27.43 %), 
totalling 59.87 %. AAF is a Mauritius-based private equity fund financed by bilateral and 
multilateral African development finance institutions (DFIs) (22). Its Technical Assistance Facility 
(TAF) is funded primarily by “the European Commission and managed by the International Fund 
for Agricultural Development (IFAD). The TAF is co-sponsored by the Italian Development 
Corporation, United Nations Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO) and the Alliance for a 
Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA)” (AAFTAF, 2016). CDC is the UK’s Development Finance 
Institution (DFI), owned by the UK Government. Deutsche Bank AG holds 1.27 % (23). 
In addition, development banks from Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands, together with the 
PPP-fund EIAB issued a loan of USD 49 million in December 2015. In total, institutional investors 
control 77.7 % of Feronia (Feronia, 2015). Although a corporate entity at first sight, this complex 
structure poses questions in terms of human rights compliance of the mentioned states. This 
creates a peculiar situation where one of the biggest palm oil players in Africa (based on its land 
pool) is owned and mainly controlled by DFIs, with eleven nations (24) involved in the case (USA, 
Canada, Germany, Spain, France, Belgium, The Netherlands, Cayman Islands, Mauritius, UK, RD 
Congo). This complex ‘multilayeredness’ can be seen as a possibly characteristic case of land grabs 
that are even more pervasive than previously assumed. Based on this case, it is more adequate to 
talk about investment webs rather than investment chains. As a result, attributing responsibilities 
for human rights violations to each of the countries involved becomes a substantive challenge for 
those in charge of determining accountability and providing remedies (including parliamentary, 
quasi-judicial and judicial mechanisms). It also hampers the advocacy work of CSOs, grass roots 
communities and their advocates seeking justice. Clapp (2013) refers to this as the ‘distancing of 
accountability.’  
21 The legitimacy of those land claims are contested by local communities, as well as Congolese and international NGOs 
(GRAIN, 2015).  
22 Including: USA (OPIC), France (AFD/ FISEA), Spain (AECID) and African development Banks (AfDB, DBSA, BOAD and 
EBID).  
23 Information Bloomberg database; for details see also Figure 4 and related footnote. 
24 Multilateral banks and the financers of the Technical Assistance Facility of AAF (especially EC and Italy) are excluded 
from this list. 
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Source: Own elaboration, based on available information (25) 
The DWS data, as well as the Feronia case, show that a reference to databases like the Land Matrix 
has its limits, and is not sufficient to identify EU actors as it would not immediately and directly 
reveal obvious links between Feronia and EU actors – despite the fact that (a) EU actors (either 
directly or through AAF) are majority shareholders (owners) of Feronia Inc., and (b) a loan by 
development banks is linked to distinct obligations of the related states. This leads to a distancing 
of accountability (Clapp 2013), and makes it more complex to find adequate policy responses 
targeting EU private and financial investors. For the scope of this study and the data presented 
above, this also means that the involvement of EU corporate and financial entities in land grabbing 
outside the EU is even more impressive than the numbers discussed above suggest. 
25 The following aspects must be considered: (1) The data are taken from different sources from different years. The 
figure might thus not reflect the exact situation as of today. However, this does not impede the purpose of the figure, 
which is to exemplify the complex investment webs surrounding land grabs. (2) CDC shares are summarized from shares 
and “benders”, an instrument that can convert loans to shares. (3) Feronia’s website mentions that due to negative 
perceptions, the Feronia entity in the Cayman Islands entered into voluntary liquidation. During an informational 
meeting with Belgian NGOs, Feronia and BIO mentioned that Feronia would now register in Belgium. 
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3.4 EU actors and five key land grabbing mechanisms 
The ways in which EU corporate and financial entities involved in land grabbing may be implicated 
in a variety of possible human rights abuses are manifold. A land deal may involve diverse actors, 
i.e. EU and non-EU, financial and corporate, private and public, which are in turn linked to each 
other in a variety of ways. These entities act in specific contexts and may be linked to the EU in 
different ways. In order for the EU and EU MS (26) to address the human rights impacts of land 
grabbing by European corporate and financial entities, it is thus essential to understand the 
mechanisms through which these entities are involved in land grabbing. This is relevant because 
different mechanisms point to different measures that have to be taken into account by the EU 
and MS in order to comply with their human rights obligations. Understanding the mechanisms 
can contribute to specifying the (institutional bases of) human rights obligations – namely, 
"respect, protect, fulfil" – at play. These five mechanisms are now discussed in detail, alongside an 
illustrative case for each. 
(I) EU-based private companies involved in land grabbing through various forms of land 
deals: In this type of mechanism, a company that has its headquarters or substantial business 
activity (or that of its controlling company) in one EU MS, is involved in a land grab and possible 
human rights abuses. The company can be involved in a land deal at different points of the 
investment chain/web. It can be a financial institution or company that is involved in the financing 
of a land deal (shareholder or loan), or a company that is involved in the operational 
implementation of a given investment project (coordinating or exercising), or a main client of the 
produced goods. In some cases, the operations on the ground are managed and/or carried out by 
a locally registered company, usually a subsidiary of the EU based company (the subsidiary may 
have other shareholders), but business operations are coordinated from the company’s 
headquarter or parent company.  
The land may have been acquired by the local company or by the EU-based company through 
purchase, lease or concession. It may have been acquired from communities, private landowners, 
or the state of the host country. In the context of large-scale land deals, there is usually the 
involvement of a state authority or agency. The EU-based company may benefit from support by 
its home country, through intervention by the embassy or, in the context of support to land 
acquisitions via development cooperation projects. In these cases, it is up to the EU and MS to 
regulate business enterprises – and sanction them – where they are in a position to do. For 
instance, where the corporation, or its parent/controlling company, has its centre of activity or 
registered or domiciled, or has its main place of business or substantive business activities in the 
country concerned; and to ensure access to justice and adequate remedy by victims of human 
rights abuses. The Luxembourg-based company SOCFIN is an illustrative case (see Box 4). 
26 As will be explained in detail in section 4.2, both EU Member States and the EU have concomitant human rights 
obligations that require them to respect, protect and fulfill human rights in the context of land grabbing in third 
countries. Member States’ obligations extend to their actions and omissions when acting within/through the EU, and 
complement the international obligations the organization itself has. They must take steps to ensure that the 
organization acts in compliance with these obligations. See Maastricht Principles 15 and 16, elaborated in De Schutter et 
al. pp. 23-26.  
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Box 4: The case of the Luxembourg-based company SOCFIN 
SOCFIN (Société Financière des Caoutchoucs) is an agro-industrial group specialized in oil palm 
and rubber plantations. The SOCFIN group is a very complex structure of cross investments and 
shareholdings. Financial holdings of the group are based in Luxemburg; operational companies 
are based in Luxemburg, Belgium and Switzerland; and subsidiaries for the management of the 
plantations are established in a dozen Sub-Saharan and Southeast Asian countries (SOCFIN, 2016). 
Although SOCFIN is a very old company with its first operations dating back to the Belgian Congo, 
the company has experienced a significant expansion of its operations in recent years, benefiting 
from the growing world demand of oil palm for industrial food and biofuels (27).  
As of end 2014, SOCFIN was managing 181 000 ha of plantations in Sub-Saharan Africa and 
Southeast Asia (+20 % since 2011) (28). SOCFIN largely relies on self-financing and commercial 
loans for the development of its operations, although it has on several occasions benefited from 
financial and technical support of DFIs like the International Finance Corporation (IFC) of the World 
Bank Group or the German DEG. It has also benefited from political and technical support from 
investment promotion agencies, which were supported by the European Commission. For 
example, in Sierra Leone, SOCFIN acquired its farmland through the Sierra Leone Investment and 
Export Promotion Agency (SLIEPA), which was decisive in identifying the area for the land 
investment and in facilitating the lease agreement between the company and national authorities. 
Despite SOCFIN’s membership to RSPO (Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil) and its publicity 
around CSR (Corporate Social Responsibility) projects, several reports from NGOs and international 
organisations have demonstrated severe environmental (Greenpeace, 2016) social and human 
rights impacts (UN, 2006; FIDH, 2011; Oakland Institute, 2012) of SOCFIN’s land investments. In 
different countries this has led to land conflicts, social unrest and criminalisation of local leaders 
(FIDH, 2016). Since 2010, a complaint has been submitted to 3 National Contact Points (NCP) by 
several NGOs, for the OECD Guidelines for multinational enterprises for a case in Cameroon. 
Despite the elaboration of an action plan and several attempts of mediation, the NCPs deplored 
the lack of collaboration from SOCFIN, which has impeded the institution of “adequate solutions 
for the workers and neighbouring populations” (Point de Contact National Belgique, 2015).   
(II) Finance capital companies from the EU involved in land grabbing: Financialisation of land, 
agriculture and the food system has been a key element of the contemporary global resource rush 
(see Fairbairn, 2014; Isakson, 2014; Clapp, 2014). Finance capital companies are of a diverse nature 
and include institutions such as banks, brokerage companies, insurances, financial services, 
pension funds, hedge funds, investment firms and venture capital funds. There is a clear trend of 
finance capital companies being increasingly involved in land deals since the beginning of the 
financial crisis and the food price spike in 2007-2008, as land became a target for financial capital 
investors who needed to find diversified investment areas as a rampart against investment areas 
that have become unstable due to the financial crisis. Clear profits could be reaped due to the 
overall rise of land and commodity prices. Financial actors may not always be very visible in a land 
deal, as they may be financing land grabs indirectly (e.g. when banks provide credit to companies 
27 The import of oil palm for biofuels in the EU has increased by 365 % from 2006–2012 (Gerasimchuk and Yam Koh, 
2013). 
28 This represents only a small part of the land controlled by SOCFIN, as only 45 % of their concession is currently planted 
(SOCFIN, 2016).  
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involved in land deals, or when hedge funds and private equity firms buy stakes in overseas 
companies that control land) (FOE, 2012). 
Major financial capital company players with regard to land grabbing are pension funds. At the 
end of 2014, total private pension assets in the 34 OECD countries were valued at 38 trillion USD 
and managed mainly by pension funds (OECD, 2015, p. 7). Pension funds are the main financing 
vehicle for private pension plans, with 25.2 trillion USD of assets under management, which 
represented 66.8 % of total private pension assets at the end of 2014 (ibid.). They are either public 
or private funds and, hence, regulated under respectively public or private sector law in the 
corresponding countries. In many cases, however, and to some extent similarly to development 
finance institutions, pension funds are often constructed in a way that makes it difficult to clearly 
distinguish between public and private fund. Public pension funds are under direct public control 
and must therefore, as a public body, avoid contributing to human rights infringements 
domestically and extraterritorially (29). As for private pension funds or funds that are of a more 
embroiled construction, EU Member States have the obligation to regulate them in order to avoid 
that their funding contributes to human rights abuses abroad, and ensuring effective remedy in 
case of abuses. The Dutch private pension fund ABP is an illustrative case (see Box 5). 
Box 5: The case of Dutch private pension fund ABP 
The Dutch private Stichting Pensioenfonds ABP, one of the world’s largest pension funds, was 
involved in a land grab in Niassa province in the north of Mozambique. Mozambican company 
Chikweti Forests of Niassa (hereafter referred to as Chikweti) began operating in Niassa in 2005, 
acquiring around 45 000 hectares of land in the province and subsequently setting up pine and 
eucalyptus plantations (30). The company is a subsidiary of Global Solidarity Forest Fund (GSFF), a 
Sweden-based investment fund. When the tree plantations were established in Niassa, investors 
from different countries stood behind GSFF, including the Dutch pension fund ABP as major 
shareholder (54.5 % of the shares). 
ABP was also part of a group of institutional investors that launched a set of ‘Principles for 
Responsible Investment in Farmland,’ or ‘Farmland Principles’ in September 2011, with the stated 
objective of “improving the sustainability, transparency and accountability of investments in 
farmland.” However, from the outset, Chikweti’s operations have had severe impacts on the 
enjoyment of human rights by peasant communities in the project area, whose most important 
source of livelihood is family agriculture. Local people complained about the loss of farmland, 
because tree plantations were set up on lands that were previously used for food production. 
Native forests, which provided additional source of income and food, were cut down to make way 
for plantations. While Chikweti had announced that it would provide 3 000 jobs, by 2012 only 900 
people were employed. Of those who had jobs, many of the contracts turned out to be short-term, 
seasonal work coinciding with the agricultural season, so workers had to neglect their fields during 
this important time of the year. Work in the tree plantations is highly intense, with long working 
hours and low pay. A World Bank report on Land Grabbing states that the Mozambican minimum 
wage is “insufficient to compensate for lost livelihoods” (Deininger and Byerlee, 2011, p. 65). 
29 See for example CESCR, 2013, in which the Committee recommends, “that the State party ensures that investments by 
the Norges Bank Investment Management in foreign companies operating in third countries are subject to a 
comprehensive human rights impact assessment (prior to and during the investment)”. 
30 According to the new owner of Chikweti, the Norwegian forestry company Green Resources, it currently operates 
17 000 hectares of tree plantations in Niassa. 
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Workers reported that they did not receive any benefits other than their salary and there were 
repeated conflicts about delayed payment and non-payment of workers due to absence for health 
reasons. 
The Mozambican Land Law of 1997 guarantees peasant families access to and use of their lands. 
According to this law, consultation with the community is needed, even if a company has a 
concession from the national government for use of community land. However, this process was 
not effectively carried out in the case of the tree plantations established, making it difficult to 
assess to what extent, on what basis, and under what conditions lands have been ceded to GSFF. 
Communities complained that their views were not properly heard. An investigation by the 
Mozambican government in 2010 confirmed the complaints of the local population, finding that 
Chikweti was, at the time, occupying 32 000 hectares of land illegally, without the required land 
title. However, the governments involved, including the home countries of the investors, took no 
adequate or effective measures. Some of the investors behind Chikweti acknowledged that the 
investment project had not met the requirements of their investment policies and claim that they 
have taken measures to address the complaints made by affected communities, mostly through 
community development projects in the context of corporate social responsibility (31). However, 
affected communities and CSOs from the project area voiced complaints about the project’s 
negative impacts on the enjoyment of human rights (FIAN, 2012; and information based on 
research from 2015 by the Mozambican peasant union, UNAC).   
(III) Land grabbing via public-private partnerships: Generally speaking, a public–private 
partnership (PPP) is an agreement between a public sector authority and a private party, which is 
funded and operated through a partnership of one or more governments and one or more private 
sector companies. The International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) defines PPPs as 
“collaborative mechanisms in which public organizations and private entities share resources, 
knowledge, and risks in order to achieve more efficiency in the production and delivery of 
products and services” (Hartwich et al., 2008, p. vii). In the context of land deals, PPPs often involve 
development cooperation agencies or public funds that invest in investment funds, or companies 
involved in land deals. In other cases, the public sector ensures an environment that facilitates land 
acquisitions and subsequent business activities by private corporations through specific policy 
interventions (see, for instance, the New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition in Box 2, as well 
as below).  
PPPs are presented by proponents as “win-win affairs” since, in theory, they make it possible to 
profit from the capacities and resources of private entities and shift some of the risk of service 
provision to them while anchoring accountability solidly in the public sector. In reality, however, 
PPPs blur the lines between public and private actors and mix up their respective roles and 
responsibilities. In the context of PPPs, public goods are increasingly seen as private goods or 
market commodities and they thus entail the risk that the state will abdicate its public 
responsibilities and human rights obligations, with important implications for human rights 
accountability. Indeed, accountability tends to drop out of the picture while corporations manage 
to evade the bulk of the risks involved in agricultural investment by pushing governments to twist 
rules and regulations to their advantage. The problems regarding human rights accountability also 
31 This includes Green Resources, the Norwegian company that acquired GSFF and its subsidiary Chikweti in 2014, which 
publishes regular Environmental and Social Impact Reports. 
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specifically refer to the reduced ability of affected people to claim their rights, especially in cases of 
abuses. 
States and state institutions involved in PPPs related to land deals have obligations to respect and 
protect human rights in as much as they are directly involved in such deals. This includes prior 
assessment, with public participation, of the risks and potential impacts of the activities within the 
partnership, on the enjoyment of human rights. The results of this assessment must be made 
public and must inform the measures that states will adopt to prevent violations or ensure their 
cessation as well as to ensure effective remedies (see chapter 4.2 and annex 4). States also have the 
obligation to protect affected people from impairments of human rights by the companies 
involved in PPPs. The Luxembourg-based African Agricultural Trade and Investment Fund (AATIF) 
is an illustrative case (see Box 6). 
Box 6: Luxembourg-based African Agricultural Trade and Investment Fund 
Chobe Agrivision Company Ltd. is a commercial farming company in Zambia owned by Mauritius 
based investment firm Africa Agrivision (formerly Chayton Africa). In 2009, the company signed an 
Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement with the Government of Zambia, including tax 
breaks. The overall plan of Chayton is to aggregate 100 000 hectares of land in Zambia and 
neighbouring countries like Botswana. In 2014, Chayton had acquired seven farms in Zambia 
totalling 16 916 hectares. Research points to land related conflicts around the Mkushi farm block 
due to a surge of commercial farming activities. In at least one estate, there exists a longstanding 
land conflict. Despite promising 1 639 jobs, in 2015 Chobe employed just 165 workers, of which 
135 were permanent staff (AATIF, 2015). Since the company took over existing farms, most of these 
jobs already existed and can hardly be presented as new jobs created by the investment injection. 
Rather, the takeover of existing large farms was accompanied by job losses as a result of 
mechanisation. 
In August 2011, the African Agricultural Trade and Investment Fund (AATIF) invested 10 Million 
USD in Chobe Agrivision via Africa Agrivision (then Chayton Africa). The AATIF is an “innovative 
public-private financing structure” (AATIF, 2015) based in Luxembourg and set up by the German 
Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ and its financial assistance branch, KfW 
Development Bank) in cooperation with Deutsche Bank AG. The Fund’s stated mission “is to realize 
the potential of Africa’s agricultural production, manufacturing, service provision and trade for the 
benefit of the poor” (AATIF, 2012). Today the fund has a volume of USD 141 million (major 
shareholders in million USD: 62 BMZ, 26 KfW, 26 DB and 19 religious institutions). It is expected 
that the returns of the fund will be at a high single-digit level. Because of a cascading fund 
arrangement (via A, B and C shares) loss of profits will first hit BMZ, then KfW and in the end 
Deutsche Bank and the other investors. Deutsche Bank manages this fund. In October 2012 the 
Norwegian Investment Fund for Developing Countries (Norfund, owned by the Norwegian 
Government) acquired 21 % of Africa Agrivision for 10 Million USD (Hands off the Land Alliance, 
2013).  
(IV) EU Development Finance involved in land grabbing: Development Finance Institutions 
(DFIs) are important actors in land grabbing, namely as financiers of land deals and investment 
projects. DFIs are specialised development banks that are usually majority owned by national 
governments and contribute to the implementation of the latter’s foreign development and co-
operation policy. However, information on the activities of DFIs is not easily available to 
parliaments and the broader public. DFIs invest their own capital and may source additional 
capital from national or international development funds. They also may benefit from government 
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guarantees, which ensure their credit-worthiness. DFIs can thus raise large amounts of funds on 
the international capital markets and provide loans or use equity on very competitive terms – 
frequently on par with commercial banks. The scale of private sector financing from International 
Finance Institutions (IFIs) and European DFIs has increased dramatically: in 2010, external 
investments exceeded USD 40 billion, and were expected to exceed USD 100 billion by 2015 
(APRODEV, 2013). This trend, sometimes referred to as “financial deepening”, is part of an on-going 
process of financialisation (i.e. the increasing importance of financial markets, financial motives, 
financial institutions and financial elites in the operation of the economy) (Bretton Woods Project, 
2014). 
The involvement of DFIs in land deals can take different forms: either they give loans to 
companies, private investors or their projects, they give guarantees or they are involved as 
shareholders (equity participation) within projects, or enter into joint ventures. In some cases, 
involvement of different DFIs can result in the majority of a company’s shares being in the hands of 
DFIs (see Box 3 for an example). Although European DFIs usually have internal guidelines or claim 
to follow the IFC performance standards to their investments as safeguards in order to ensure that 
they are not involved in land grabs, a large number of reported land grabs and related human 
rights abuses and violations involve one or several European DFIs.  
It has to be noted that DFIs increasingly invest in financial institutions, as part of an approach that 
sees the private financial sector as a development actor and bolsters it with public resources. Some 
European DFIs invest around half of their total portfolios in financial intermediaries, making it 
extremely difficult to know where this money is then used, thus raising huge problems of 
accountability (32). While DFIs are financial actors, their position as a link between public and 
private actors and, often, being majority owned and controlled by states, implies some specificities 
regarding human rights obligations. While – as with financial and corporate entities in general – 
human rights obligations comprise the regulation by EU and/or EU MS in order to protect the 
human rights of people in third countries, EU MS also have a respect obligation, where DFIs are 
directly linked to states as well as public resources and, thus, to public regulation (33). The case of 
the private-sector branch of the German Bank for Development, DEG, is illustrative of this (see Box 
7). 
32 An example is the German DEG who invests 44.6 % in financial intermediaries, along with the World Bank’s 62 % (FIAN 
Deutschland, 2014, p. 7).  
33 Maastricht Principles on Extraterritorial Obligations of States in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (2011), 
principle 12(a); International Law Commission, Report of the Fifty-Third Session, Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts, A/56/10 (2001), arts. 5, 8; Concluding Observations of the Committee on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights, Germany, E/C.12/DEU/CO/5 (2011), para. 10, 11. See also chapter 4.2 and annex 4. 
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Box 7: The case of the private sector branch of the German Bank for Development 
In January 2013, the private-sector branch of the German Bank for Development (DEG), announced 
that it would invest 25 million euros in the Paraguay Agricultural Corporation (PAYCO) (DEG, 
2013) (34). According to PAYCO, DEG holds 15.8 % of the shares of the company. Rioforte, an 
international private equity firm based in Luxembourg, holds the remaining 84.2 %. According to 
information provided by DEG, it has negotiated an environmental and social plan with the 
company that should give insight about how human rights risks are assessed. This plan is, 
however, classified as confidential under the investment agreement. By referring to this 
agreement, DEG has repeatedly refused to make this information available, including under the 
German freedom of information law. 
PAYCO manages 135 000 hectares of land in Paraguay, on which the company produces cereals, 
soy and plantation wood. A part of the land is used for cattle ranching and another part of it is also 
declared as a natural reserve. The context regarding land in Paraguay is highly sensitive: Paraguay 
is the country with one of the highest concentrations of land ownership worldwide (35). According 
to the 2008 agriculture census, 2.6 % of landowners hold 85.5 % of Paraguay’s land, while 91.4 % of 
small farmers hold only 6 % of the agricultural land. The UN Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (CESCR) highlighted this fact as being problematic in the context of human rights 
(CESCR, 2008, paras. 12 (b) and 18). Over the last 23 years, the number of undernourished persons 
increased by a staggering 69.9 % in Paraguay, which makes the country the third most affected by 
hunger in Latin America and the Caribbean (FAO, 2012, p. 30). In the context of the high 
percentage of poverty of the rural population (48.9 % of the population lived in poverty in 2010 
and 32.4 % lived in conditions of extreme poverty), combined with extreme levels of land 
concentration, the Paraguayan state’s failure to enact agrarian reform constitutes a violation of its 
obligation to ensure the human right to food (FIAN et al., 2014). In addition, about 20 % of 
Paraguay’s total land area is considered as so-called tierras malhabidas, or "ill-gotten lands", which 
were acquired under problematic circumstances during the dictatorship of Alfredo Stroessner. This 
fact poses additional human rights issues in the context of land acquisitions. 
Accordingly, agrarian reform and access to land is the main demand by landless peasants. Conflicts 
between rural communities (including Indigenous communities) and large landowners in the 
country are very violent and characterized by a strong imbalance of power between 
farmers/indigenous groups and large landowners. In addition to the overall situation regarding 
land in Paraguay, which makes land investments highly problematic, parts of the land controlled 
by PAYCO are claimed by indigenous and peasant communities. Local people have complained 
about unselective sprayings of agro-toxics and resulting health problems in several of the 
company’s holdings. Some of PAYCO’s operations are carried out in the Chaco, an environmentally 
highly fragile region, which has the world’s highest deforestation rate. According to statements 
made by the company, PAYCO further aims to expand its operations (FIAN Deutschland, 2014).  
States are under an obligation to create an enabling international environment for human rights 
(Maastricht Principle 29, UN Charter art. 56, UDHR art. 28). In not providing for adequate regulation 
of its investors in a sensitive land context, such as the one found in Paraguay, Germany is not living 
up to its obligation with regard to creating such an environment.  
34 PAYCO was then called PAC.   
35 Gini Coefficient of 0.94 according to UNDP.   
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(V) EU companies involved in land grabbing through EU policies and gaining control 
through the supply chain linked to land grabs: EU policies, laws and regulations have a 
substantive impact on land-related human rights issues abroad and therefore are critical when it 
comes to compliance with the obligation to create an enabling international environment for 
human rights (see chapter 4.2). These policies and regulations include trade and investment 
agreements, agriculture and development policies, and energy and bio-economy policies – to 
name a few (36). Thus, the EU must not only be analysed in its role as “home state” where concrete 
actors of land grabbing are based, but also with regard to the manner in which it contributes to 
(facilitates/aids) land grabbing through its domestic policies and the international agreements that 
it is part of, as well as through its capacity to influence non state actors’ conduct through these 
policies and laws when acting abroad (see chapter 4.2). The following policies are particularly 
relevant to the context of land grabbing (see also Cotula, 2014): 
Investment policies: Since the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009, the conclusion of 
international investment agreements has become, alongside with the common commercial policy 
(international trade), an exclusive EU competence (TFEU, 2007). Contrary to States’ obligation to 
create an international environment conducive to the universal realisation of human rights, the 
current international investment regime as promoted by the EU and EU member states 
contributes, among other serious human rights concerns, to an enabling international 
environment for land grabbing (TNI 2015, Concord, 2015a). One central concern is the imbalance 
between the protection offered to foreign investors and the protection offered to communities 
negatively affected by foreign investments. Investment treaties are by nature one-sided and only 
investors can invoke the treaty protections and put claims forward against states, even suing them 
through the use of ISDS mechanisms (37). No similar mechanism exists at the international level for 
individuals or communities affected by land grabbing to hold foreign investors accountable. A 
second concern relates to the curtailing of public policy space and interference with measures 
aimed at the progressive realization of human rights. In recent years the number of investment 
arbitration cases targeting public interest regulations has increased dramatically causing a 
“regulatory chill” well beyond the states implicated. As shown by the Palmital and Sawhoyamaxa 
cases in Paraguay, investment treaties (in this case between Germany and Paraguay) can present 
significant barriers to implementing measures such as redistributive land reforms that address past 
injustices and play a vital role in the realization of land related human rights (see Both Ends, 2015, 
for a summary of the cases; see also TNI, 2015).  
Development policies: Like the external trade policy, the development cooperation policy of the 
EU falls within its external actions and is hence subject to a wide range of human rights 
obligations (38) (see chapter 4.2). The stated primary objective of the EU development cooperation 
policy is “the reduction and, in the long term, the eradication of poverty” (TFEU). The TFEU 
emphasises that the EU will guarantee the coherence of this overall objective with its other 
policies and that the EU and EU MS “shall comply with the commitments and take account of the 
objectives they have approved in the context of the United Nations and other competent 
36 While MS policies are also relevant in this regard, a detailed list of relevant MS polices would go beyond the scope of 
this study. Here, we will showcase relevant examples of EU policies.    
37 Which are decided by private arbitrators outside the official court system in inequitable proceedings, as states, within 
the scope of Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) mechanisms, may at no point sue a company for the latter’s 
human rights abuses. See CEO and TNI, 2012. 
38 See UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 19: The right to social security (Art. 
9 of the Covenant), E/C.12/GC/19 (2008), para. 82. See also chapter 4.2 and annex 4. 
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international organisations” (TFEU, art. 208(2)). The EU further has committed to Policy Coherence 
for Development (PCD) since 2005, which is applied to 12 policy areas of the EU. However, a study 
commissioned by the Committee on Development of the European Parliament concluded that 
policy coherence between development objectives, on the one hand, and several other EU policies 
(i.e. trade policy, migration policy, climate change and agricultural policy), on the other hand, 
remains unsatisfactory (Sarisoy Guerin et al., 2011, pp. 33-37). 
In recent years, the EU has increasingly shifted towards a private sector-led approach to 
development, arguing that private sector engagement and funding is an indispensable 
complement to EU development assistance (EC, 2014). However, so-called “partnerships” with the 
corporate sector carry major risks, in particular when conflicts of interest are not adequately 
addressed (39). Without going deep into the discussion, which would exceed the scope of this 
study, such partnerships tend to shift the focus towards interventions that are beneficial/profitable 
to the corporations involved, thereby diverting attention from the root causes and the 
strengthening of rights of the supposed beneficiaries. At times, they end up promoting precisely 
the actions that are at the heart of the problem (e.g., liberalization of markets for land and seeds, 
commodification of food and promotion of the agro-industry). A study conducted by family 
farmers’ organizations in Africa concluded that resources are targeted towards industrial 
agriculture and that PPPs are not an appropriate instrument for supporting the family farms that 
are the foundation of African food security and sovereignty (EAFF, ROPPA and PROPAC, 2013). 
The private sector focus of the EU’s development cooperation has also been criticized in the 
context of the New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition (New Alliance), a PPP initiative 
launched at the G8 Summit in 2012 (see Box 2). The New Alliance includes all G8 members, plus 
the EU as founding members (New Alliance, 2014; see also McKeon, 2014). Presented as an 
initiative to “leverage the potential of private investment” to support development goals and “help 
lift 50 million people out of poverty in Africa by 2022” (New Alliance, 2016), a growing number of 
studies and statements have heavily criticised the New Alliance, pointing out to fundamental 
human rights concerns regarding the process of elaboration of the New Alliance country 
frameworks as well as its policy commitments, which foremost enable corporations to advance 
their interests, including by facilitating large-scale land deals. At a Hearing on the New Alliance in 
the Committee for Development (DEVE) in the European Parliament in December 2015, 
De Schutter presented an expert study, which raises six major concerns regarding the New 
Alliance, including the fact that within the New Alliance, “speculation over land increases, and so 
does land concentration: foreign investors are mostly interested in developing large-scale 
plantations, that are relatively non-labour-intensive and contribute relatively little to rural 
development; and conflicts over land increase as land becomes a valuable asset” (De Schutter, 
2015). The human rights impacts of the New Alliance, including those related to land deals, have 
led to strong calls, especially by African peasant organisations, to stop the implementation of the 
New Alliance frameworks, including calls upon the involved donor countries to withdraw support 
to the initiative (Call of Civil Society Organizations, 2015; CSM, 2013; AFSA et al., 2013; Letter from 
African Civil Society, 2012). 
Bioenergy policies and the EU Renewable Energy Directive (RED): The RED aims at reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions through the significant scaling up of forms of energy classed as 
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renewable, including agrofuels. It states that the incentives it lays out encourage increased 
production of biofuels and bioliquids worldwide. Indeed, agrofuels have been identified early on 
as one of the main drivers of land grabbing. As stated by Cotula, “biofuels have played an 
important role in the land rush” and recent studies have found that oilseed crops for agrofuels are 
one of the most important drivers underlying renewed interest in land deals, especially in Africa 
(Cotula, 2014, p. 11; Diop et al., 2013). European companies and financial investors have been 
important actors in land deals for agrofuel production (Cotula, 2014, pp. 13 and 30).  
Civil society organisations have repeatedly pointed to the direct link between land grabbing and 
documented the human rights impacts and the EU biofuel policy (and its biofuels mandates in 
particular), as well as the involvement of European companies as important actors in land 
grabbing in this context (see EuropAfrica, 2011), urging the EU to drop its biofuels target and to 
exclude bioenergy from the next EU Renewable Energy Directive (see, for example, NOAH et al., 
2015). Different institutions, including the World Bank, echoed these reports and the links between 
the EU bioenergy policy and land deals were also confirmed by a study commissioned by the 
European Commission in 2013 (Cotula, 2014, pp. 30-31).  
However, since the RED was adopted in 2009 and entered into force in 2010, the EU and EU MS 
have not taken concrete and direct measures to ensure that their biofuel policy does not engender 
negative social, environmental and human rights impacts (see chapter 5.1). This is even more 
concerning when we view the political economy of some of the key feedstocks used for agrofuels, 
and as 'flex crops and commodities' (40).  
Trade policies, including the EU’s Everything But Arms Initiative (EBA): According to the TFEU 
(Art. 3), the common commercial policy – i.e. external trade policy – is an exclusive competence of 
the European Union (41). The TFEU further establishes that the EU’s common commercial policies 
have to be conducted in the context of the principles and objectives of the Union's external action, 
which include human rights. The most recent EU trade and investment strategy, “Trade for all. 
Towards a more responsible trade and investment policy” (EC, 2015), specifies that one of the aims 
of the EU is “to ensure that economic growth goes hand in hand with social justice, respect for 
human rights, high labour and environmental standards, and health and safety protection” (EC, 
2015, p. 22).  
However, several studies point to conflicts between EU trade policy and the EU’s human rights 
obligations, including with regard to the human right to food (Paasch, 2011; Concord, 2015b). With 
regard to land grabbing, a central concern relates to the incentives created through EU trade 
agreements for large-scale land acquisitions in countries outside the EU to produce crops for the 
EU market. Currently, there are no adequate mechanisms in place to assess and monitor EU trade 
agreements with regard to their potential and actual human rights effects and adjust them to 
ensure human rights compliance. Sustainable impact assessments (SIAs) were first developed in 
1999 within the scope of the WTO Doha Development Agenda (DDA). However, human rights 
were not integrated there, neither were they in 2006 when DG Trade published its Handbook for 
Trade Sustainable Impact Assessment (European Commission, 2006). Human rights have been 
40 See Borras et al. (2016b), Alonso-Fradejas et al. (2016), McKay et al. (2016), Oliveira and Schneider (2016) and Gillon 
(2016). 
41 Trade agreements are negotiated by the European Commission, in collaboration with national governments and the 
European Parliament and within the scope of WTO rules. 
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taken into account in EU-led SIAs only from 2012 onwards (42), and they are also part of SIAs under 
the Better Regulation agenda (adopted by the Commission on 19 May 2015), among others by 
issuing specific Guidelines on the analysis of human rights impacts in impact assessments for 
trade-related policy initiatives (EC, 2015a). Yet, potential human rights impacts are still not being 
considered in a systematic fashion as required by human rights standards (see Bürgi Bonanomi, 
2013) (43).  
While the revision of the SIA handbook from 2006 and inclusion of human rights as one 
assessment criteria is an important step of the EU towards complying with its human rights 
obligations in the context of international trade agreements, the draft revised handbook still has 
major shortcomings that need to be addressed in order to be effective in preventing negative 
human rights impacts, in particular as concerns participation of civil society and the ability of 
results to effectively influence negotiations (44). The EU still does not systematically carry out ex 
ante human rights impact assessments (HRIA) that are independent; include human rights experts 
and broad consultations with civil society. This has largely been criticised by CSOs and the EU 
ombudsperson (European Ombudsman, 2016; FIDH, 2015). 
While most bilateral trade agreements of the EU include human rights clauses, the standard 
human rights clause as currently applied is inadequate for ensuring human rights compliance of 
the EU’s trade agreements (Bartels 2014; Hachet 2015). The focus, rather than being on avoiding 
negative human rights impacts of the agreements in the partnering countries, as required by the 
EU’s extraterritorial obligations under the TEU and the TFEU, tends to be on the other countries’ 
compliance with their human rights obligations.  
An illustrative example of how trade policies can act as a driver/trigger for land grabs is the EU’s 
Everything But Arms Initiative (EBA). The initiative was adopted in 2001 by the EU with the stated 
intention of promoting development in the world’s least developed countries (LDCs) by granting 
duty-free and quota-free access to the European market. Market access for sugar was fully 
liberalized by October 2009, which is especially relevant as the EU guarantees a minimum sugar 
price higher than the world market price (Equitable Cambodia et al., 2013, p. 20). The EU has 
claimed that the EBA has had positive effects but the case of Cambodia shows that this initiative 
has been a driver of land grabbing and human rights violations in Cambodia (see Box 8). 
42 The first time that an EU-led SIA took into account potential human rights impacts was within the scope of the “Trade 
Sustainability Impact Assessment in support of negotiations of a DCFTA between the EU and Georgia and the Republic 
of Moldavia” (Ecorys and Case 2012). 
43 The former Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, Olivier De Schutter has developed guidelines for States on how to 
conduct HRIAs in the context of trade and investment agreements, see De Shutter, 2011.  
44 See for example comments by CIDSE in the context of the consultation conducted by the European Commission on 
the updated handbook (EC, 2015b). 
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Box 8: ‘Everything But Arms’ EU policy and land grabbing in Cambodia 
EBA has been a key driver of land grabbing for sugar cane plantations in Cambodia. According to 
the companies involved in sugar cane plantations, the EU initiative EBA has been a primary 
motivator for their land acquisitions and operations in Cambodia (Equitable Cambodia et al., 2013, 
p. 22). And while sugar cane holding were negligible before EBA became effective, today around 
100 000 hectares of land are under agro-industrial sugar cane production. Consequently, all 
exports have been progressively directed towards the EU. 
Cambodian sugar exports to the EU: 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Total sugar exports to 
EU, in thousands of 
dollars 
28 51 3 851 13 229 10 614 51 615 
Sugar exports to EU 
compared to total sugar 
exports, in percentage 
6.5 % 30 % 90 % 94 % 100 % - 
Sugar exports to EU, in 
tons 
- - 10 000 22 500 15 501 64 917 
Since 2010 affected communities, national and international CSOs called on the European 
Commission to investigate the human rights impact of its EBA (45). As the Commission rejected 
these calls (46), NGOs did their own comprehensive human rights impact assessment, concluding 
that some 10 000 people were negatively affected by the expansion of sugar cane plantations 
(Equitable Cambodia et al., 2013, pp. 25-29). The serious and systematic human violations 
documented included forced evictions, loss of land and water and criminalisation of human rights 
defenders. While Thai sugar TNCs and national Cambodian elites are the dominant actors in this 
sugar cane expansion, the German Deutsche Bank Group, through its fund managers DWS held 
10.9 Million Euro equity shares in the involved Thai Sugar Company Khon Kaen Sugar (KSL) via 
three different funds (FIAN, 2010, p. 11). In 2013, 200 affected villagers from Koh Kong – with 
support from NGOs – also filed a complaint at the UK High Court of Justice against the UK-based 
company Tate & Lyle Sugars (sold in October 2010 to the US sugar titan ASR Group) which signed 
contracts with a KSL subsidiary to purchase its output from Cambodia (47).  
The Thai Human Rights Commission investigated the case of the two sugar concessions in Koh 
Kong province related to KSL and stated in its final report that “the impact of these human rights 
violations are a direct responsibility of Khon Kaen Sugar” (NHRC, 2015). The human rights impact 
assessment on the sugar cases referred to above highlighted that in Koh Kong Province alone, 456 
45 Demands have first been formally raised in a letter from 30 August 2010 to the European Union Delegation to 
Cambodia. This was followed-up by meetings with them and a first letter on 7 January 2011 directly asking Trade 
Commissioner De Gucht for an investigation.  
46 In early 2015, the EU delegation to Cambodia, together with the Government, launched an audit process to assess all 
claims of people affected by sugar cane concessions. This process is contested among the affected communities and its 
outcomes are highly unclear.  
47 Claim submitted on 28 March 2013. Defense and Counterclaim submitted on 2 May 2013. See: Business and Human 
Rights Resource Centre (2015).  
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families owned land on the concessions granted for sugar cane plantations. They were not 
informed or consulted about the project. Villagers came under attack in 2006 when demolition 
workers with bulldozers and excavators, accompanied by armed police and military police, arrived 
without warning and began clearing their land and crops. Most of the farmers lost all their 
vegetable land holdings. The two community forests, totalling 1 800 ha were completely 
destroyed. Over the following months, land clearances continued, with villagers injured or 
gunshot wounded during evictions. One community activist was found axe murdered after 
documenting and actively protesting the evictions. Only 23 families were compensated, ranging 
between USD 75 and 750. Local communities also have less access to water as local resources have 
been blocked, polluted, covered over with earth or excessively used for irrigation of the new 
plantations.  
What the discussion on EU policies, and specifically RED and EBA, partly shows is that the already 
complicated task of tracking human rights footprints in a global commodity chain has become 
even more complex with the rise of 'flex crops and commodities' – crops that have multiple, 
flexible and interchangeable/substitutable uses: food, feed, fuel, industrial and commercial uses 
because a commodity can always be claimed to be agrofuel or not, food or not (Borras et al., 
2016b). Tracking via a single global commodity chain has become limited, as what has emerged is 
more of a chain of chains – a web – that requires more complex approaches to (global) 
governance, but where the principles of human rights have become even more relevant (48). Thus, 
in the case of oil palm and the widespread land grabs occurring from Colombia to Indonesia, from 
Myanmar to Nigeria, the debate about the complicity of the EU RED policy and human rights 
violations in these places remains highly relevant, and the documentation of human rights abuses 
so far calls for the adoption of a precautionary approach. The EBA story is indicative of the 
complexity of ongoing processes and mechanisms: involving EBA and a flex crop, in the case of 
sugarcane in Cambodia.   
The explained complexities allow concluding that existing human rights obligations, in order to 
achieve their original aim, have to be interpreted in good faith, in a way that allows the protection 
gaps (produced by the new realities described) to be addressed. It is necessary that states, 
individually or as part of inter-governmental and supra-national organizations, are proactive in 
strictly complying with their human rights obligations and accepting more progressive, effective 
and pro persona interpretations. They should also develop new required standards and 
mechanisms to comply with their obligation to create an enabling environment for human rights 
and to ensure monitoring, accountability and effective remedy mechanisms to all rights holders 
under their jurisdiction, even if this extends beyond their territorial borders. The following section 
will look closer into the links between land grabbing and human rights. 
48 See Borras et al. (2016b); Alonso-Fradejas et al. (2016); McKay et al. (2016). 
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4 Land grabbing and the human rights obligations of the 
EU and EU Member States 
4.1 Impacts of land grabbing on affected populations 
This section looks at the impacts of land deals, including those involving European corporate and 
financial entities, on affected people and communities. It is necessary to clearly analyse the 
impacts of land grabbing from a human rights perspective as human rights provide a clear 
framework to guide all competent bodies of the EU to formulate the appropriate policy responses. 
As stated by Cotula, there is a “substantial and growing body of scholarly writing on ‘land 
grabbing’ and human rights” (Cotula, 2014) and a large number of case studies done by civil 
society organizations. The human rights impacts of land grabbing have also been addressed “in 
the work of (UN) Special Rapporteurs; and in sessions of UN bodies that receive and comment on 
periodic reports submitted by states on the implementation of human rights treaties” (ibid.). 
Within the scope of this study, it is not possible to do an in-depth analysis of all cases of land deals 
that involve European corporate and financial entities. However, a large number of these cases are 
well documented, which enables us to provide an overview of the impacts of land deals on the 
human rights of affected people and communities.  
4.1.1 Loss of access to and control over land and other natural resources 
The most frequent and most immediate impact of land deals are land conflicts as well as the loss of 
access to and control over land and land-related resources by local people and communities. This 
loss does not always imply the loss of land rights, especially understood as formalised private 
property rights. In fact, access to and control over land is, in many countries, governed, managed 
and used through informal or customary systems that are not recognised or effectively protected 
by formal legal systems. Indeed, in the context of land grabbing, “many people […] lose land 
without being formally expropriated” (Cotula, 2014, p. 15). Moreover, loss of land does not 
necessarily occur through illegal practices or through the use of violence, but may happen in more 
subtle or indirect ways. However, displacements – often violent – and forced evictions take place 
in many cases of land deals, including those involving European corporate and financial entities. 
An emblematic case is the Neumann Kaffee Gruppe case (see Box 1) where about 4 000 people in 
Mubende District, Uganda, were violently evicted from their land of 2 524 hectares on which they 
had been living for years. Another more recent example directly implicates the EU's 'Everything But 
Arms' (EBA) policy (see Box 8), and is equally iconic case that involves the forcible eviction of 
hundreds of villagers in Cambodia in 2006 and 2010-2012, paving the way for the establishment of 
sugarcane plantation. Several villagers were injured or wounded by gunshots during eviction and 
as they protested against the destruction of their vegetable land holdings and community forests 
(49).  
The second aspect to be highlighted is that the loss of land often refers, at least partly, to areas 
that are considered as “non-used,” “fallow” or “vacant” lands, but which are used by communities 
for different purposes, such as grazing lands and transit routes used by herders or forests for food 
and wood supply, among others. Although some of these uses are at times described as being 
“secondary uses” of land, they are essential for the livelihoods of many communities. These areas 
49 See McKay et al. (2016); Schneider (2011); Equitable Cambodia et al. (2013). 
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are often publicly owned lands and forests that are collectively used and managed, sometimes 
referred to as “commons”. In some regions, communities also apply practices that include rotation 
of cultivated areas so that lands that lay fallow for a while are still part of their agricultural lands – 
and access to them is lost when land deals happen.  
An example is the case of tree plantations in Niassa, Mozambique, which involves several 
European corporate and financial actors, and where land conflicts merged as tree plantations were 
established on lands that lay fallow and were considered as not used by the company Chikweti 
Forests of Niassa (see Box 5). Land deals and the establishment of projects frequently also limit the 
freedom of movement of local people because access to or transfer through acquired lands is 
denied and/or the establishment of projects cuts off roads and paths used by local people for 
different purposes. Finally, even where communities and households do not lose all of their land, 
also the partial loss of land has severe impacts on the enjoyment of their human rights. 
4.1.2 The human rights impacts of land grabbing 
Land and related natural resources are the condition for the realisation of several human rights, 
including the right to adequate food and nutrition, the right to water and sanitation, the right to 
health, the right to housing, the right to work, the right not to be deprived of one’s means of 
subsistence and the right to taking part in cultural life (50). Women’s rights, including the rights of 
rural women (CEDAW, art. 14 and General Recommendation No. 34 on the Rights of Rural Women), 
and the rights of indigenous peoples (UNDRIP, 2007) are closely linked to secure, stable and 
equitable access to land and related resources. Regarding the human right to food (UDHR, art. 25; 
ICESCR, art. 11; CEDAW, art. 12; CDC, art. 24; CESCR GC 12) many land deals directly destroy – 
entirely or partly – the possibility of people to produce or collect their own food and ensure 
adequate nutrition. This also applies to water bodies used as fishing grounds and to forest areas 
that provide fruit and are used for hunting. Increased food and nutrition insecurity and 
impairments of the right to food and nutrition are the most frequent complaints of affected 
people in the context of land deals. In many cases, agricultural products are also a main source of 
income, which allows families to complement their diets and to satisfy other basic needs.  
Moreover, several land deals jeopardise the human right to housing (UDHR, art. 25; ICESCR, art. 11; 
CESCR GCs 4 and 7) of communities, especially where families or entire communities are displaced 
or evicted. Especially in cases where land deals have lead displacements and forced evictions, 
violence by public or private security forces has led to impairments of the right to the enjoyment 
of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health (UDHR, art. 25; ICESCR, art. 12). 
These are most concrete in the cases of the EBA-inspired sugar plantations in Cambodia (Box 5) 
and the Neumann Kaffee Gruppe case in Mubende District, Uganda (Box 1). Given the close 
spiritual and cultural ties of many communities with the land they live on, land deals frequently 
also impair people’s human right to take part in cultural life (ICESCR, art. 15(1)). There are 
numerous cases where, for example, cultural and spiritual sites of local communities, including 
cemeteries, have been bulldozed, or face the threat of being bulldozed, by investors, as in the case 
of ProCana in Mozambique (Borras et al., 2011). 
50 So far, international human rights treaty law has recognized land as a human right for indigenous and tribal peoples 
(ILO Convention No. 169 and UNDRIP). However, an ever-increasing body of soft law instruments and 
recommendations/observations by UN Human Rights treaty bodies recognises the inextricable connection between 
land and human rights, and there are strong voices calling for a clear human rights perspective to land in the 
international human rights framework. See De Schutter (2010).  
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People’s enjoyment of the human right to water (ICESCR, art. 11; UN General Assembly resolution 
64/292; CESCR GC 15; CEDAW, art. 14(2); CRC, arts. 20, 26, 29, 46) is impaired by land deals when 
they lose the access to safe drinking water and water sources. These may be situated inside an 
acquired area or the roads/paths to access water are cut off by an investment project. In other 
cases, the availability of water is diminished or destroyed (for example due to extraction of water 
and/or deviation of water streams in the context of investment projects) and/or the water quality 
is diminished due to pollution). Again, the EBA-inspired sugar plantations in Cambodia (Box 5) are 
an illustrative example, where local water resources of the population have been blocked, 
polluted, covered over with earth or excessively used for irrigation of the new plantations.  
Another example is the Marlin mine in Guatemala, which involves Swedish pension funds owning 
shares in the Canadian mining company Goldcorp (which runs the mine through its subsidiary 
Montana Exploradora), which is extracting up to 45 000 litres per hour, according to the company, 
leading to water shortages affecting the local population (FIAN Sweden, 2016; FIAN, 2010). 
Pollution of land, water and air, as well as environmental impacts of investment projects in 
general, also impairs the enjoyment of the human right to health. Deforestation or the cutting 
down of trees and forests is often one of the first actions undertaken after land acquisitions, in 
order to prepare the land for the investment project. Pollution is also an important impact in the 
context of mining projects through the massive use of chemicals, as in the already mentioned case 
of the Marlin mine in Guatemala. Large-scale agricultural projects almost always establish 
monocultures. The intensive use of pesticides, which contaminate land, water (water bodies as 
well as underground water) and the air, reduce and even destroy biodiversity.  
Many land deals, including those involving EU actors, also lead to impairments to the human right 
to work (ICESCR, art.6) which entitles everyone to freely chose or accept an activity that allows him 
or her to earn a living. On the one hand, this right is impaired in cases where this activity is 
agriculture, or any other activity that requires secure and stable access to land but where people 
are deprived of this access. On the other hand, jobs created in the context of land deals do often 
do not provide for alternative livelihoods. While “jobs are often presented as a – or even the – main 
local economic benefit created by large-scale land deals” (Cotula, 2014), when looking into 
concrete cases, reality turns out to be different. In many cases, the number of jobs created in the 
context of land deals has been considerably below what was promised and communities 
frequently complain about low wages, long working days, temporary or seasonal employment 
contracts and poor working conditions in general. See, again, the case of tree plantations in Niassa, 
Mozambique (Box 5) and the case of Chobe Agrivision in Zambia, backed by the AATIF (Box 6). The 
Niassa case is also illustrative of the fact that, where only some members of communities are 
employed and others not, division and conflicts arise in the communities, which affect peace and 
freedom.  
Another example is the Singapore-based palm oil company Wilmar in Nigeria, which is financed by 
EU finance institutions such as HSBC (UK), BNP Paribas (France), Rabobank (Netherlands), DZ Bank 
(Germany) – all giving loans -- ABP (Netherlands), Pensioenfonds Zorg & Welzijn (Netherlands), 
Anima (Italy), Deutsche Bank (Germany), Aviva (UK), Helaba (Germany) – all shareholders. The 
company created much less jobs than announced and, according to reports based on testimonies 
by affected people, pays less than minimum wage (Friends of the Earth US/Environmental Rights 
Action-Friends of the Earth Nigeria, 2015a and 2015b). Instead of contributing to development – as 
claimed by many promoters and defenders of large-scale land acquisitions – land deals thus often 
lead to adverse incorporation of people and communities into increasingly globalised value 
chains. In many cases, they end up in situations of dependency from one company and complete 
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loss of autonomy, or even infringements against their right to self-determination. Several 
examples also reveal that different forms of outgrower schemes (such as contract farming) are not 
necessarily beneficial for communities – despite often being promoted as an alternative to land 
acquisitions that leads to so-called “win-win situations.” The example of Sweden-based company 
EcoEnergy’s activities in the context of the G7 New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition in 
Africa is one illustrative example (see Box 2) (51).  
Land grabbing also has severe impacts on the civil and political rights of affected people. As stated 
by Cotula, “At root, ‘land grabbing’ is an issue of democratic governance – who makes decisions, 
whose voices are heard, and what space is available for dissent” (Cotula, 2013, p.21). The issue of 
lack of consultation of local people is indeed a major issue in many land deals (Vermeulen and 
Cotula, 2010). In most documented land deals, affected communities complain about not having 
been appropriately involved in decisions about land deals that affect them, directly or indirectly. 
Secrecy surrounds many land deals and people are poorly, if at all, informed about them.  
The situation becomes even worse when it comes to involving affected people in decisions on 
land deals. Companies and private investors often claim that consultations have been carried out 
and that local communities have given consent. Yet, there are many cases where major problems 
exist regarding the way consultations have been carried out and documented, including 
agreements that may have been achieved. Most of the time, there is little evidence to assert that 
affected people actually have the possibility to refuse the establishment of a project. Previously 
mentioned cases of EU financed palm oil plantations by Wilmar in Nigeria, the case of tree 
plantations in Niassa, Mozambique as well as Sweden-based EcoEnergy’s investment in Bagamoyo, 
Tanzania, illustrate this (see Box 2). All of these issues impair the right of people to take part in the 
conduct of public affairs (ICCPR, art. 25), the right to access to information (ICCPR, art. 19), the right 
to self-determination of peoples and the freedom of expression (ICCPR, art. 19). It is also a breach 
of the principle of free, prior and informed consent (FPIC).  
In this context, it is important to underline that in some cases, communities, or some community 
members, may have agreed to land deals or investment projects, but it then turns out that 
commitments made by companies and investors, e.g. regarding the creation of jobs, are not 
fulfilled, or expected development outcomes do not materialize as promised. Also resettlement 
and compensation may not be complied with or not in the conditions that guarantee that 
communities continue to enjoy their human rights. In these cases, also the right to an effective 
remedy (UDHR, art. 8; ICCPR, arts 2(3), 14(1)) is impaired when there are no effective accountability 
and liability mechanisms in place, or if these are not accessible to affected people. Effective, 
impartial and accessible remedy mechanisms are also a condition for redress where people have 
been dispossessed without proper compensation as well as for reparation where people’s rights 
have been impaired. Reparation is also a major issue in many cases where investment projects 
related to land have failed and projects are shut down.  
Indeed, in cases where human rights abuses and violations have occurred, communities face major 
difficulties in obtaining adequate and just reparation. Damage done by the respective project and 
adverse human rights impacts often continue to affect people even after the end of a project and 
projects usually do not foresee redress and reparation for abuses and violations suffered. This can 
be seen partly in the case of ProCana in Mozambique where the company stopped operations in 




Land Grabbing and Human Rights: 
The Involvement of European Corporate and Financial Entities in Land Grabbing Outside the EU 
2012, but only after bulldozing a large part of the affected communities and creating so much 
social and political disturbance and displacement in the communities. This problematic situation 
did not stop or were not put back in their prior condition even after the company stopped 
operation and left. Instead, the Mozambican government has been busy looking for a new investor 
(FIAN, 2010).  
Another illustrative example is Addax Bioenergy’s sugar plantations in Makeni District, Sierra 
Leone. Addax is a subsidiary of the Swiss company Addax and Oryx Group (AOG), which produces 
sugarcane on 10 000 hectares for bio-ethanol for the export to Europe and for domestic use, as 
well as ‘green’ electricity from a biomass-fuelled plant. The project has faced resistance from local 
people from the outset and is supported by a diverse group of development finance institutions, 
which have become co-funders and/or co-shareholders, lending significant funds to the project. 
EU actors include the German DEG, UK-based Emerging Africa Infrastructure Fund (EAIF), the 
Netherlands Development Finance Company (FMO, equity partner), the Belgian Development 
Bank (BIO), Swedfund International AB (equity partner) and, until 2014, the Austrian Development 
Agency (ADA) (Addax Bioenergy, 2016).  
In 2015, Addax announced that it had scaled down operations in Makeni for economic reasons, 
saying that it will conduct a review of all options for the future. The impact of the scale down of the 
project caught communities by surprise and has dramatic impacts on them, since the project has 
made a part of the population dependent after losing their economic autonomy when it arrived. 
According to local CSOs, the main consequences for the communities are disruption of farming 
activities, food production is expected to be on the lowest level, most workers (mainly youth) were 
laid off and received only partial salary, many local petty traders are now jobless (52). Reports from 
local CSOs point out that the scale down also left the communities in uncertainty about their 
future livelihoods as it is unclear what will happen if the project will be shut down, including 
regarding the land leased by Addax. The plots where local communities used to grow rice have 
been transformed into circular fields watered by pivot irrigation, and can thus not be easily 
reconverted to former use. 
In 2015, Addax announced that it had scaled down operations in Makeni for economic reasons, 
saying that it will conduct a review of all options for the future. The impact of the scale down of the 
project caught communities by surprise and has dramatic impacts on them. According to local 
CSOs, the main consequences for the communities are disruption of farming activities, food 
production is expected to be on the lowest level, most workers (mainly youth) were laid off and 
received only partial salary, many local petty traders are now jobless. Reports point out that the 
scale down also left the communities in uncertainty about their future livelihoods as it is unclear 
what will happen if the project will be shut down, including regarding the land leased by Addax. 
The plots where local communities used to grow rice have been transformed into circular fields 
watered by pivot irrigation, and can thus not be easily reconverted to former use. 
52 Information from field visits conducted by the Sierra Leone Network on the Right to Food (SiLNoRF) in August 2015. 
39 
 
Policy Department, Directorate-General for External Policies 
 
4.2 Extraterritorial human rights obligations of the EU and EU 
Member States (53) 
The described impacts of land grabbing involving European corporate and financial actors on local 
people and communities relate, directly or indirectly, to the EU and its Member States. The 
European Union and its Member States have obligations under international and European 
(Union) law to respect, protect and fulfil human rights both within the European Union and with 
regard to people living in third countries. Regarding the EU, the entry into force of the Lisbon 
Treaty in 2009 elevated the status of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (EU 
Charter) to primary law and introduced specific human rights obligations, both domestic and 
extraterritorial, into the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (TFEU) (Bartels, 2014).  
Article 3(5) of the TEU requires the EU to “uphold and promote its values” in its relations with the 
wider world. Respect for human rights is one of the foundational values of the EU (54). Article 
21(2b) TEU adds that the EU “shall define and pursue common policies and actions, and shall work 
for a high degree of cooperation in all fields of international relations in order to […] consolidate 
and support democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the principles of international law”. 
These principles and objectives shall moreover be “respected and pursued” in the “development 
and implementation of the different areas of the Union’s external action […] and of the external 
aspects of its other policies” (55).   
In other words, the TEU imposes on the EU obligations to respect, protect (“uphold”) and fulfil 
(“promote” and “pursue”) human rights in its foreign relations and to cooperate to this effect (56). 
Importantly, the treaty establishes that both the EU’s external action, as well as its domestic 
policies with extraterritorial effect must be developed and implemented in line with and in 
pursuance of human rights (57). The TFEU in article 205 reiterates that the EU’s actions on the 
international scene must be guided by, compliant with and pursuant of human rights, among 
other principles and objectives described in the TEU (Annex 4: 1).  
In addition to the obligations imposed by the TEU and TFEU, the EU and its institutions are bound 
by the human rights obligations enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU (EU 
Charter) and must respect the fundamental rights contained in the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR) and derived from the constitutional traditions common to Member States 
which constitute general principles of EU Law under the Lisbon Treaty (58). The EU Charter, which is 
53 This sub-chapter contains an important number of juridical references that are important to show that the statements 
made are based on a legally consolidated basis. In order to guarantee an easy reading of this sub-chapter, all references 
regarding extraterritorial obligations are listed in a separate annex enclosing thematic sections (Annex 4: Legal Sources 
for the Extraterritorial Obligations of the European Union and EU Member States). All in-text references starting with 
“(ANNEX 4: […])” are explicitly referred to and explained in Annex 4. E.g., “ANNEX 4: 1” refers to the first juridical 
reference mentioned under Annex 4). Seen the importance of ETOs and in to clarify the basis for statements made in this 
chapter, all 69 juridical references are listed in Annex 4. 
54 Article 2 of the TEU states: “The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, 
equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities.” 
55 Article 21, paragraph 3.  
56 Different views persist as to whether article 3(5) entails also protect obligations (see Bartels 2014, Cannizzaro 2015, and 
Bürgi 2014). The EU is, however, in any case bound by the ECHR (TEU art. 6) and therefore, alongside EU MS, bound by 
extraterritorial protect obligations. See: Kirshner, 2015, p. 24; Augenstein, 2010, p. 16, para. 39; Douglas-Scott, 2011. 
57 For a comprehensive analysis, see Bartels 2014(a) and 2014(b). 
58 TEU Article 6, para. 1 and 3. 
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binding for both EU institutions and Member States when applying EU law, contains no 
jurisdictional or territorial conditions. Past pronouncements by the European Commission and 
Parliament have supported the extraterritorial scope of the Charter’s provisions (Annex 4: 2-3). 
Similarly, in regard to EU MS, the protect obligations under the ECHR as well as the duty to provide 
access to judicial remedies for victims of human rights violations (article 6) have been interpreted 
broadly by the European Court on Human Rights, with jurisdiction extending to situations of both 
extraterritorial conduct and domestic measures with extraterritorial impacts (59).   
The human rights obligations of the EU complement and reinforce the obligations of its Member 
States (Annex 4: 4-8). All Member States of the EU have ratified the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (ICCPR), the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR), the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 
(CEDAW), the Convention on the Rights of the Child, as well as several ILO Conventions. In doing 
so, they have agreed to be bound by the obligations established under these treaties in relation to 
the rights protected. These include the rights mentioned in the previous chapter that are 
intimately linked to land and natural resources. Also the Guidelines on the Responsible 
Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests, which were adopted by the UN Committee 
on World Food Security in May 2012 (including all EU MS), provide an authoritative international 
interpretation and guidance on how to implement existing binding international human rights 
obligations related to land and natural resources (FAO, 2012). 
International human rights law imposes both domestic and extraterritorial obligations on States 
(Annex 4: 9-17). The latter have been summarized in the Maastricht Principles on States’ 
Extraterritorial Obligations in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ETOP) (Annex 4: 18). 
The Maastricht Principles are based on underlying principles of international law and constitute an 
international expert opinion adopted by international law experts from all regions of the world, 
including current and former members of international human rights treaty bodies, regional 
human rights bodies, former and current special rapporteurs of the Human Rights Council and 
recognized scholars (Maastricht Principles, pp. 3-4). These principles are a source of international 
law, in line with articles 38 c) and d) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. 
Furthermore, rather than establishing new elements of international law, the principles clarify 
extraterritorial obligations of States on the basis of standing international law, as explained in the 
Commentary to the Maastricht Principles, and are therefore a useful and valid tool when analysing 
the extraterritorial obligations of States (De Schutter et al., 2012).  
Importantly, EU Member States remain bound by their international human rights obligations 
when transferring competences to the EU (Annex 4: 4). They must thus take all reasonable steps to 
ensure that the EU acts in compliance with these obligations and must object to measures that 
could result in human rights infringements, including in the context of land grabbing. They cannot 
hide behind the EU but remain fully responsible for their acts and omissions within the 
organisation. In this sense, the human rights obligations applicable to EU Member States also 
apply by extension to the EU (for the areas in which the EU has competence) (OHCHR, 2015).     
Both the EU and EU Member States must, firstly, avoid causing harm in other countries (Annex 4: 
19-20). They must take concrete measures to prevent their domestic and international policies and 
actions from directly or indirectly contributing to land grabbing and interfering with the 
59 See Augenstein, 2010, pp. 23-25. See also Kirshner 2015, pp. 24-25. See Ilascu and Others v. Moldova and Russia, 
48787/99, Council of Europe: European Court of Human Rights, 8 July 2004, para. 314. 
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enjoyment of human rights (Annex 4: 19, 21-25). Direct interference refers to conduct that directly 
impairs the human rights of persons abroad. With regard to the mechanisms of EU actors’ 
involvement in land grabbing, this refers particularly to mechanism (iv), as DFIs are public entities. 
It also refers to mechanism (iii) in as much as states, or their institutions, engage in PPPs that 
contribute to land grabbing related human rights violations (60). 
Indirect interference encompasses conduct by the EU and EU MS that reduces the ability of 
another state to comply with its human rights obligations, or that assists or puts pressure on that 
state to breach its obligations, including its obligations to protect communities against land 
grabbing (Annex 4: 22, 26). Examples include international investment and trade agreements that 
reduce the policy space of states to implement measures required to progressively realise 
economic, social and cultural rights (such as redistributive land reforms), or force them to adopt 
retrogressive measures (61). Avoiding harm through indirect interference refers particularly to 
mechanisms (v) and may also apply to (iii), where PPPs contribute to creating an environment that 
is detrimental to the realisation of human rights, such as in the context of the G7 New Alliance for 
Food Security and Nutrition in Africa, which promote land acquisitions by private and institutional 
investors. 
One step to avoid harm in other countries is the conduct of prior human rights impact assessments 
(HRIAs) and the monitoring of the extraterritorial human rights impacts of policies, laws and 
practices, in particular where the risk of adverse impacts is high (Annex 4: 27) (62). Such 
assessments must be conducted under public participation, and their results be made public and 
inform measures to prevent, cease, and remedy the harm (Annex 4: 28-33).  
The obligation to avoid harm also requires the EU and MS to elaborate, interpret and apply 
international agreements, including in the area of trade, investment, finance, development 
cooperation, and climate change, in a manner consistent with their human rights obligations 
(Annex 4: 34-35). The EU and EU MS should ensure, including through regular review of relevant 
policies and agreements, not only that these do not negatively affect human rights in other 
countries, but also that they are conducive to the universal realisation of human rights (Annex 4: 
36-40).  
When engaging in international cooperation, including development cooperation, the EU and EU 
MS must ensure that their policies and practices respect human rights principles and priorities, 
including that they prioritise the rights of marginalised and disadvantaged population groups 
(Annex 4: 41-42, 25), observe the right to participation and self-determination, and avoid 
retrogressive measures (Annex 4: 43).  
Secondly, the extraterritorial human rights obligations of EU MS, and to some extent of the EU, 
place obligations on them to establish the necessary regulatory mechanisms to ensure that private 
corporations, including transnational corporations, and other non-state actors that they are in a 
position to regulate do not impair the enjoyment of human rights in other countries, including 
60 The need for states to ensure that land investments made or promoted by them are consistent with their human rights 
obligations is also highlighted by paras. 3.2 and 12.15 of the Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of 
Land, Fisheries and Forests. 
61 For an analysis on how international investment rules affect States’ ability to address land grabbing, see TNI, 2015b; 
Both Ends, 2015.   
62 The need for independent impact assessments in the context of land investments is also highlighted by para. 12.10 of 
the Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests. 
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through land grabbing (Annex 4: 44-49, 25, 50-52). This means concretely that Member States 
must adopt and enforce measures to protect human rights from abuses by corporations involved 
in land grabbing wherever a corporation has its centre of activity, is registered or domiciled, or has 
its main place of business or substantial business activities, in the State concerned (Annex 4: 53-54, 
46). Moreover, the EU and MS should use their influence, for example through public procurement 
and diplomacy, to protect human rights (Annex 4: 55-56). EU MS must, moreover, cooperate in 
regulating and holding TNCs and other non-State actors accountable for human rights abuses and 
ensuring effective remedies for those affected (Annex 4: 57, 50-54) (63). The obligation to regulate 
corporate and financial actors refers to the mechanisms (i) and (ii) outlined above, as well as 
mechanisms (iii) and (iv) in particular, in as much as DFIs are directly linked to states and, thus, 
state regulation, and PPPs involved in land deals as they directly involve public institutions which, 
consequently, are in a position to directly influence acts and omissions of non-state actors (Annex 
4: 58). 
Adequate and effective regulation of the extraterritorial activities of corporate and financial 
entities remains a crucial issue in order to address land grabbing by EU actors. In this regard, the 
UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, adopted by the UN Human Rights Council in 
2011 and considered by the EU as the authoritative framework for addressing human rights abuses 
of businesses, have considerable shortcomings. These Guiding Principles are non-binding and 
voluntary, and thus compliance depends solely on the goodwill of businesses to abide by the 
Principles and the willingness of individual States to regulate them to respect human rights. 
Regarding protect obligations vis-à-vis people affected by operations of business enterprises, they 
recognize “the State duty to protect human rights” in their first pillar but a gap persists when it 
comes to legal accountability of business actors.  
Thirdly, the human rights obligations of EU MS and the EU require them to establish accountability 
mechanisms in order to ensure that individuals and communities affected by land grabbing have 
access to effective remedies, including judicial remedies where necessary (Annex 4: 59-69, 46). 
They must cooperate with other States to this effect. Access to effective remedy relates to all 
mechanisms of EU actors’ involvement in land grabbing mentioned above.  
Moral-duty-based and non-judicial grievance mechanisms have in many cases proven to be 
ineffective addressing human rights abuses, and businesses indeed use them to strategically avoid 
victims from taking legal action, for example, by including legal waivers in which victims accepting 
private non-judicial remedies cannot initiate legal proceedings (Feeney, 2016). An example is 
Acacia Mining, a British subsidiary of Barrick Gold Corporation, whose remedy programme for the 
victims of excessive use of violence by the mine’s security personnel has failed to meet its 
obligations and required complainants to waive their right to seek judicial remedy in order to 
access the remedy package (Mining Watch, 2016).  
State-based judicial remedy is thus crucial and human rights obligations call for EU MS to advance 
their judicial system, opening it up and guaranteeing full access to civil, administrative and 
criminal effective justice systems to all victims of corporate human rights abuses, wherever they 
occur, including in the context of land grabbing. The EU should support such a process within its 
competence. Such a process needs to take into account the needs and experiences of victims. In 
63 The obligation of home states to ensure that businesses are not involved in abuse of human rights and legitimate 
tenure rights and to provide effective juridical remedies is also highlighted by para. 3.2 of the Guidelines on the 
Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests. 
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addition to ensuring access to remedies at the national level, EU MS should develop judicial 
remedies at the international level. Current efforts in the context of the UN Human Rights Council 
to develop an international binding instrument on the regulation of transnational corporations 
and other business enterprises present a crucial step in this direction, which the EU and EU MS 
should support. So far, however, the EU has not been playing a constructive role in this process, 
but has rather tried to obstruct its advancement during the opening session of the 
Intergovernmental Working Group (IGWG) established by UN Human Rights Council Resolution 
26/9 (see FIAN et al. 2015). This despite the fact that the EP has called “for the establishment of a 
legally binding framework for companies, including transnational corporations with a grievance 
mechanism” in a recent resolution (EP, 2015b, par. 35) and has called specifically upon the EU and 
its MS to engage in the current process at the Human Rights Council (EP, 2015a, par. 32). 
Under the Brussels I Regulation, national courts of EU MS are mandated to provide extraterritorial 
jurisdiction in civil liability cases where the defendants are domiciled in the forum state (Skinner et 
Al. 2013). However, jurisdiction for cases that relate to the activities of foreign subsidiaries of EU 
companies is not regulated at EU level but by the law of MS, which have different approaches on 
the issue (ibid.). Removing the existing obstacles to EU MS’ courts is of major relevance for 
addressing the human rights abuses arising from land grabbing by European corporate and 
financial entities outside the EU. The jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights has 
already suggested that article 6 of the European Convention of Human Rights supports 
extraterritorial jurisdiction and some EU MS have drawn on article 6 to assume extraterritorial 
jurisdiction in cases involving companies (Kirshner, 2015).   
4.3 EU human rights policy  
The EU has human rights policies and guidelines in which it details the steps to implement its 
human rights obligations. Indeed, the European Union describes itself ‘as a global force for human 
rights’. The EU has a Special Representative (EUSR) for Human Rights, who works closely with the 
EEAS and whose flexible mandate is based on the EU’s objectives regarding human rights (as set 
out in particular by the TEU, the EU Strategic Framework on Human Rights and Democracy and the 
EU Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy) and whose role is to contribute to better 
coherence and consistency of the EU’s policies and actions in the area of protection and 
promotion of human rights, among others by enhancing the effectiveness and visibility of EU 
human rights policy.  
Among the existing EU human rights instruments, the EU Action Plan on Human Rights and 
Democracy 2015-2019 (henceforth EU Action Plan) has to be highlighted in this context (64). It 
reaffirms that the EU “will […] ensure a comprehensive human rights approach to preventing and 
addressing conflicts and crises, and further mainstream human rights in the external aspects of EU 
policies in order to ensure better policy coherence, in particular in the fields of migration, trade 
and investment, development cooperation and counter terrorism.” Commitments from this Action 
Plan are relevant in the context of land grabbing be EU actors, especially in the context of the 
mechanisms described above (65). 
64 This Action Plan’s purpose is to continue implementing the EU Strategic Framework on Human Rights and Democracy 
2012-2014. 
65 The Action Plan mentions land grabbing in point 17c. 
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Regarding trade and investment policies, the EU has committed to develop a robust and 
methodologically sound approach to the analysis of human rights impacts of trade and 
investment agreements, in ex ante impact assessments, sustainability impact assessments and ex 
post evaluations, as well as explore ways to extend the existing quantitative analysis in assessing 
the impact of trade and investment initiatives on human rights (66) EU MS committed to strive to 
include in new or revised Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) provisions related to the respect and 
fulfilment of human rights, in line with those inserted in agreements negotiated at EU level. Finally, 
the EU aims at systematically including in EU trade and investment agreements the respect of 
internationally recognised principles and guidelines on Corporate Social Responsibility, such as 
those contained in the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, the UN Global Compact, the 
UN Guiding principles on business and human rights (UNGPs), the ILO Tripartite Declaration of 
Principles concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy, and ISO 26000. Concerning 
points iii) and iv), and as mentioned before, the EU so far relies exclusively on voluntary measures 
and guidelines when it comes to corporate accountability in cases of corporate crimes and 
offences against human rights, instead of human rights accountability and liability of EU 
companies, as their human rights obligations would require, in order to close existing gaps in 
protection, which especially affect the most marginalized and disadvantaged groups of the 
population. 
Concerning development policy, the EU Action Plan foresees a rights-based approach to 
development that contains, amongst others, the stated objectives of implementing the EU 
commitment to move towards a rights based approach to development cooperation, 
encompassing all human rights by pursuing its full concrete integration into all EU development 
instruments and activities. Also EU MS have committed to will work towards increasingly 
integrating a human rights based approach in their development cooperation policies. The EU will 
further explore the possibility to further implement a human rights based approach into non-
development related external activities. 
While the EU Action Plan, thus, takes up some of the issues that are relevant to address adverse 
human rights impacts in the context of its acts and omissions, the provisions will likely not be 
sufficient in order to address them adequately and close existing gaps regarding the respect, 
protection and fulfilment of human rights. 
4.4 Violence against human rights defenders working on land 
issues  
4.4.1 Land rights defenders at risk 
Human rights violations and abuses occur also especially in cases where communities and people 
protest and resist against land grabbing. Several studies and reports clearly reveal that violence 
against land rights defenders has increased over the last years and that this development is 
directly linked to land grabbing and the surge of land deals (OBS, 2016a; UNGA, 2015). Violence 
against human rights defenders (HRDs) working on land and natural resources has thus to be 
considered as a crosscutting issue in the context of land grabs. Several documented cases relate to 
deals that involve European corporate and financial entities. An example are the activities of 
SOCFIN in Sierra Leone whose severe environmental, social and human rights impacts have led to 
66 As mentioned in chapter 3.4 the EU does not systematically carry out human rights impact assessments. 
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land conflicts and resistance, in the context of which local leaders have been criminalised (see Box 
4) (OBS, 2016b). The murder of Berta Cáceres, a Honduran defender of land, environmental and 
indigenous peoples’ rights, as well as of Nelson García is also linked to a project involving EU 
actors. 
Box 9: The murder of Berta Cáceres and Nelson García in the case of the Agua Zarca 
dam construction project (Honduras), a project backed by several EU actors 
This emblematic case gives wide-ranging evidence of the significant criminalisation of and fierce 
violence, including killing, against HRDs in Honduras. The construction of the Agua Zarca dam on Rio 
Gualcarque is situated on the land of the Lenca, an indigenous people in Honduras. Very early on, the 
Lenca people got organised and opposed this project, as it would affect their living conditions in many 
regards. Desiccation of traditional Lenca land was feared as well as an impediment to their customary 
elementary connection with flowing water, amongst many others. According to reports, the Agua 
Zarca dam project has infringed several international human rights standards, such as ILO’s Convention 
169, the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP), the ICESCR, the American 
Convention on Human Rights (ACHR) and the ICCPR (International Rivers et al, 2015). The Civil Council 
of Popular and Indigenous Peoples of Honduras (Consejo Cívico de Organizaciones Populares e 
Indígenas de Honduras, COPINH) was a longstanding opponent of the Agua Zarca project and 
identified it as the probably most symbolic of the nearly 50 megaprojects they have been struggling 
against. As a means of manifest support of this megaproject, the Honduran authorities have strongly 
militarised the region. This resulted in repeated death threats, harassment, criminalisation, sexual 
abuses and even murders of opponents of this project, above all of indigenous people and members of 
COPINH. Berta Cáceres, co-founder and coordinator of COPINH, was murdered on 3 March 2016 in her 
home. Shortly afterwards, Nelson García, another member of COPINH, was killed during an eviction on 
15 March 2016. In 2006, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) had granted 
precautionary measures to protect Ms Cáceres (OAS 2016). Yet, Honduran authorities did not 
implement these, as Ms Cáceres repeatedly claimed (IACHR, 2016). A recent report shows that 
Honduras is the most deadly country per capita to be an environmental activist for the last five years, 
with 111 activists killed between 2002 and 2014, including 12 in 2014 (Global Witness, 2015). 
Several EU actors are involved in the Agua Zarca dam project: Voith GmbH is a German engineering 
company active at global level in different sectors such as raw materials, energy, transport, oil and gas. 
One of its four Group Divisions is the Voith Hydro Holding GmbH and Co. Within the scope of a joint 
venture, the Germany-based technology company Siemens AG is associated with Voith Hydro in the 
hydroelectric dam construction project Agua Zarca in the department of Santa Barbara in Honduras. 
For the construction of the dam, Siemens is to provide turbines and other technical equipment. EU-
based financial actors supporting this project were the national Development Banks FMO from the 
Netherlands and Finnfund from Finland. Next to a USD 24.4 million investment by the Central American 
Bank for Economic Integration (CABEI) in 2012 (Environmental Justice Atlas, 2016), FMO’s and 
Finnfund’s financial support of this project amounted to respectively USD 15 million and USD 5 million 
in 2014 (Bank Track, 2016). Siemens AG and Voith Hydro have repeatedly been informed about the 
serious human rights abuses and violations committed within the scope of this project, and were asked 
to withdraw from the project. Only after the recent killings of Ms Cáceres and Mr García, FMO and 
Finnfund have suspended their support to this project in the course of March 2016.  
The European Parliament very recently adopted a resolution on the situation of HRDs in Honduras, 
referring explicitly to the case and calling upon the EU delegation and Embassies of EU Member States 
in the country "to further step up efforts to engage with human rights defenders currently in danger" 
(European Parliament, 2016). 
Another example is the already described case of Feronia in DRC. Reports on the company’s 
activities, which are financed by several European DFIs (see Box 3), pointed to cases of brutal 
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repression from the security services of the company against opponents to the project, including 
criminalisation of local leaders (RIAO-RDC/GRAIN, 2015; Frontline Defenders, 2015). Resistance 
from local indigenous people and allegations of human rights violations have also accompanied 
the activities of the Marlin mine in Guatemala, which is backed by a Swedish pension fund, from 
the outset in 2005. Since then, multiple attacks as well as intimidation of human rights defenders, 
community representatives, researchers and people connected to the church, who have spoken 
out against the Marlin project have been documented. In the beginning of 2005 as, people tried to 
block the passage of heavy mining equipment headed toward the mine an indigenous farmer, was 
killed and many others were injured in a clash between the protesters and the Guatemalan 
security forces, consisting of members of the army and the police (FIAN and Misereor, 2005).  
Even where EU entities are not directly involved in violence against land rights defenders, they are 
often operating in countries and areas where the general context is characterised by abuses and 
violations of the rights of human rights defenders, and lack of protection for this group. For 
example, several EU actors are involved in operations in Brazil, a country with an extremely difficult 
environment for human rights defenders working on land issues, in particular indigenous peoples. 
In 2014 alone, there were 138 cases of homicides against indigenous peoples in Brazil, 41 cases of 
which against communities of the Guarani-Kaiowá in Mato Grosso do Sul. In the period from 2000 
to 2014, 55 % of all national indigenous homicides occurred against Guarani-Kaiowá in Mato 
Grosso do Sul, amounting to more than 400 cases, i.e. one homicide every 12 days (Conselho 
Indigenista Missionário, 2014). Guarani-Kaiowá communities in Mato Grosso do Sul were even 
attacked right after the UN Special Rapporteur on Indigenous Peoples visited those areas as part of 
her recent official visit to Brazil, in March 2016 (Tauli-Corpuz, 2016).    
Land rights defenders are subject to different forms of violence that include threats to them and 
their families, harassment, illegal surveillance, slander (67), obstacles in the course of their work, 
criminalization, attacks, enforced disappearances, arbitrary arrest and detention as well as killings 
(See Box 9). This impairs their rights to freedom of expression, assembly and association, the right 
to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health, the right to life, 
the right to freedom of movement and the right to liberty and security of person. Given the 
inextricable links between land and human rights, land rights defenders have to be considered as 
human rights defenders. According to the definition of the “Declaration on the Right and 
Responsibility of Individuals, Groups and Organs of Society to Promote and Protect Universally 
Recognized Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms” from 1998 – commonly known as the 
“Declaration on Human Rights Defenders” – HRDs are those individuals, groups and organs of 
society that promote and protect universally recognised human rights and fundamental freedoms. 
The definition does not cover those individuals or groups who commit or propagate violence or 
those who seek to destroy the rights of others (68). Based on this definition, the Observatory for the 
Protection of Human Rights Defenders defines land rights defenders as “the subset group of 
human rights defenders who seek to promote and protect human rights related to land” (OBS, 
2016a).   
67 The term “slander” refers to the denigration of human rights defenders, their work and their reputation by various 
actors who attempt to portray their human rights work negatively. Labels such as “enemies of development”, “enemies 
of the State”, “radicals”, “terrorists”, and “gang members” seek to stigmatize individuals and communities that speak out 
against land deals (OBS, 2014). 
68 This definition is also used by the EU Guidelines on the Protection of Human Rights Defenders (see below). 
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While human rights defenders working on land issues share the characteristics of HRDs, they also 
present some particularities and face specific risks and threats. Generally speaking, land rights 
defenders form a heterogeneous group. They include land users affected by practices or policies 
negatively impacting on their access to land, and who have committed themselves to the 
promotion and protection of the land rights of larger groups (amongst whom leaders or members 
of communities). Particularly in cases where land rights are held collectively they are also often 
defended as such. Thus, land rights defenders can refer to groups from the affected communities 
that organise collectively in order to claim respect for the human rights of one, several or all 
communities. Indeed, as underlined by the former UN Special Representative on Human Rights 
Defenders, “defenders working on land rights often organise themselves in the form of social 
movements. These are usually broad grassroots-based movements with a more horizontal 
organizational structure than for instance most NGOs” (UNHCR, 2007).  
However, land rights defenders can also be professionals who are not personally affected by a land 
conflict but act as allies of those who seek respect for their right to land and related human rights, 
such as representatives and/or members of non-governmental organisations (NGOs), lawyers or 
journalists. Land rights defenders use the same type of activities as those who defend other 
human rights, such as investigation of human rights violations, documented reports, 
communications with national and international bodies, litigation, advocacy at national and 
international levels, peaceful demonstrations, and other forms of protest. However, land rights 
defenders also use specific forms of protest such as the refusal to comply with an eviction order, 
the occupation of a house or piece of land as a symbolic act to oppose eviction or reclaim rights 
(“land occupation”), the blocking of roads or the entrance of a project site, or other forms of direct 
action (OBS, 2014, p. 11).  
Human rights defenders working on land issues further often operate in remote areas, meaning 
that they have more difficult access to justice. They are often disconnected from traditional human 
rights organisations and, as a consequence, also less frequently resorting to international and 
regional protection mechanisms for human rights defenders. In many cases, they are members of 
already marginalised groups, including ethnic minorities. Individuals and communities opposing 
land deals also face risks linked to the existence of significant power imbalances as land conflicts 
often involve high financial stakes. Data indicates that land rights defenders are among the groups 
most exposed to violence. The former UN Special Representative on Human Rights Defenders 
identified defenders working on land rights and natural resources as being “the second most 
vulnerable group when it comes to the danger of being killed because of their activities in the 
defence of human rights” (UNHCR, 2007). A report from 2015 revealed that in 2014 alone over 116 
human rights defenders were killed, reaching an average of more than two a week (see Global 
Witness 2015). The vulnerability of land rights defenders further increases with the rampant 
impunity of crimes committed against them in many countries and the failure of states to hold 
perpetrators accountable, either by their action or their omission. 
Accordingly, the EU Action Plan foresees to step up efforts to protect HRDs, mentioning explicitly 
those working “on issues related to land rights […] including those of indigenous peoples, in the 
context of inter alia 'land grabbing' and climate change” (EU Action Plan, para. 16 b). Also the UN 
Human Rights Council has very recently adopted a landmark resolution on the protection of 
human rights defenders working to promote economic, social and cultural rights, expressing grave 
concern regarding the situation of this group of HRDs specifically and calling for states to take the 
necessary measures to ensure the rights and safety of HRDs, including combatting impunity of 
attacks against them. 
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4.4.2 EU Guidelines on Human Rights Defenders  
The protection of human rights defenders is part of the human rights obligation of any state, 
including the EU and EU MS. Given its dimension and crosscutting nature, particularly in the 
context of land grabbing, it is an issue that requires specific attention by the EU and EU MS. The EU 
has specific Guidelines on Human Rights Defenders, which were adopted in 2004 and updated by 
the EU Foreign Ministers Council in 2008. While the EU Guidelines are not a binding legal 
document, they represent a strong political commitment by EU Member States at ministerial level 
to advancing the work of HRDs in the EU's external relations and provide guidance for the 
European External Action Service’s (EEAS) and EU Missions’ (Embassies and Consulates of EU 
Member States and European Union Delegation) work with HRDs. They provide specific 
recommendations on how EU Missions should proactively play their important role in putting into 
practice the EU's policy towards human rights defenders. The EEAS has set up focal points of 
human rights and democracy within EU delegations that should take up issues related to HRD. In 
some countries, EU missions have elaborated Local Implementation Strategies (LIS) for the EU 
Guidelines on HRDs (as foreseen by para. 11 of these Guidelines).  
In a very recent resolution on the situation of HRDs in Honduras, the European Parliament calls 
upon the EU delegation and Embassies of EU Member States "to further step up efforts to engage 
with human rights defenders currently in danger" (European Parliament, 2016, point 8), a 
recommendation on which the EU and EU MS must be consistent in all countries. In practice, 
however, experience shows that the implementation of these guidelines varies significantly from 
one mission to another and between MS, lastly depending on the political will of the respective 
head of mission or ambassador. Some missions tend to give more importance to the advancement 
of the EU’s or EU MS’ economic interests and their relation with the private sector over their 
human rights obligations. Some missions also proposed to incorporate the participation of 
companies in dialogue processes between a state and affected communities, and even suggest 
that they should be part of mechanisms to protect HRDs from violence caused by the activities of 
companies, proposals that have been rejected by HRDs (Act Alliance et al., 2015). 
The EUSR on Human Rights’ mandate includes enhancing the effectiveness and visibility of EU 
human rights policy regarding HRDs. In addition, the European Instrument for Democracy and 
Human Rights (EIDHR) also has a strong focus on HRDs and provides urgent direct financial or 
material support for human rights defenders at risk through some of the projects it finances. The 
European Parliament can issue “resolutions on cases of breaches of human rights, democracy and 
the rule of law” for cases of human rights violations outside the EU. Although such resolutions do 
not have legal character, they can be a very useful instrument for advocacy efforts related to land 
conflicts (among others), because they explicitly underline the fact that a land conflict situation is a 
human rights issue. 
The listed documents and procedures provide some tools for protection of HRDs by EU and EU MS, 
including in the context of land grabbing. A particular responsibility regarding HRDs arises where 
European corporate and financial entities are involved in land grabbing and related human rights 
abuses. When applying these tools, the EU should avoid any double standards and also undertake 
these crucial steps vis-à-vis ‘powerful’ countries. 
Recently, the EU Commissioner for International Cooperation and Development announced the 
creation of a new European Union Human Rights Defenders Mechanism, which is intended to 
become one of Europe's key tools to assist human rights defenders at high risk, including in 
remote areas, running until 2018. Through the new mechanism, the EU will provide human rights 
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defenders at risk with short-term, medium-term and long-term support, including physical 
protection, legal and medical support, trial and prison monitoring, urgent advocacy and 
relocation, monitoring of their situation, early warning of risks, training on risk prevention and 
security (including digital security), support to national networks, advocacy, lobbying and 
development of strategies to counter restrictions and sanctions imposed on human rights 
defenders by states. A consortium of twelve international Non-Governmental Organisations 
(NGOs) manages this mechanism. While this new tool for the protection of HRDs has to be 
welcomed in principle, it has to be seen to what extent this tool entails the risk of the EU 
dispensing its responsibility under human rights law to NGOs, albeit the fact that the selected 
organisations have longstanding experience and are renowned for their work on HRDs. 
5 The EU’s response to land grabbing  
The issue of land grabbing and its human rights impacts were brought to the attention of the EU – 
both the EU and MS – very early and was also taken up fairly soon by officials. Already in June 2009, 
the then Director-General for aid and development at the European Commission, Stefano 
Manservisi, expressed concern about the trend of foreign investors and countries acquiring large 
tracts of farmland in developing countries to guarantee their own food security, highlighting that 
this trend might pose a risk to developing countries. Land grabbing was also one of the key issues 
evoked at the European Development Days that same year, which were held under the Swedish 
presidency of the EU in October 2009, in order to show that the EU was starting to take the 
problem seriously. Land grabbing was also taken up early at the level of EU MS, by several 
countries, including Germany and France, among others during the UN World Summit on Food 
Security, held in November 2009 (see Graham et al., 2010, pp. 62-64). Still in 2009, the EU re-
activated its Working Group on Land Issues, which, among other topics, discussed land grabbing 
with the intention of developing a common EU position (ibid.) (69). Since then, land issues and land 
grabbing have been regularly addressed by different EU entities in different contexts, which 
represents a major shift after interest in land and rural development had not figured very 
prominently in the development and, even less, human rights discourse. 
It has to be underlined that civil society has been playing an important role in bringing the 
attention of the EU and its MS to land grabbing and its impacts on the human rights of affected 
people. Apart from a growing body of studies and reports on land grabbing in general since 2009, 
some of which also include cases linked to European corporate and financial entities (70), several 
reports analysed specifically the role of the EU-based actors and formulated concrete proposals 
and recommendations to the EU and EU MS to comply with their human rights obligations in this 
regard (71). However, these proposals have not adequately, if at all, been taken into account by the 
relevant EU bodies. In many cases, the EU and EU MS have been particularly hesitant to accept that 
their human rights obligations also apply extraterritorially, including in the context of land 
69 The EU Land Working Group is now part of the Global Donor Working Group on Land, which is part of the Global 
Donor Platform for Rural Development (2016).  
70 For examples of cases involving European corporate and financial entities see chapter 2.3. 
71 One of the earliest examples is a monitoring report submitted to the European Parliament’s DEVE Committee by the 
European NGO confederation for relief and development (CONCORD) on the European Commission’s 2007 
Communication on “Advancing African Agriculture” (AAA). See Graham et al., 2010). 
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grabbing, and that they include the obligation to effectively regulate companies and financial 
actors in order to protect human rights in third countries (72).   
More recently, the EU has, however, given more attention to the issue of land grabbing. Although 
not very prominently, land grabbing is mentioned in the EU Action Plan on Human Rights and 
Democracy 2015-2019, with particular reference to HRDs working on land issues (Point 17 c). The 
European Parliament has also commissioned reports and issued own-initiative opinions on the 
issue, both on land grabbing inside the EU, as well as outside the EU (Cotula, 2014; European 
Economic and Social Committee, 2015; Transnational Institute, 2015). Human rights and land 
grabbing have also been one of the main topics taken up during the 15th EU-NGO Forum on 
Human Rights in December 2013 (which is part of the EIDHR), under the overarching topic of 
accountability. However, the EU must urgently take concrete steps in order to address land 
grabbing and its human rights impacts. 
As it is not possible in the scope of this study to do a comprehensive assessment of the EU’s 
response to land grabbing, what follows are some examples of steps the EU has taken to address 
the issue. The objective is to critically assess experience so far and identify some of the 
shortcomings that persist in order to overcome them. 
5.1 EU biofuel policy and the Renewable Energy Directive   
One example, which illustrates how the EU and MS have been reluctant to adequately address 
land grabbing, is the EU’s biofuel policy and, specifically, the EU Renewable Energy Directive (RED). 
As discussed in chapter 3.4, despite the fact that agrofuels have been identified early on as one of 
the main drivers of land grabbing and European companies and financial investors have been 
important actors in land deals for agrofuel production, the EU and EU MS have resisted to 
fundamentally review the RED and to acknowledge their obligation to address human rights 
impacts (73).  
The arguments brought forward by the Commission to justify this omission are, among others 
(EuropAfrica, 2011) a “win-win” narrative according to which the EU policy would benefit poor 
people in developing countries, by maximizing the benefits for local communities as well as the 
opportunities for business; the claim that land grabbing is first and foremost an issue linked to 
weak governance in the countries concerned and thus an issue that must be tackled by the host 
countries of land deals; the belief that technical innovation (second and third generation biofuels) 
will bring the solution to the problem; the reference to international trade rules under the WTO, 
which would impede actions by the EU; and scepticism (if not refusal to consider it at all) towards 
information provided on the links between the EU biofuels policy and adverse human rights 
impacts in the context of land grabbing. This approach has laid the burden of proof on those 
affected and CSOs to prove that occurred human rights violations are directly linked to agrofuels 
consumed in the EU under the RED. These direct links are extremely difficult to prove in the 
context of prevailing market mechanisms, and this approach does not consider at all the role the 
72 Examples of resistance by EU and EU MS to accept their extraterritorial human rights obligations in land grabbing 
cases involving EU actors are the cases of Germany-based Neumann Kaffee Gruppe’s involvement in a case of eviction in 
Uganda as well as the case of tree plantations in Niassa, Mozambique, involving the Dutch pension fund ABP (see Boxes 
1 and 5). In both cases, German and Dutch officials have denied responsibility to hold the companies accountable as of 
their human rights obligations. 
73 In 2015 new rules came into force, which amend the current legislation on biofuels – including the RED – to reduce the 
risk of indirect land use change. However, the RED as such was not revised.  
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RED has played in triggering land grabs, even in cases where deals have been of a purely 
speculative nature and no significant amounts of biofuels have been imported by the EU (Cotula, 
2014, p. 31). The EU has thus adopted a technical approach to the issue instead of applying the 
precautionary principle in the light of reported human rights abuses and violations. 
Accordingly, much of the discussion around agrofuels and the RED has happened on a very 
technical level. Much of it has focused on indirect land use change (ILUC), a discussion which, itself, 
has focused on the carbon emissions associated with clearing new land and ways of measuring 
them, while neglecting impacts on human rights of affected people (Cotula, 2014, p. 31). The EU 
has constantly denied the need for a revision of the RED, claiming that possible negative side 
effects are sufficiently addressed through a common sustainability scheme that relies on voluntary 
certification standards that are adopted by the European Commission as well as a monitoring 
mechanism, which requires the EC to report regularly to the European Parliament and the Council 
on a number of consequences of the EU biofuel policy (74).   
Although this monitoring mechanism has been the central argument of the EU to defend that it 
controls the negative social and human rights impacts of its biofuel policy, the conclusion drawn 
from the 2012 progress report still questions the contribution of EU biofuels demand to “any abuse 
of land use rights” (EC, 2013). However, several reports have unveiled the direct link between land 
grabbing and the EU biofuel policy and documented human rights impacts (see Diop et al., 2013; 
EuropAfrica, 2011), leading to calls for the EU to drop its biofuels target. Notwithstanding the 
presented documentation, the EU has not taken effective regulative measures in order to address 
adverse human rights impacts on affected people in the context of the EU biofuel policy and 
European corporate and financial entities involved in land deals for agrofuel production. 
5.2 The EU’s role in the adoption and implementation of the CFS 
Tenure Guidelines  
The EU and several EU MS played an important and positive role in the process that led to the 
adoption of the Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and 
Forests by the UN Committee on World Food Security (CFS) in May 2012 (FAO, 2012). The 
importance of these Guidelines lies in the fact that they are the first comprehensive international 
instrument on the governance of land and natural resources, based on human rights. They provide 
an authoritative international interpretation and guidance on how to implement existing binding 
international human rights obligations related to land and natural resources. The Tenure 
Guidelines are, strictly speaking, not a direct response to land grabbing in as much as they were 
developed in a process that goes back to times before the debate on the newest wave of land 
grabbing started (especially the 2006 International Conference on Agrarian Reform and Rural 
Development – ICARRD) and because they address the issue of land and natural resources tenure 
in a comprehensive way, linking it with investment, agriculture, food policies, rural development, 
and with other international policies. As a matter of fact, governments and FAO itself pointed out 
repeatedly throughout the negotiation process that it was not about developing ‘guidelines 
against land grabbing’ (Seufert, 2013). However, the negotiations took part in the context of a new 
74 These include: 1) the impact on social sustainability in the Community and in third countries of increased demand for 
biofuel; 2) the impact of Community biofuel policy on the availability of foodstuffs at affordable prices, in particular for 
people living in developing countries; 3) wider development issues; and 4) the respect of land-use rights. 
52 
 
Land Grabbing and Human Rights: 
The Involvement of European Corporate and Financial Entities in Land Grabbing Outside the EU 
wave of land grabbing, and CSOs clearly emphasized the link between the Tenure Guidelines and 
this reality and the impacts on communities around the world (75).  
The EU and several EU MS significantly supported the process of the Guidelines, including 
financially. The support also specifically aimed at the participation of social movements and CSOs 
throughout all stages of the process, including several CSO consultations. The inclusive process 
which ensured the autonomous and self-organized participation of civil society – especially of 
social movements – as well as the Guidelines’ grounding in human rights makes them more 
legitimate than other proposed responses to land grabbing. Social movements of small-scale food 
producers have welcomed the adoption by the Tenure Guidelines and expressed their hope that 
they will serve their purpose of advancing the human rights of local people, including in the 
context of land grabbing. The EU and EU MS have also been significantly supporting the efforts 
towards implementation of the Tenure Guidelines since their adoption in 2012. This support has, 
again, included initiatives aimed at making them accessible for communities and people affected 
by land conflicts and land grabbing, among others through specific capacity building programmes 
for grassroots communities.  
The Global Donor Working Group on Land, of which the EU and several EU MS are members, has 
set up a data base and map on projects related to the implementation of the Tenure Guidelines. 
The programmes listed there by the EU and those EU MS that provided information account (as of 
15 April 2016) to a total number of 426 out of a total number of 714 programmes. However, when 
looking into specific programmes, it is not always clear in how much they actually support the 
implementation of the Guidelines in line with existing human rights obligations and prioritising 
the most vulnerable and marginalized groups. 
In a recent statement, several international social movements and CSOs involved in the Guidelines 
process have expressed concerns that current efforts towards the implementation of the 
Guidelines, including some of those carried out by the EU and EU MS, are focusing on making 
them a useful tool for companies and private investors involved in land deals, instead of focusing 
on the rights and needs of communities affected by land grabbing. There is thus a tendency to 
focus on corporate and private investments understood as land acquisition in a corporate social 
responsibility framing, instead of using the Tenure Guidelines as a tool to address the roots of land 
grabbing, starting from the rights and needs of marginalised people, as the EU and EU MS’s human 
rights obligations require. It is also problematic that the EU and some of it MS claim to be 
contributing to implement the Tenure Guidelines with PPPs as the New Alliance for Food Security 
and Nutrition in Africa and multi-stakeholder initiatives which do not clearly distinguish the roles 
of states, civil society and the private sector. 
5.3 The G8 Land Transparency Initiative   
One year after the adoption of the Tenure Guidelines, the EU and several EU MS (76) were involved 
in an initiative of the G8 that aimed at promoting transparency with regard to land acquisitions by 
national and international investors in order to support and increase what the G8 called, in one of 
the drafts, “productive investments in land”. The Land Transparency Initiative (LTI) was supposed 
75 One of the main tools of resistance against land grabbing has been the Dakar Appeal against the Land Grab, which 
was issued during the World Social Forum in Dakar in February 2011, by social movements, small-scale food producers’ 
organizations and other civil society organizations. It was then signed by more than 900 organizations from all around 
the world and served as a main reference for civil society during the negotiation of the Tenure Guidelines.  
76 The initiative was strongly promoted by the governments of the UK and Germany. 
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to be launched as a global initiative at the G8 summit in June 2013. Presented as a response to 
global and growing pressure on land for food and fuel, the initiative was fiercely criticized by civil 
society for not presenting an adequate response to land grabbing, as it was not clear how it would 
arrest on-going trends and human rights violations. Critique of the LTI targeted, among others, the 
fact that it relied exclusively on voluntary disclosure of information about land deals by the 
investors themselves, by civil society and by the governments of G8 and those of selected 
developing countries, as well as the fact that transparency alone does not address land grabs and 
its human rights impacts (and could even facilitate additional land deals), if not linked to 
accountability mechanisms. The G8 also faced criticism that the initiative undermined 
international agreements, particularly the Tenure Guidelines by duplicating processes instead of 
focusing on coordinated and coherent efforts towards their implementation according to their 
human rights obligations. While the LTI was presented as an initiative to implement the Tenure 
Guidelines, some elements rather geared towards serving the interests of investors by facilitating 
land deals (La Via Campesina et al., 2013).  
The LTI did eventually not materialise as initially planned. However, the G8 committed at its 2013 
summit to support greater transparency in land transactions and to establish partnerships with 
developing countries, including relevant international organisations, to accelerate and target 
support to countries’ existing land governance programmes in conjunction with businesses, in 
particular farmers, and civil society. Since then, so-called Land Partnerships have been signed 
between G7/8 countries (including the EU) and several African countries (77). The fundamental 
concerns raised regarding the LTI have, however, not been addressed by the G7. While the land 
partnerships refer to the Tenure Guidelines and are presented as a means of their implementation, 
some partnerships explicitly aim for making land available for companies and investors. The land 
partnership between Germany, the UK, the USA and Ethiopia in particular also raises serious 
questions regarding the conditions for implementation of these Tenure Guidelines, given the fact 
that Ethiopian civil society organizations are severely constrained to freely defend the human 
rights of pastoralists, indigenous peoples and other rural peoples who have been seriously 
affected by large-scale agricultural investments projects (78). Under these circumstances, it is 
questionable whether Ethiopia offers the very basic conditions for civil society to engage in a 
meaningful process on how to implement the Tenure Guidelines in the country. 
77 Seven pilot country partnerships were signed in 2013 with Burkina Faso (US), Niger (EU), Nigeria (UK), Senegal (France), 
South Sudan (EU), Tanzania (UK) and Ethiopia (UK, US, Germany). Additional partnerships have been added since then 
(see Global Donor Platform for Rural Development, 2016). 
78 Ethiopian civil society organizations are, for instance, not allowed to directly or indirectly relate to international human 
rights organizations working on land issues, based on the provisions contained in the Charities and Societies 
Proclamation no. 621/2009. A recent case of arrested pastoralists shows that these provisions are applied in concrete 
cases related to land, see Human Rights Watch, 2015.  
54 
 
Land Grabbing and Human Rights: 
The Involvement of European Corporate and Financial Entities in Land Grabbing Outside the EU 
5.4 The EU’s response to land grabbing linked to EBA in Cambodia  
While EC highlights the “leading role” of the European Parliament in the promotion of human 
rights, “in particular through its resolutions, the EBA case shows a somewhat different picture. In 
2012 and 2014 the EP has demanded through such resolutions that the European Commission (DG 
Trade) shall investigate in human rights violations linked to the agro-industrial expansion of sugar 
cane plantations. The case was also repeatedly brought to the attention of the EU High 
Representatives Catherine Ashton and her successor Federica Mogherini. Delegations of affected 
community members also repeatedly met with EEAS and DG Trade and EU Member states 
ministries. Recommendations were also made under the 15th EU-NGO Human Rights Forum in 
December 2013, an activity under the EU Action Plan for Human Rights and Democracy (79).  
While the Commission still neglects an official investigation under EBA/GSP scheme, it has, 
commissioned an audit of the human rights impact, 5 years after the affected first demanded 
action from the EU and criticized by the affected of being silent on “how the audit will be 
implemented” (80). This points to severe problems to address human rights violations in the 
context of EU policies. The experience with EBA shows that the current threshold for action on 
human rights violations linked to EU initiative EBA is too high. In addition, it is problematic that the 
accused party (DG Trade) is also the one that interprets the threshold, instead of an independent 
body. A monitoring role of the EP could play an important monitoring role in addressing some of 
these issues. 
5.5 The EU’s reliance on business self-regulation  
As already mentioned before, the EU and its Member States have been very reluctant so far to 
introduce binding regulation on corporate and financial actors, including effective accountability 
and remedy mechanisms. Instead, the EU has largely been relying on voluntary commitments by 
companies to apply standards for responsible investments. The EU itself has endorsed a series of 
voluntary guidelines and principles on which it has built its Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) 
Strategy, such as the United Nations Global Compact, the United Nations Guiding Principles on 
Business and Human Rights, ISO 26000 Guidance Standards on Social Responsibility, the 
International Labour Organization Tripartite Declaration of Principles concerning Multinational 
Enterprises on Social Policy and the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (81). The EU 
claims that its mix of voluntary policy measures and, where necessary, complementary regulation 
is widely supported by businesses and MS. This approach has nonetheless proven to be 
insufficient in providing effective human rights protection and legal remedies to victims of 
corporate human rights abuses, including in the context of land grabbing.  
As already stated, non-binding frameworks such as the UN Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human Rights fail, among others, to ensure corporate liability and in providing people whose 
human rights have been impaired with access to legal remedies (Skinner et al., 2013). The cases of 
79 “All European Union authorities including DG Trade should fully recognize that UN Special Rapporteurs, especially 
country specific Rapporteurs are relevant monitoring bodies so that their reports are seen as particularly important 
evidence which can trigger off EU investigation procedures of the impacts or possible impacts of the Everything but 
Arms initiative (EBA) and Generalized Scheme of Preferences (GSP)”. 
80 Quote from an NGO letter to Commissioner Malmstrom and High Representative Mogherini (18 January 2016).  
81 See the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Commission and 
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Mubende, involving the Germany-based company Neumann Kaffee Gruppe, and the activities of 
SOCFIN (see Boxes 1 and 4) show the limits of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises as 
they have not provided remedy to affected communities. In the case of SOCFIN, the Belgian 
national contact point for the OECD Guidelines has deplored the lack of collaboration by the 
company (Point de Contact National Belgique, 2015), thus pointing to the fact that the application 
of the Guidelines depends entirely on the good-will of companies, thus raising serious concerns 
about their effectiveness in terms of ensuring accountability. 
CSR and voluntary guidelines and schemes have been used as an argument to avoid binding 
regulations on the activities of transnationally operating companies. The EU has, for instance, 
recently pointed to the voluntary UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights in order to 
obstruct the process towards an international legally binding instrument on transnational 
corporations with respect to human rights that is currently happening at the UN Human Rights 
Council. 
The situation is even more critical when it comes to voluntary self-regulation by business and all 
kinds of multi-stakeholder initiatives that have flourished during the past years and that are 
presented by the private sector as means to address the human rights impacts of land grabs. 
Examples are the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO), the Roundtable on Sustainable 
Biofuels (RSB), the Roundtable on Responsible Soy (RRS) and the Bonsucro/Better Sugar Cane 
Initiative, which have all their own certification schemes. Membership in these consortia has not 
stopped companies from being involved in land grabs and alleged human rights abuses. This also 
applies for companies with links to EU actors, such as Wilmar, who is backed by several EU finance 
institutions and whose palm oil plantations in Nigeria have led to human rights abuses, according 
to reports (Friends of the Earth US/Environmental Rights Action-Friends of the Earth Nigeria, 2015a 
and 2015b). Another example is the already mentioned company SOCFIN, which is member of the 
RSPO and does much publicity around its CSR projects but whose operations have severe 
environmental, social and human rights impacts (see Box 4). What has to be kept in mind is that 
standards and certification most of the time rely on private contracts between companies and 
consultancies of their choice, a process that makes independence literally impossible. Another big 
problem with self-regulation by business is the often highly unequal power relations between 
corporations and communities that raise big concerns about the terms under which all sorts of 
agreements between companies and affected people come about, that are frequently used by 
companies to underline how they are dealing with conflicts that may arise in the context of their 
operations, including human rights abuses. 
Another example are the Principles for Responsible Investment in Farmland (Farmland Principles), 
which were launched in September 2011 by a group of institutional investors, with – according to 
its promoters – “the goal of improving the sustainability, transparency and accountability of 
investments in farmland” (82). The principles, which the investors that sign up to them commit to 
implement in all farmland investments include, inter alia, the promotion of environmental 
sustainability (Principle 1); the respect of labour and human rights (Principle 2); and the respect of 
existing land and resource rights (Principle 3). Several EU actors have signed this initiative. 
However, examples show that the self-regulation of investors has not prevented human rights 
abuses in the context of land deals. One example is the already mentioned case of tree plantations 
in Niassa province, Mozambique, which involved the Dutch pension fund ABP, one of the initiators 
82 In August 2014 the Farmland Principles were incorporated in the Principles for Responsible Investment (PRI). 
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of the Farmland Principles, as a major shareholder when operations started. When affected people 
made allegations of human rights abuses, ABP admitted that the forestry projects did not comply 
with its responsible investment policy, but announced that it would not withdraw its investments 
(FIAN, 2013, p. 31; see also Box 5). 
Another founding member of the Farmland Principles initiative is the Second Swedish National 
Pension Fund AP2, which has invested in farmland in Brazil through a global farmland fund named 
TIAA-CREF Global Agriculture LLC (TCGA). Managed through a complex structure including 
different national and foreign companies und leases, land deals have been made in the states of 
São Paolo, Mato Grosso, Maranhão and Piauí and involve large scale industrial production of soy, 
sugar cane, cotton and maize on 60 000 hectares. AP2 has not been willing to disclose any detailed 
information concerning the location of the land purchased by TCGA, referring to fear of 
competition. This makes any transparent verification about the impacts on the land deals 
impossible. The investments have been made in areas where big land conflicts have been 
reported. Investigations have furthermore uncovered how TCGA is using a complex company 
structure enabling it to evade Brazilian laws restricting foreign investments (Rede Social de Justiça 
e Direitos Humanos et al., 2015). The deeper issue with the Farmland Principles is that it is not at all 
clear what it means to adhere to these principles, as there are no documents or statements 
available clarifying on land issues. The complete absence of clarity and accountability is well 
illustrated by a very recent statement by TIAA-CREF (also founding member of the Farmland 
Principles). When confronted with concerns regarding its investments in Brazil, the fund dismissed 
the concerns referring to “the high standards of responsible investing principles to which we hold 
ourselves accountable” (83). 
An example of an initiative led by a private company is Coca-Cola’s “zero tolerance policy” on land 
grabbing. Although Coca-Cola is not an EU company, it has many subsidiaries, sellers and end 
consumers in the EU and the case is illustrative for the fundamental problems with self-regulation 
schemes of companies. The announcement by the company of its zero tolerance policy on land 
grabbing was broadly acclaimed as a success in ensuring responsible investments throughout the 
supply chain. However, in the context on the EBA-inspired land grabs for sugar plantations in 
Cambodia, the corporation failed to undertake serious due diligence on its major sugar supplier, 
Mitr Phol, which was found to be responsible for human rights abuses by the Thai Human Rights 
Commission (84). The fundamental flaws of private voluntary schemes is epitomized by the fact 
that, after having been excluded from the Bonsucro/Better Sugar Cane Initiative, Mitr Phol’s was 
eventually readmitted and was granted Bonsucro’s Sustainability Award – only two weeks after the 
Thai Human Rights Commission issued its findings, while reportedly almost 470 families were still 
fighting to regain land and compensation. 
What these examples illustrate is that self-regulation schemes have failed to address human rights 
abuses in the context of land grabbing. Additionally, companies are using CSR schemes, due 
diligence and non-judicial grievance mechanisms to whitewash their operations and to dismiss 
responsibility of abuses (RAID, 2015). Moreover, it is the genuine duty of states, as of their human 
83 Official statement by TIAA-CREF from February 2016 to the involved German pension scheme ÄVWL communication, 
after they requested a clarification of allegations made by an NGO report in November 2015. 
84 In October 2015, after a two year investigation, Mitr Phol was found by the Thai Human Rights Commission to be 
responsible for violating international obligations and rights of victims in Cambodia, who saw their land seized, homes 
destroyed and livestock killed to make way the company’s plantations between 2008 and 2009 (see Inclusive 
Development International, 2016). 
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rights obligations, to ensure adequate regulation to make sure that business enterprises do not 
abuse human rights. This includes accountability and effective remedy through justifiability of 
human rights. The EU and EU MS must thus take action in order to comply with their human rights 
obligations. 
6 Conclusions and recommendations 
The EU and EU MS have an important role to play to stop land grabbing and actively address 
related human rights violations and abuses. An adequate response to these issues is required in 
order to comply with their human rights obligations, especially their extraterritorial obligations. 
Due to the ‘multilayeredness’ of land grabs, the involvement of different EU actors and 
mechanisms, a set of regulatory actions by different bodies in the EU (EP, EC, Council and MS) is 
needed. This complex issue cannot be dealt with by a 'silo' regulatory approach nor by superficial 
approaches that tackle the symptoms, instead of the root causes, of the problems. Responses by 
the EU and its MS will thus have to reflect this complexity, embedded in the political economic 
context, and should have components to prevent land grabbing through regulation and respond 
to violations and abuses, with a special attention to ensuring access to prompt and effective 
remedy mechanisms for those affected. The approach pursued by the EU should be to pro-actively 
contribute to the universal realisation of human rights, creating an enabling environment for this, 
rather than being only defensive. Finally, land grabbing is characterized by huge power 
imbalances, and EU private and financial actors are clearly the powerful vis-à-vis the communities 
threatened or affected by land grabbing. The responses of the EU should be framed within this 
political context.  
What follows is a set of recommendations addressed to policy makers at EU and MS level to tackle 
land grabbing of EU corporate and financial actors, based on their corresponding specific 
obligations to respect, protect and fulfil human rights and the general obligation to adopt 
measures as soon as possible and to the maximum of available resources, to not discriminate, and 
to cooperate. These recommendations have been developed in a way to be mutually reinforcing 
and should thus be seen as interconnected. 
1. Ensuring compliance with human rights obligations and making the EU’s human  
rights agenda more proactive and responsive to land grabbing 
The EU’s commitment to human rights and its human rights obligations has recently been 
reiterated by the Communication “Keeping human rights at the heart of the EU agenda” and the 
related EU Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy for the period 2015 – 2019. We 
recommend the following actions to the EU and EU MS: 
1) Formally acknowledge and commit to implementing their extraterritorial 
obligations including, in the case of the EU, through Communications and 
Directives, and by incorporating them into human rights policies and guidelines. 
2) Comply in good faith with their extraterritorial human rights obligations including 
in the context of land grabbing by EU corporate and financial actors. 
3) Tap the full potential of the EU Special Representative (EUSR) on Human Rights and 
this flexible mandate by assessing and elaborating reports on cases of human 
rights abuses related to European corporate and financial actors. Land grabbing by 
European corporate and financial actors should be included under Point 18 of the 
EU Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy at the Action Plan’s mid-term 
implementation review; and annual reports by (an) independent HR expert(s), 
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complemented by reporting by the EUSR on Human Rights should be produced on 
the topic. 
4) Ensure better and closer collaboration between the EUSR on Human Rights and the 
UN Special Procedures. 
5) Produce operational tools (such as toolkit or logbooks, as foreseen in para. 30b of 
the EU Action Plan) on land grabbing for staff in the EU headquarters, EU Member 
States’ capitals, EU Delegations, Representations and Embassies in order to provide 
guidance for the protection and promotion of human rights in the context of land 
grabbing, especially when involving EU actors. 
2. Toward human rights compliant policies 
1) Some EU policies facilitate and/or encourage, directly and indirectly, land grabs of 
European corporate and financial actors. This in turn implicates the EU’s and EU 
MS’ extraterritorial human rights obligations. We recommend the following actions 
to the EU and EU MS in their respective fields of competences: 
(a) Elaborate, interpret and apply policies and international agreements in a 
manner consistent with their human rights obligations in order to avoid 
potential negative effects on human rights abroad; and include binding 
human rights criteria and accountability mechanisms into their policies 
that affect land abroad.  
(b) Adjust human rights clauses in trade and investment agreements, among 
others, to guarantee the participating states’ policy space for implementing 
measures aimed at the realisation of human rights, to provide for regular 
reviews and adjustment (or elimination) of provisions that conflict with 
human rights, and allow for complaints by individuals and groups whose 
human rights have been negatively affected. This entails the exclusion of 
ISDS mechanisms from all investor protection chapters in trade and 
investment agreements.   
(c) Systematically carry out prior human-rights impact assessments (ex ante 
HRIAs) and regularly assess and revise agreements, laws and policies 
(including in the area of trade, investment, finance, development 
cooperation, and climate change) in order to ensure that they do not 
negatively affect human rights – which includes that they do not curtail 
policy space to implement measures required for the realisation of human 
rights – and are conducive to the universal realisation of human rights (ex 
post HRIA), applying a sound methodology, building upon paras. 24b and 
27 of the EU Action Plan. Prior HRIAs must be conducted by an 
independent body and with public participation, and their results be made 
public and inform measures to prevent, cease, and remedy the harm. This 
requires that information on planned agreements are accessible to MPs 
and MEPs as well as the public and that assessments are carried out at an 
early stage of negotiations in order to allow for influencing on-going 
negotiations. The inclusion of human rights criteria in the revised EU 
handbook on trade SIAs is an important step, but it is central that the 
mentioned standards are met. Regarding monitoring of existing EU 
policies, agreements and actions, human rights compliance should be at 
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the centre of formal monitoring and evaluation processes and they should 
involve independent human rights bodies/experts, the European 
Parliament as well as those affected by policies. Monitoring should include 
the collaboration with national human rights institutes in countries 
affected by land grabbing. 
(d) The European Parliament and the Council should carry out their own 
human rights impact assessments, in addition to Commission impact 
assessments, where needed (e.g. when policies and actions are likely to 
have considerable human rights impacts or where such policies and 
actions involve countries where human rights abuses and violations have 
been documented, among others), according to the standards referred to 
above, as foreseen in Inter-Institutional Common Approach to Impact 
Assessment and the Provisional text of the proposed inter-institutional 
agreement on better regulation. 
(e) Adopt all necessary measures, as soon as possible, to provide adequate and 
effective complaint and remedy mechanisms for individuals and groups 
whose human rights have been negatively affected EU policies beyond EU 
borders. The thresholds to access these mechanisms must allow for victims 
to access these mechanisms. 
Where recommendations are directed directly to the EU in so far as policy areas are concerned that 
are exclusive or shared competences of the EU (such as trade and investment) and for which the 
EU carries direct human rights obligations, MS must nevertheless take steps to ensure that the EU 
acts accordingly (as they remain bound by their human rights obligations when transferring 
competences to the EU).  
2) Regarding specific policies that are particularly relevant for land grabbing by EU 
actors we recommend the EU and EU MS to: 
(a) Substantially reduce the thresholds for existing human rights clauses in the 
EU’s Everything But Arms trade initiative (EBA). 
(b) Drop the biofuel target and exclude bioenergy from the next EU 
Renewable Energy Directive (RED). 
(c) Withdraw support of the New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition in 
Africa; stop the implementation of the cooperation frameworks of the New 
Alliance, and the negotiation of new frameworks that undermine 
sustainable small-scale food production and local food systems. 
(d) Support the implementation of the CFS Guidelines on the Responsible 
Governance of Tenure of Land Fisheries and Forests in accordance with 
existing human rights obligations, focusing on the rights and needs of 
communities and the most marginalised. This entails to apply these 
Guidelines in projects of the EU (DEVCO) and EU MS in all development 
projects that may impact tenure rights, as well as to ensure compliance of 
activities by corporate and financial actors by regulating them according to 
the Guidelines. 
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3. Accountability and regulation of corporate and financial actors 
1. Adequate and effective regulation of corporate and financial entities remains a 
crucial issue in order to address land grabbing by EU actors. As of their human 
rights obligations, the EU and its MS have to, in accordance with their respective 
competences, protect people from abuses by third parties. The extraterritorial 
human rights obligations of the EU and MS place obligations on them to establish 
the necessary regulatory mechanisms to ensure that private corporations, 
including transnational corporations, and other non-state actors that they are in a 
position to regulate, do not impair the enjoyment of human rights in other 
countries, including in the context of land grabbing. Failure to do so represents a 
breach of human rights obligations. In order to ensure accountability, victims have 
to have full access to adequate and effective remedy mechanisms independent of 
where human rights abuses have occurred. Experience shows that corporate social 
responsibility and voluntary regulation schemes fail to prevent land grabbing, do 
not protect people from human rights abuses and do not ensure accountability. 
We recommend the following actions to the EU and EU MS: 
(a) Given the non-transparency, which surrounds many land deal processes, 
the first step to holding investors accountable is for the EU to proactively 
track and monitor land deals involving EU actors. This could happen in 
form of a registry at EU level of all EU actors involved in land deals abroad. 
Mandatory disclosure rules should require these EU actors to provide all 
information relevant to assess human rights risks and impacts in relation to 
their business activities, and to report on their subsidiaries, wherever 
incorporated and operating, and their business relationships. 
(b) EU delegations and embassies of EU MS should proactively monitor and 
report on the activities of EU companies in the respective countries, 
particularly where there are indications that these are involved in human 
rights abuses, as well as monitor compliance of EU companies with national 
law as well as human rights standards, including the Guidelines on the 
Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests 
(contributing to overall application of these Guidelines, see 
recommendation 2.2.d). The monitoring reports by EU delegations and EU 
MS embassies should be provided to all relevant EU institutions, including 
the EP (particularly DROI and AFET), the EEAS and the European 
Commission (e.g. DG Trade). 
(c) EU MS should develop policies and frameworks for the conduct of 
corporations over which they have jurisdiction (adapting existing 
regulations or introducing new regulations) to effectively regulate EU 
corporate and financial actors, through a process of dialogue with 
individuals and communities affected by human rights abuses, taking into 
account their experiences and needs. Civil, administrative and criminal 
regulation should clearly define the duties of corporations and financial 
actors, including rules on impact assessments, responsibility of due 
diligence and victim centred criteria for the determination of liability, and 
contain clear provisions on legal accountability by these actors for human 
rights abuses and crimes. The frameworks for conduct should impose a 
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legal duty on parent companies to exercise due diligence by controlling 
their subsidiaries to prevent HR abuses and make it a criminal offence for 
companies to contribute to human rights abuses abroad.  
(d) The EU should take steps within its competence to develop common 
standards at the EU level for corporate regulation by MS in line with 
recommendation 3.1 (c). The proposal by the European Commission to add 
a forum necessitates provision to the Brussels I Regulation should be re-
introduced so that it becomes mandatory for MS courts to exercise 
jurisdiction in situations where no other forum ensuring the right to a fair 
trial exists and there is a sufficient link with the MS concerned.   
(e) EU MS have to ensure victims' access to effective judicial remedies, 
including by assuming jurisdiction in cases of corporate human rights 
abuses committed by EU-based actors and removing obstacles for people 
affected abroad to bring a case in the home state of the business or the 
state in which controlling companies are domiciled and/or develop 
activities, based on the Brussels Regulation. MS courts should, in situations 
where the legal protection offered in the state where the harm occurred is 
insufficient, apply the law of the country in which the case is heard. They 
should also allow for collective actions, including class actions and public 
interest litigation.  
(f) The current process of an own-initiative report by the European Parliament 
on “Corporate liability for serious human rights abuses in third countries” 
which is produced in the Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET) should be 
used in order to advance in this regard, remembering that all human rights 
abuses and violations have to be tackled by effective accountability 
mechanisms. 
(g) EU MS and the European Commission should explore options for providing 
financial support to individuals from abroad to bring claims to EU MS 
courts.  
(h) The EU and MS should consider the creation of an EU-wide independent 
complaint mechanism for individuals and communities whose rights have 
been negatively affected by EU actors, which can complement judicial 
remedies at MS level. 
2. Where the EU and EU MS are directly involved in land grabbing, they also have to 
comply with their obligation to respect human rights. This is the case, among 
others, where land grabs take place with the involvement of development finance 
institutions (DFIs), public pension funds and public-private partnerships (PPPs). 
(a) In these cases, the EU and EU MS have to ensure public scrutiny of the 
involvement of public and state-related entities in land deals, 
systematically carrying out independent ex ante and ex post human-rights 
impacts assessments of these deals and withdraw from investment 
projects/land deals where substantial human rights risks have been 
identified or violations have occurred. In the latter case, states must 
provide for effective remedy mechanisms.  
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(b) While the EU is directly responsible for ensuring that EU development 
finance and public-private partnerships do not contribute to human rights 
abuses, MS carry a responsibility to ensure that the EU acts accordingly.    
(c) Parliaments of MS and, in the case of European development finance, also 
the EP, have to be able to effectively monitor the activities of DFIs, for 
instance through a parliamentary commission that has access to all the 
business records of DFIs and that meets regularly. 
(d) DFIs should establish accessible complaint mechanisms for victims of 
human rights abuses and violations, which ensure that such complaints are 
investigated independently and ensure ways of effective remedy. 
(e) The EU and its Member States should withdraw any form of support 
(including financial and diplomatic) from companies involved in human 
rights abuses and use their influence to prevent such.    
4. Advance human rights in international/multilateral bodies 
EU MS’ human rights obligations also apply when they engage in multilateral bodies. They have to 
ensure that both their acts and omissions in these bodies do not lead to breaches of their 
obligations. Furthermore, EU MS should contribute to advance human rights within/through the 
international bodies they engage in and/or transfer competences to. The EU must equally act in 
line with its own and MS’ human rights obligations when engaging in international bodies. We 
recommend the following actions to EU MS and, where applicable, to the EU: 
(a) Support and engage in good faith in the on-going process towards the 
adoption of an international legally binding instrument on transnational 
corporations and other business enterprises with respect to human rights 
at the UN Human Rights Council, in order to define clear and obligatory 
international standards on duties of transnational corporations and other 
business, including rules on impact assessments, due diligence and liability, 
and hold them legally accountable for human rights abuses and crimes 
(contributing to adequate regulation of corporate and financial entities and 
accountability, see recommendation 3.1).  
(b) Support and adopt the United Nations Declaration of the Rights of 
Peasants and other people working in rural areas, which is currently 
developed in the UN Human Rights Council, in order to increase protection 
of the human rights of these groups, including in the context of land 
grabbing. 
(c) Support the establishment of a robust and innovative monitoring 
mechanism within the UN Committee on World Food Security (CFS) and 
contribute in a constructive way to the global monitoring event during the 
43rd CFS session in 2016, in order to ensure a comprehensive and 
thorough assessment of the use and application of the Guidelines on the 
Responsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests 
(contributing to improved accountability and to overall application of the 
Tenure Guidelines, see recommendations 3 and 2.2.d). 
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5. Continue and scale up support/protection for human rights defenders 
Violence of all forms against human rights defenders (HRDs) is a cross-cutting issue of land grabs 
and needs special attention because of the specific risks faced by HRDs working on land and land-
related issues. The EU and EU MS should continue existing support and increase mechanisms to 
protect HRDs, based on the EU Guidelines on human rights defenders. Para. 31 of the EU Action 
Plan establishes a focus on the implementation of EU Human Rights Guidelines, including 
awareness raising, dissemination and training of staff in EU Delegations and Member State 
Embassies as well as more systematic reporting on their implementation. The protection of human 
rights defenders falls under the responsibility of the European External Action Service. The EP has a 
specific responsibility as it monitors the work of the EEAS. We recommend the following actions to 
the EU and EU MS: 
(a) EU delegations and embassies of EU MS should develop local 
implementation strategies of the EU Guidelines on HRDs in each country 
(as foreseen by paragraph 11 of these Guidelines), which include specific 
reference to defenders of land, water and environmental rights, based on 
the specific risks these groups faces. The local implementation strategies 
should be developed in cooperation with HRDs and CSOs and include 
activities such as monitoring, reporting and assessment as well as direct 
support and protection of HRDs, among others. EU delegations and 
embassies of EU MS should assess with HRDs and CSOs whether these 
strategies should be made available to the public. The EEAS and the EP 
should make sure that EU delegations develop these strategies and 
implement them. The effectiveness and the outcomes of the 
implementation strategies should be regularly assessed, including through 
evaluation meetings with HRDs and CSOs. 
(b) EU delegations and embassies of EU MS should take active steps for the 
protection of HRDs, by, among other steps: issuing public statements 
supporting HRDs and organisations that support them; proactively making 
direct contact with HRDs; making visits to HRDs as well as their 
organisations; making visits to communities of HRDs, especially in remote 
and rural areas; making visible their support for the work of HRDs in events 
organized by the missions/embassies; following up on specific cases of 
violence against and criminalisation of HRDs and speaking out publicly on 
them; assisting as observers at hearings in cases of HRDs that are 
prosecuted and/or arbitrarily arrested, and visit detainees in prison, urging 
for their release. 
(c) Mechanisms to protect HRDs must be based on existing human rights 
obligations and be designed, implemented and monitored free from 
corporate influence. Corporations/the private sector should be excluded 
from participation in dialogues with HRDs and communities as well as from 
mechanisms for the protection of HRDs. 
(d) Based on Article 6 of the Treaty of the EU; and the principle of coherence of 
EU policies and international instruments ratified by the EU Member States, 
EU delegations and embassies of EU MS should: (i) Insist on the 
cancellation, repeal or amendment of rules allowing the criminalisation of 
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the defence of human rights and whose application contravenes 
international and regional state obligations in this matter; (ii) Include in the 
cooperation programs aimed at strengthening the juridical systems the 
training of national human rights institutions and institutions for legal 
defence and designate sufficient resources for monitoring of the proper 
and equal application of justice, respect for the presumption of innocence 
and the right to a fair trial and to the competent authority; (iii) Identify, 
support and urge governments to implement existing recommendations 
related to the criminalisation of human rights defenders, such as those 
issued by: a) regional human rights systems; b) special mechanisms of the 
United Nations (Committees and Rapporteurs) and c) the United Nations 
Human Rights Council’s Universal Periodic Review; (iv) base its activities to 
protect human rights defenders on states’ human rights obligations in this 
regard, which included to not promote business involvement in dialogues 
with communities or their participation in institutions for the protection of 
human rights defenders.  
(e) The EU and its MS should contribute to the diverse mechanisms on human 
rights defenders in the frame of the UN Human Rights System, including 
financial and political support to the OHCHR, to ensure capacity for its work 
in this topic. 
(f) The EU and its Member States should support all actions taken in the frame 
of the UN Human Rights Council to improve the protection of HRDs 
working on economic, social and cultural rights, including land rights 
defenders. This includes the adoption of new resolutions, the support to 
statements of the presidency and the constitution of inquiry commissions 
for specific cases of violence against HRDs.  
(g) The recent creation of a new European Union Human Rights Defenders 
Mechanism, which is intended to become one of Europe's key tools to 
assist human rights defenders at risk, including in remote areas, is to be 
welcomed. However, it should not entail an outsourcing of the EU’s and EU 
MS’ obligations regarding the protection of HRDs.  
6. Strengthen the monitoring role of the European Parliament 
With the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty, the European Parliament has been given greater power 
regarding the EU’s external policies. This strengthened role gives the EP an important role in 
addressing land grabbing by EU corporate and financial entities. We recommend the following 
actions to the EP:  
(a) Contribute to the monitoring of the human rights impacts of EU policies 
and actions, among others by scrutinising Commission impact assessments 
and considering the possibility to conduct own impact assessments (see 
recommendations 2.1.c and 2.1.d), as well as monitoring the work of the 
EEAS, including monitoring reports of EU delegations on the activities of EU 
companies in other countries and on the situation of human rights 
defenders (see recommendations 3.1.b and 5). 
(b) Proactively fulfil its mission and use its right to request proposals for 
legislation from the Commission, and subsequently legislate, together with 
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the Council of the European Union, in order to 1) prevent extraterritorial 
human rights abuses and violations by EU actors and 2) provide effective 
remedy, complaint and sanction measures when human rights abuses and 
violations occur.  
(c) Until legislation and related mechanisms (see recommendation 6.b) are in 
place to prevent extraterritorial human rights abuses and violations by EU 
actors, the EP (e.g. DROI and AFET) should actively engage in assessing 
human rights impacts, amongst others, by requesting detailed information 
from relevant EU institutions (e.g. DG Trade, EEAS etc.), MS and European 
corporate and financial entities. 
(d) Set up a committee of inquiry (by making use of Rule 198 of the EP’s Rules 
of Procedure) in order to investigate alleged breaches of the EU’s 
extraterritorial human rights obligations in the context of land grabbing in 
third countries and related human rights abuses and violations by EU 
actors. 
We recommend the following actions to the EU and EU MS:  
(e) Provide the EP with adequate information on human rights impact related 
to the involvement of European corporate and financial entities in land 
grabbing abroad (based on recommendation 3.1.b) and information 
directly retrieved from the European entities concerned. 
7. Enhance the role of civil society 
Civil society has played an important role in bringing the issue of land grabbing to the agenda of 
the EU. While different processes and fora exist at EU level for the participation of civil society 
organisations (CSOs), their participation should be more systematic and guided by clear rules of 
engagement, also reflecting a clear understanding of different types of CSOs. We recommend the 
following actions to the EU: 
(a) Launch an inclusive process to discuss the promotion and implementation 
of a permanent mechanism that facilitates and guarantees the effective 
participation of CSOs, in developing, implementing and monitoring EU 
policies and actions, including those leading to land grabbing and human 
rights violations or abuses outside the EU. The discussion could be inspired 
by the Civil Society Mechanism established under the UN Committee on 
World Food Security (CFS), frequently quoted as being the most inclusive 
international and intergovernmental platform for policymaking. 
(b) Organise regular hearings at the EP in order to hear the voices of those 
affected by EU policies and the activities of EU actors, including in the 
context of land grabbing, as well as CSOs. 
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Annexes 











Total Amount of 
Land Under 
Contract (ha) 
Intended Use of Land 
Austria 2 India (1), Ethiopia (1) 2 21.000 Agriculture, Biofuels, Food crops, Non-
food agricultural commodities 
Belgium 7 Tanzania (1), Democratic 
Repblic of Congo (3), 
Nigeria (3), Cote d’Ivoire 
(3), Gabon (1), Indonesia 
(8), Argentina (1) 
20 251.808 Agriculture, Food crops, Agriunspecified, 
Forestry for carbon sequestration/REDD, 
Conservation, Non-food agricultural 
commodities, Livestock, Tourism 
Denmark 5 Peru (2), Mali (1), Zambia 
(1), Ethiopia (1), Cambodia 
(1) 
6 31.460 Agriculture, Food crops, Non-food 
agricultural commodities, Biofuels, 
Forestry 
Estonia 1 Mozambique (1) 1 18.800 Agriculture, Food crops, Non-food 
agricultural commodities, 
Agriunspecified 
Finland 5 South Sudan (1), Tanzania 
(1), Sierra Leone (1), China 
(1), Uruguay (14) 
18 566.559 Forestry for wood and fibre and for 
carbon sequestration/REDD, Agriculture 
France 17 Burkina Faso (1), Mali (2), 
Guinea (1), Argentina (2), 
India (1), Ethiopia (1), 
Cambodia (1), Senegal (4), 
Ghana (1), Cameroon (2), 
Madagascar (1), Niger (1), 
Nigeria (1), Liberia (1), 
Uruguay (8), Cote d’Ivoire 
(1), Gabon (1), Central 
African Republic (1), 
Tunisia (1), Indonesia (1), 
Paraguay (1), Argentina 
(3), Brazil (3) 
40 629.953 Agriculture, Biofuels, Food crops, 
Industry, Tourism, Forestry for carbon 
sequestration/REDD, Forestry, 
Forestunspecified, Non-food agricultural 
commodities, Livestock, Agriunspecified, 
Conservation 
Germany 12 Zambia (3), Uganda (2), 
Zimbabwe (1), Tanzania 
(1), Mozambique (1), 
Thailand (1), Madagascar 
(2), Ghana (3), Sierra 
Leone (1), Ethiopia (1) 
16 309.566 Agriculture, Food crops, Livestock, 
Agriunspecified, Forestry for wood and 
fibre, Biofuels, Industry, Non-food 
agricultural commodities 
Italy 17 Ghana (1), Tanzania (1), 
Mozambique (6), Senegal 
(3), Angola (1), Congo (1), 
Liberia (2), Ethiopia (3), 
Nigeria (1), Guinea (1), 
Madagascar (1) 
21 615.674 Agriculture, Biofuels, Forestry for carbon 
sequestration/REDD, Food crops, 
Forestry for wood and fibre, Non-food 
agricultural commodities 
Luxembourg 4 Ethiopia (1), Argentina (4), 
Peru (2), Sierra Leone (1), 
Liberia (1), Democratic 
Republic of Congo (1), 
Guinea (1), Cambodia (1), 
Sao Tome and Principe (1), 
Nigeria (1) 
14 157.914 Agriculture, Biofuels, Food crops, 
Agriunspecified, Non-food agricultural 
commodities 
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Netherlands 18 Ethiopia (3), Senegal (2), 
Tanzania (2), Liberia (1), 
Mozambique (2), Malawi 
(1), Sierra Leone (1), Brazil 
(3), Costa Rica (2), Ghana 
(1), Cambodia (1), Kenya 
(1) 
20 414.974 Agriculture, Non-food agricultural 
commodities, Biofuels, Food crops, 
Forestry for carbon sequestration/REDD, 
Conservation, Forestry for wood and 
fibre, Forestunspecified, Forestry, 
Tourism, Livestock, Renewable energy 
Portugal 13 Mozambique (12), Angola 
(3), Paraguay (1), Brazil (1) 
17 503.953 Agriculture, Food crops, Non-food 
agricultural commodities, Biofuels, 
Livestock, Forestry for wood and fibre, 
Renewable energy, Agriunspecified 
Romania 1 Gambia (1), Senegal (1) 2 130.000 Agriculture, Biofuels 
Spain 16 Philippines (2), Mexico (1), 
Chile (2), Brazil (1), Guinea-
Bissau (1) Congo (1), 
Guatemala (1), Colombia 
(2), Nicaragua (1), 
Argentina (1), Ghana (1), 
Gambia (1), South Africa 
(1), Tunisia (1), Morocco 
(1) 
18 136.504 Agriculture, Biofuels, Renewable energy, 
Food crops, Tourism, Forestry for wood 
and fibre, Agriunspecified 
Sweden 4 Tanzania (2), Ethiopia (1), 
Mozambique (2) 
5 77.329 Agriculture, Biofuels, Forestry for wood 
and fibre, Food crops, Renewable energy 
United 
Kingdom 
60 Mozambique (9), Tanzania 
(9), Ghana (9), Sierra 
Leone (7), Kenya (2), 
Indonesia (18), Philippines 
(2), Namibia (2), Malawi 
(4), Peru (2), Rwanda (2), 
Liberia (3), Guinea (4), 
Madagascar (2), Zambia 
(4) Democratic Republic of 
Congo (2), Nigeria (5), 
Argentina (4), Cameroon 
(1), Angola (1), Mali (1), 
South Sudan (2), India (3), 
Malaysia (1), Uganda (1), 
Honduras (1), Paraguay 
(1), Uruguay (15), Brazil 
(3), Ethiopia (1) 
124 1.972.010 Forestry for carbon sequestration/REDD, 
Agriculture, Food crops, Renewable 
energy, Non-food agricultural 
commodities, Biofuels, Agriunspecified, 
Livestock, Forestry for wood and fibre 
Total 182 52 323 5.837.504   
Companies Countries Targeted Deals Hectares 
Source: Own elaboration using calculations made from Land Matrix data (2016). 
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Annex 2: Overall intended use of land involved in EU land deals 
 
Source: Own elaboration using calculations made from Land Matrix data (2016). 
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Annex 3: Recorded land deals involving EU-based companies 











Deal Status Size of Land Nature of Deal 
 
EASTERN EUROPE (2 Deals) 
 
Romania Ovidiu Tender Gambia  Unknown Agriculture, Biofuels Concluded, contract signed; 
[2011] Startup phase, no 
production 
30.000 ha [intended size); 
30.000 ha [contract size] 
Lease/Concession 
Romania Ovidiu Tender Senegal Unknown Agriculture , Biofuels Concluded, contract signed; 
[2011] Startup phase, no 
production 
100.000 ha [intended size]; 
100.000 ha [contract size] 
Lease/Concession 
 
NORTHERN EUROPE (154 Deals) 
 
Denmark  Arne Hensel Berg Peru Danper Trujillo S.A.C Agriculture, Food crops, 
Non-food agricultural 
commodities 
[2003] Concluded (Contract 
signed); In operation 
(production) 
unknown [intended]; 1.640 
ha [contract] 
Outright purchase 
Denmark  Arne Hensel Berg Peru Danper Trujillo S.A.C Agriculture [2012] Concluded (Contract 
signed); [2012] Startup phase 
(no production) 
unknown [intended]; 1.000 
ha [contract] 
Outright purchase 
Denmark  Danish Folkecenter 
for Renewable 
Energy 
Mali Mali Folkcenter Agriculture, Biofuels Concluded (Contract signed); In 
operation (production)  
unknown ha [intended size]; 
1.000 ha [contract size] 
Unknown 
Denmark  Denbia Zambia Chulumenda Agriculture, Food Crops, 
Livestock 
[2003] Concluded (Contract 
signed); In operation 
(production) 
3.000 ha [intended]; 3.000 
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Denmark  I.D.C Investment Ethiopia Unknown Agriculture, Biofuels Concluded (Contract signed); 
[2007] In operation (production) 
unknown [intended size];  
15.000 ha [contract size] 
Unknown 
Denmark  International 
Woodlands 
Company A/S 
Cambodia Grandis Timber Ltd.  Forestry [2009] Concluded, contract 
signed 
Unknown [intended size]; 
9.820 ha [contract size] 
Lease/Concession 




Concluded (Contract signed); In 
operation (production) 
18.800 ha [intended]; 18.800 
ha [contract]; 1.000 ha [in 
production 2014] 
Lease/Concession 
Finland Stora Enso China Guangxi Stora Enso 
Forestry Co. Ltd. 
Forestry for wood and 
fibre, Industry 
Concluded, contract signed; 
[2005] in production 
120.000 ha [intended size]; 
90.286 ha [contract size] 
Lease/Concession 
Finland Stora Enso Uruguay Montes del Plata 
(Silver Forests) 
Forestry for wood and 
fibre 
[2009] Concluded (Contract 
signed); [2009] In operation 
(production) 
unknown [intended]; 66.659 
ha [contract]; 39.146 ha [in 
production 2012] 
Outright purchase 
Finland Stora Enso Uruguay Montes del Plata 
(Silver Forests) 
Forestry for wood and 
fibre 
[2009] Concluded (Contract 
signed); [2009] In operation 
(production) 
unknown [intended]; 69.957 
ha [contract]; 37.508 ha [in 
production 2012] 
Outright purchase 
Finland Stora Enso Uruguay Montes del Plata 
(Silver Forests) 
Forestry for wood and 
fibre 
[2009] Concluded (Contract 
signed); [2009] In operation 
(production) 
unknown [intended]; 40.269 
ha [contract]; 23.231 ha [in 
production 2012] 
Outright purchase 
Finland Stora Enso Uruguay Montes del Plata 
(Silver Forests) 
Forestry for wood and 
fibre 
[2009] Concluded (Contract 
signed); [2009] In operation 
(production) 
unknown [intended]; 23.614 
ha [contract]; 15.824 ha [in 
production 2012] 
Outright purchase 
Finland Stora Enso Uruguay Montes del Plata 
(Silver Forests) 
Forestry for wood and 
fibre 
[2009] Concluded (Contract 
signed); [2009] In operation 
(production) 
unknown [intended]; 15.626 
ha [contract]; 10.864 ha [in 
production 2012] 
Outright purchase 
Finland Stora Enso Uruguay Montes del Plata 
(Silver Forests) 
Forestry for wood and 
fibre 
Concluded (Contract signed); 
[2012] Startup phase (no 
production) 
unknown [intended]; 366 ha 
[contract] 
Outright purchase 
Finland Stora Enso Uruguay Montes del Plata 
(Silver Forests) 
Forestry for wood and 
fibre 
[2009] Concluded (Contract 
signed); [2009] In operation 
(production) 
unknown [intended]; 5.186 
ha [contract]; 3.142 ha [in 
production 2012] 
Outright purchase 
Finland Stora Enso Uruguay Montes del Plata 
(Silver Forests) 
Forestry for wood and 
fibre 
[2009] Concluded (Contract 
signed); [2009] In operation 
unknown [intended]; 4.695 
ha [contract]; 2.755 ha [in 
Outright purchase 
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(production) production 2012] 
Finland Stora Enso Uruguay Montes del Plata 
(Silver Forests) 
Forestry for wood and 
fibre 
[2009] Concluded (Contract 
signed); [2009] In operation 
(production) 
unknown [intended]; 1.153 
ha [contract]; 702 ha [in 
production 2012] 
Outright purchase 
Finland Stora Enso Uruguay Montes del Plata 
(Silver Forests) 
Forestry for wood and 
fibre 
[2009] Concluded (Contract 
signed); [2009] In operation 
(production) 
unknown [intended]; 1.816 
ha [contract]; 421 ha [in 
production 2012] 
Outright purchase 
Finland UPM Uruguay Unknown (M-Real, 
Metsäliitto) 
Forestry for wood and 
fibre 
Concluded (Contract signed); In 
operation (production) 
140.000 ha [intended size]; 
unknown [contract size] 
Outright purchase 
Finland UPM Uruguay Forestal Oriental S.A. Forestry for wood and 
fibre 
[2011] Concluded (Contract 
signed); [2011] In operation 
(production) 
unknown [intended] 7.000 
ha [contract]; 7.000 ha [in 
production 2011] 
Lease/Concession 
Finland UPM Uruguay Forestal Oriental S.A. Forestry for wood and 
fibre 
[2011] Concluded (Contract 
signed); [2011] In operation 
(production) 
unknown [intended]; 11.000 
ha [contract]; 11.000 ha [in 
production 2011] 
Lease/Concession 
Finland  Fenno Caledonian South Sudan Unknown Forestry for wood and 
fibre 
[2010] Intended (Under 
negotiation); unknown current 
status 
160.000 ha [intended]; 
unknown ha [contract] 
Unknown 




Tanzania Kilombero Valley Teak 
Company (KVTC)  
Forestry for wood and 
fibre and for carbon 
sequestration/REDD 
[2011] Concluded (Contract 
signed); [2011] In operation 
(production) 
28.132 ha [intended]; 28.132 
ha [contract]; 4.748 ha [in 
operation 2012] 
Lease/Concession 
Finland  Finnish Fund for 
Industrial 
Cooperation 
Sierra Leone Goldtree (SL) Ltd. Agriculture [2011] Concluded (Contract 
signed); [2013] In operation 
(production) 
5.058 ha [intended]; 800 ha 
[contract 2011]  
Lease/Concession 
Finland  UPM Uruguay Forestal Oriental S.A. Forestry for wood and 
fibre 
[2009] Concluded (Contract 
signed); [2009] In operation 
(production) 
unknown [intended size]; 
200.000 ha [contract size]; 




Sweden  Bio Massive Tanzania Unknown Agriculture, Biofuels [2009] Failed (Negotiations 
failed); [2009] Project 
abandoned 
50.000 ha [intended]; 
unknown [contract] 
Unknown 
Sweden Bio Massive Ethiopia Unknown Agriculture, Biofuels Intended (Under negotiation); 50.000 ha [intended size]; Unknown 
84 
Land Grabbing and Human Rights: 
The Involvement of European Corporate and Financial Entities in Land Grabbing Outside the EU 
unknown current status unknown [contract size] 
Sweden  Diocese of Vasteras 
Church of Sweden 
Mozambique LevasFlor, Lda Forestry for wood and 
fibre 
[2005] Concluded (Contract 
signed); In operation 
(production) 
unknown [intended]; 46.240 
ha [contract] 
Unknown 
Sweden  EcoEnergy Africa AB Tanzania Agro EcoEnergy 
Tanzania Limited 
Agriculture, Biofuels, 
Food crops, Forestry for 
wood and Fibre, 
Renewable energy 
[2009] Concluded (Contract 
signed); [2012] In operation 
(production) 
28.000 ha [intended]; 22.300 
ha [contract]; 200 ha [in 
production 2012] 
Lease/Concession 
Sweden  Silvestria 
Utveckling AB 
Mozambique Luambala Jatropha 
Lda 
Agriculture, Biofuels [2008] Concluded (Contract 
signed); In operation 
(production) 





African Timber and 
Farming Co 
Mozambique ATFC (Mozambique) 
Madeiras e 
Agricultura, Lda 
Forestry for carbon 
sequestration/REDD 
[2009] Concluded (Oral 
Agreement); In operation 
(production) 





AgDevCo Tanzania Sasamua Holdings 
Limited 
Agriculture, Food Crops [2012] Concluded (Contract 
signed); Startup phase (no 
production) 
2.500 ha [intended]; 7.295 





AgDevCo Ghana Unknown 
(Government of 
Ghana) 
Agriculture, Food crops [2012] Intended (Under 
negotiation); unknown current 
status 





AgDevCo Ghana Unknown 
(Government of 
Ghana) 
Agriculture, Food crops [2012] Intended (Under 
negotiation); unknown current 
status 





Agriterra Ltd. Sierra Leone Tropical Farms 
Limited 
Agriculture, Food crops [2011] Concluded (Contract 
signed); [2008] In operation 
(production) 
unknown [intended]; 1.550 








Kenya Lake Turkana Wind 
Power Ltd 
Renewable energy [2009] Concluded (Contract 
signed); [2014] Project not 
started 











Food crops, Non-food 
agricultural 
commodities 
[2004] Concluded (Contract 
signed); [2005] In operation 
(production) 
unknown [intended]; 5.200 














Food crops, Non-food 
agricultural 
commodities 
[2007] Concluded (Contract 
signed); unknown current status 







Indonesia PT Kahayan Agriculture, Biofuels, 
Food crops, Non-food 
agricultural 
commodities 
[2010] Concluded (Contract 
signed); unknown current status 





Bronzeoak Group Philippines Unknown Agriculture Concluded (Contract signed); In 
operation (production) 





Farm Lands of 
Guinea Limited 
Guinea Land & Resources Agriculture, Food crops [2010] Concluded (Contract 
signed); [2011] Project not 
started 
8.815 ha [intended size];  




Farm Lands of 
Guinea Limited 
Guinea Land & Resources Agriculture [2010] Concluded (Contract 
signed); Project not started 
1.500.000 ha [intended size]; 




Formako Farms Ghana Formako Company 
Ltd. 
Agriculture, Food crops Concluded (Contract signed); 
[2004] In operation (production) 





G4 Kenya Unknown Agriculture, Biofuels, 
Food crops 
[2009] Under negotiation; [2011] 
Failed (Negotiations failed); 
unknown current status 
28.991 ha [intended size]; 







Republic of the 
Congo 
Congo Biofuels (CBF) Agriculture, Food crops, 
Forestry for wood and 
fibre 
Concluded (Contract signed); 
Startup phase (no production) 








Republic of the 
Congo 
Congo Biofuels (CBF) Agriculture, Food crops, 
Non-food agricultural 
commodities, Forestry 
for wood and fibre 
[2008] Concluded (Contract 
signed); Project not started 
12.700 ha [intended]; 12.700 







Zambia Unknown Agriculture, Food crops [2003] Concluded (Contract 
signed); In operation 
(production) 





InfraCo Limited Zambia Chanyanya 
Infrastructure 
Company 
Agriculture, Food crops [2006] Concluded (Contract 
signed); [2009] In operation 
(production) 
1.575 ha [intended]; 1.575 
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United 
Kingdom 




Malawi Tropha Ltd. Agriculture, Food Crops [2014] Concluded (Contract 
signed); [2014] Project not 
started 





Justin Sugar Ltd. Cameroon Justin Sugar Mills Agriculture, Biofuels, 
Food crops, Non-food 
agricultural 
commodities 
[2013] Concluded (Contract 
signed); [2014] Startup phase 
(no production) 







Sierra Leone Unknown Agriculture, Food crops Concluded (Contract signed); 
[2014] Project not started  







Tanzania Lukulilo Farm 
Holdings 
Agriculture, Food crops [2012] Concluded (Oral 
Agreement); Project not started 





M.P. Evans Group 
PLC 




Concluded (Contract signed); In 
operation (production) 
unknown [intended]; 2.586 





M.P. Evans Group 
PLC 
Indonesia PT Bilah Plantindo Agriculture, 
Agriunspecified 
Concluded (Contract signed); In 
operation (production) 
unknown [intended]; 2.961 





M.P. Evans Group 
PLC 




Concluded (Contract signed); In 
operation (production) 
unknown [intended]; 1.813 





M.P. Evans Group 
PLC 




[2007] Concluded (Contract 
signed); [2007] In operation 
(production) 
unknown [intended]; 18.600 





MedEnergy Global Mozambique Unknown Agriculture, 
Agriunspecified 
[2010] Concluded (Contract 
signed); Startup phase (no 
production) 





Merlin Partners LLP Malawi Malawi Mangoes 
Limited 
Agriculture, Food crops Concluded (Contract signed); 
[2013] In operation (production) 







Indonesia PT D1 Oils Indonesia Agriculture, Non-food 
agricultural 
commodities 
[2007] concluded, contract 
signed; project abandoned 
Unknown [intended size]; 






Philippines Atlas Consolidated 
Mining and 
Agriculture, Biofuels [2005] under negotiation; [2008] 
project abandoned 
7.000 ha [intended size]; 
unknown [contract size] 
Unknown 
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Agriculture, Biofuels [2007] Concluded (Contract 
signed); Project abandoned 







Zambia D1 Oils Ltd. (Malawi) Agriculture, Biofuels [2006] Concluded (Contract 
signed); [2012] Project 
abandoned 





Peak Palm Oil PLC Guinea Unknown Agriculture, 
Agriunspecified 
Concluded (Contract signed); In 
operation (production) 
100.000 ha [intended]; 5.000 





SABmiller Honduras Unknown Agriculture, Food crops Concluded (Contract signed); 
Startup phase (no production) 







Uruguay CalyxAgro Agriculture, Food Crops, 
Livestock 
[2008] Concluded (Contract 
signed); [2008] In operation 
(production) 







Uruguay CalyxAgro Agriculture, Food Crops, 
Livestock 
Concluded (Contract signed); In 
operation (production) 







Uruguay CalyxAgro Agriculture, Food Crops, 
Livestock 
[2009] Concluded (Contract 
signed); [2009] In operation 
(production) 







Uruguay CalyxAgro Agriculture, Food Crops, 
Livestock 
Concluded (Contract signed); In 
operation (production) 







Brazil CalyxAgro Agriculture Concluded (Contract signed); 
[2013] In operation (production) 







Brazil CalyxAgro Agriculture, Food crops Concluded (Contract signed); 
[2009] In operation (production) 
unknown [intended]; 10.853 







Brazil CalyxAgro Agriculture, Food Crops [2008] Concluded (Contract 
signed); [2008] In operation 
(production) 
unknown [intended]; 8.758 





Sunbird Bio Energy 
Limited 
Nigeria Obax Worldwide 
Limited 
Agriculture, Biofuels [2014] Concluded (Contract 
signed); unknown current status 
20.000 ha [intended]; 20.000 
ha [contract] 
Lease/Concession 
United Trans4mation Nigeria Unknown Agriculture, Food Crops [2008] Concluded (Contract 300.000 ha [intended];  Lease/Concession 
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Agriculture, Food Crops, 
Livestock 
[2009] Concluded (Contract 
signed); [2013] In operation 
(production) 







Ghana Unknown Agriculture, Food crops [2009] Intended (Under 
negotiation); unknown current 
status 





Union Groups (UK) 
LLP 
Uruguay Unión Agriculture 
Group 
Agriculture, Food Crops, 
Livestock 
Concluded (Contract signed); In 
operation (production) 
unknown [intended]; 25.524 





Union Groups (UK) 
LLP 
Uruguay Unión Agriculture 
Group 
Agriculture, Food Crops, 
Livestock 
Concluded (Contract signed); In 
operation (production) 
unknown [intended]; 10.178 





Union Groups (UK) 
LLP 
Uruguay Unión Agriculture 
Group 
Agriculture, Food Crops, 
Livestock 
Concluded (Contract signed); In 
operation (production) 
Unknown [intended]; 
Unknown [contract]; 2.666 




Union Groups (UK) 
LLP 
Uruguay Unión Agriculture 
Group 
Agriculture, Food Crops, 
Livestock 
Concluded (Contract signed); In 
operation (production) 
Unknown [intended]; 
Unknown [contract]; 15.693 




Union Groups (UK) 
LLP 
Uruguay Unión Agriculture 
Group 
Agriculture, Livestock Concluded (Contract signed); In 
operation (production) 
unknown [intended]; 7.064 





Union Groups (UK) 
LLP 
Uruguay Unión Agriculture 
Group 
Agriculture, Food Crops, 
Livestock 
Concluded (Contract signed); In 
operation (production) 
unknown [intended]; 9.262 





Union Groups (UK) 
LLP 
Uruguay Unión Agriculture 
Group 
Agriculture, Food Crops, 
Livestock 
Concluded (Contract signed); In 
operation (production) 
unknown [intended]; 1.192 





Union Groups (UK) 
LLP 
Uruguay Unión Agriculture 
Group 
Agriculture, Food Crops, 
Livestock 
Concluded (Contract signed); In 
operation (production) 
unknown [intended]; 15.458 





Union Groups (UK) 
LLP 
Uruguay Unión Agriculture 
Group 
Agriculture, Livestock, 
Forestry for wood and 
fibre 
Concluded (Contract signed); In 
operation (production) 
unknown [intended]; 11.502 








Union Groups (UK) 
LLP 
Uruguay Unión Agriculture 
Group 
Agriculture, Food Crops, 
Livestock 
Concluded (Contract signed); In 
operation (production) 
unknown [intended]; 6.889 





Union Groups (UK) 
LLP 
Uruguay Unión Agriculture 
Group 
Agriculture, Livestock Concluded (Contract signed); In 
operation (production) 
unknown [intended]; 922 ha 





Unknown Ghana Gold Coast Fruits Ltd. Agriculture, Food Crops [2005] Concluded (Contract 
signed); [2007] In operation 
(production) 
500 ha [intended]; 500 ha 





Volta Red Ghana Unknown Agriculture, 
Agriunspecified 
[2013] Concluded (Contract 
signed); [2010] In operation 
(production) 
3.750 ha [intended]; 3.750 
ha [contract 2013]; 2.050 ha 




Volta Red Ghana Unknown Agriculture, 
Agriunspecified 
[2013] Concluded (Contract 
signed); [2015] In operation 
(production) 





Agrica Tanzania Kilombero Plantations 
Ltd. 
Agriculture, Food Crops [2006] Concluded (Contract 
signed); [2010] In operation 
(production) 
11.018 ha [intended]; 5.818 





Agricapital Sierra Leone Agricapital Sierra 
Leone Ltd 
Agriculture, Food Crops [2011] Concluded (Contract 
signed); unknown current status 
unknown ha [intended]; 




Agricapital Sierra Leone Red Bunch Ventures 
(SL) 
Agriculture [2011] Concluded (Contract 
signed); Project not started 





Agriterra Ltd. Mozambique Mozbife Agriculture, Livestock [2010] Concluded (Contract 
signed); In operation 
(production) 
23.650 ha [intended size]; 










Food crops, Non-food 
agricultural 
commodities 
[2007] Concluded (Contract 
signed); [2007] In operation 
(production) 
unknown [intended]; 5.536 











Food crops, Non-food 
agricultural 
commodities 
[2007] Concluded (Contract 
signed); [2007] In operation 
(production) 
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Indonesia PT Riau Agrindo 
Agung (RAA) 
Agriculture, Biofuels, 
Food crops, Non-food 
agricultural 
commodities 
[2008] Concluded (Contract 
signed); unknown current status 







Indonesia PT Empat Lawang 
Agro Perkasa (ELAP) 
Agriculture, Biofuels, 
Food crops, Non-food 
agricultural 
commodities 
[2008] Concluded (Contract 
signed); unknown current status 







Indonesia PT Karya Kencana 
Sentosa Tiga (KKST) 
Agriculture, Biofuels, 
Food crops, Non-food 
agricultural 
commodities 
[2008] Concluded (Contract 
signed); unknown current status 





Bronzeoak Group Philippines Bronzeoak Philippines 
Inc. 
Agriculture, Biofuels Concluded, contract signed; 
Project not started 
10.000 ha [intended size]; 




Bronzeoak Group Philippines San Carlos Bioenergy Agriculture, Biofuels Concluded (Contract signed); 
[2009] In operation (production) 





CAMS Global Tanzania CMC Agriculture Bio-
Energy Tanzania 
Agriculture, Biofuels, 
Food crops, Renewable 
energy 
[2013] Intended (Under 
negotiation); unknown current 
status 





Caparo Group Namibia Namibia Agriculture 
and Renewables 
(NAR) 
Agriculture, Food Crops [2010] Intended (Under 
negotiation); Project abandoned 
30.000 ha [intended]; 




Cru Investments Malawi Unknown Agriculture, Food crops [2009] In operation (production); 
[2010] Failed (Contract 
canceled); [2010] Project 
abandoned 







Namibia LIH Demeter 
Agribusiness (LDA) 
Agriculture, Food Crops [2009] Under negotiation; [2010] 
Failed (Negotiations failed); 
unknown current status 





Deutsche Bank Ag 
London 
Peru Camposol S.A. Agriculture, Food crops [2006] Concluded (Contract 
signed); [2006] Startup phase 
(no production) 
unknown [intended size]; 




Deutsche Bank Ag 
London 
Peru Camposol S.A. Agriculture, Food Crops [2003] Concluded (Contract 
signed); [2003] In operation 
(production) 









DOS Palm Oil 
Production Limited 
UK 





Agriculture [2007] Concluded 
(Contract signed); [2013] Startup 
phase (no production) 
3.000 ha [intended]; 700 ha 





Eco-Positive Ltd. Rwanda Rwanda Biofuels Ltd.  Agriculture, Biofuels [2009] Concluded (Contract 
signed); unknown current status 
100.000 ha [intended];  




Equatorial Palm Oil 
Plc 
Liberia Liberian Operations 
Inc. 
Agriculture [2008] Concluded (Contract 
signed); [2012] In operation 
(production) 
24.079 ha [intended size]; 
13.962 ha [contract size]; 





Equatorial Palm Oil 
Plc 
Liberia Liberian Operations 
Inc. 
Agriculture [2008] Concluded (Contract 
signed); [2012] In operation 
(production) 
38.957 ha [intended size]; 
54.550 ha [contract size 





Equatorial Palm Oil 
plc 
Liberia Liberian Operations 
Inc (LIBINC) 
Agriculture [2012] Intended (Under 
negotiation); unknown current 
status 





Farm Lands of 
Guinea Limited 
Guinea Land & Resources Agriculture, Food crops [2010] Concluded (Contract 
signed); [2011] Startup phase 
(no production) 
98.400 ha [intended size]; 




Fuel Stock Madagascar Fuelstock Madagascar Agriculture, Biofuels, 
Food crops 
[2012] Concluded (Contract 
signed); [2009] In operation 
(production) 
30.000 ha [intended size]; 
2.000 ha [contract size]; 300 










[2008] Concluded (Contract 
signed); In operation 
(production) 





Highbury Finance Mozambique Sun Mozambique Agriculture, Biofuels [2011] Concluded (Contract 
signed); [2007] In operation 
(production) 
5.800 ha [intended]; 5.800 







Madagascar Green Energy 
Madagascar 
Agriculture, Biofuels [2005] Concluded (Contract 
signed); [2012] Project 
abandoned 
550.000 ha [intended size]; 
495.000 ha [contract size]; 





InfraCo Limited Mozambique Envalor Limitade Agriculture, Biofuels, 
Food crops 
[2011] Concluded (Contract 
signed); unknown current status 
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United 
Kingdom  
Jan-Kasal Company Nigeria Unknown Agriculture, Biofuels, 
Food crops, Renewable 
energy 
Concluded (Contract signed); In 
operation (production) 





Jatropha Africa Ghana Unknown Agriculture, Biofuels Concluded (Contract signed); In 
operation (production) 
120.000 ha [intended size]; 
50.000 ha [contract size]; 5 




Joseph Lewis and 
his son Charles 
Lewis 
Argentina Unknown Tourism Concluded (contract signed); 
Startup phase (no production) 
Unknown [intended size]; 





vera plantation Ltd. 
British 
Tanzania Kilimanjaro aloe vera 
plantation Ltd. 
Agriculture, Food Crops Concluded (Contract signed); 
[2008] Startup phase (no 
production) 





Lion's Head Tanzania Sun Biofuel Tanzania 
Ltd. 
Agriculture, Biofuels [2009] Concluded (Contract 
signed); Project abandoned 
18.000 ha [intended]; 8.211 




Lion's Head Tanzania Mtanga Farms 
Limited 
Agriculture, Food Crops, 
Livestock 
[2008] Concluded (Contract 
signed); In operation 
(production) 
2.200 ha [intended]; 2.200 




Lonrho Plc Angola Unknown Agriculture, Food Crops [2009] Concluded (Contract 
signed); unknown current status 
25.000 ha [intended size]; 




Lonrho Plc Mali Unknown Agriculture, Biofuels, 
Food crops 
Intended (Under negotiation); 
unknown current status 
100.000 ha [intended size]; 




M.P. Evans Group 
PLC 
Indonesia PT Simpang Kiri Agriculture, 
Agriunspecified 
Concluded (Contract signed); 
unknown current status 





M.P. Evans Group 
PLC 




[2007] Concluded (Contract 
signed); [2007] In operation 
(production) 
unknown [intended]; 21.500 





M.P. Evans Group 
PLC 




[2005] Concluded (Contract 
signed); [2012] In operation 
(production) 
unknown [intended]; 10.000 





M.P. Evans Group 
PLC 




Concluded (Contract signed); In 
operation (production) 
unknown [intended]; 22.952 








M.P. Evans Group 
PLC 




Concluded (Contract signed); In 
operation (production)  
unknown [intended]; 2.362 





Maris Capital South Sudan Equatoria Teak 
Company 
Forestry for wood and 
fibre 
[2006] Concluded (Contract 
signed); In operation 
(production) 
unknown [intended];  
18.640 ha [contract]; 1.489 




Maris Capital South Sudan Equatoria Teak 
Company 
Forestry for wood and 
fibre 
[2007] Concluded (Contract 
signed); unknown current status 







India Nandan Bio Energy 
Pte Ltd. 
Agriculture, Biofuels Concluded, contract signed; In 
operation (production) 
100.000 ha [intended size]; 
40.800 ha [contract size]; 







India Bharat Renewable 
Energy Limited 
Agriculture, Biofuels Concluded, contract signed; 
[2010] In operation (production) 
Unknown [intended size]; 










Agriculture Concluded (Contract signed); In 
operation (production) 
unknown [intended]; 564 ha 







Malawi D1 Oils Ltd. Agriculture, Biofuels Concluded (Contract signed); 
[2011] Project abandoned 







Rwanda Unknown (Agri-Vie) Forestry for wood and 
fibre 
[2011] Concluded (Contract 
signed); unknown current status 
10.000 ha [intended]; 10.000 






Tanzania New Forests 
Company Tanzania 
UK Ltd. 
Forestry for wood and 
fibre and for carbon 
sequestration/REDD 
[2009] Concluded (Contract 
signed); [2009] Startup phase 
(no production)  
30.000 ha [intended]; 8.098 








Uganda Unknown Forestry for wood and 
fibre 
[2013] Concluded (Contract 
signed); [2013] In operation 
(production) 
20.000 ha [intended]; 20.000 







Mozambique Montara Continental Agriculture, Food Crops [2010] Concluded (Contract 
signed); In operation 
(production) 







Tanzania Unknown Agriculture, Food Crops [2014] Concluded (Contract 
signed); [2014] Project not 
started 
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Philippines BioEnergy Northern 
Luzon Inc.  
Agriculture, Biofuels [2008] concluded, oral 
agreement; [2009] startup 
phase, no production 
400.000 ha [intended size]; 




Principle Capital Mozambique Mozambique 
Principle Energy 
Limitada 
Agriculture, Biofuels [2013] Failed (Contract 
canceled); [2010] Project 
abandoned 







Nigeria PZ Wilmar Agriculture [2011] Concluded (Contract 
signed); In operation 
(production) 
50.000 ha [intended]; 29.964 






Sierra Leone Unknown Agriculture, Biofuels, 
Forestry for carbon 
sequestration/REDD 
Concluded (Contract signed); 
unknown current status 
unknown [intended]; 






Paraguay CalyxAgro Agriculture, Food crops, 
Conservation 
[2008] Concluded (Contract 
signed); [2008] In operation 
(production) 
unknown [intended size]; 
2.859 ha [contract size]; 760 






Argentina CalyxAgro Agriculture, Food Crops [2013] Concluded (Contract 
signed); [2013] In operation 
(production) 







Argentina CalyxAgro Agriculture, Food Crops, 
Livestock 
[2013] Concluded (Contract 
signed); [2013] In operation 
(production) 







Argentina CalyxAgro Agriculture, Food Crops, 
Livestock 
[2013] Concluded (Contract 
signed); [2013] In operation 
(production) 





Sun Biofuels Energy 
Limited 
Ethiopia National Biodiesel 
Corporation 
Agriculture, Biofuels Concluded (Contract signed); 
Project abandoned 
unknown [intended size];  




Vedanta Resources India Sesa Sterlite Limited Mining, Industry Concluded, oral agreement; 
[2007] In opreration 
(production) 
Unknown [intended size]; 
1.494 ha [contract size]; 834 




Viridesco Mozambique Unknown Agriculture, Biofuels Concluded (Contract signed); 
[2008] Startup phase (no 
production) 
10.000 ha [intended]; 200 ha 





Viridesco Zambia Unknown Agriculture, Biofuels Agriculture Failed (Contract 
canceled); unknown current 











Sierra Leone Whitestone (SL) 
Limited 
Agriculture, Biofuels [2010] Concluded (Contract 
signed) [2010] Project not 
started 
525.000 ha [intended]; 




Windcliffe Sierra Leone Win-Agri Sierra Leone Agriculture, Food Crops [2011] Intended (Under 
negotiation); unknown current 
status 




SOUTHERN EUROPE (55 Deals) 
  
Italy Agrioils Ghana Smart Oils Agriculture, Biofuels [2008] Concluded (Contract 
signed); [2012] In operation 
(production) 
4.000 ha [intended]; 6.699 
ha [contract]; 1.400 ha [in 
production 2014] 
Lease/Concession 
Italy Arkadia Ltd Tanzania Unknown Agriculture, Biofuels Concluded (Contract signed); 
Project not started 
25.000 ha [intended]; 500 ha 
[contract]; 500 ha [in 
production 2012] 
Lease/Concession 
Italy AVIA Spa (Aviam) Mozambique Aviam Lda Agriculture, Biofuels [2008] Concluded (Contract 
signed); [2008] Startup phase 
(no production) 
10.000 ha [intended]; 10.000 









Senegal African National Oil 
Corporation Sarl 
Agriculture, Biofuels, 
Forestry for carbon 
sequestration/REDD 
[2009] Concluded (Contract 
signed); [2013] In operation 
(production) 
2.750 ha [intended]; 2.750 






Mozambique Unknown (Company 
Agro Social Igo 
Sammartini) 
Agriculture [2010] Concluded (Contract 
signed); Startup phase (no 
production) 
20.000 ha [intended]; 3.000 
ha [contract] 
Lease/Concession 
Italy ENI Angola Unknown (ENI and 
Sonangol) 
Agriculture, Biofuels [2008] Intended (Under 
negotiation); unknown current 
status 
12.000 ha [intended]; 
unknown [contract] 
Lease/Concession 




[2009] Intended (Under 
negotiation); unknown current 
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Italy Euro - Liberia 
Logging 
Liberia Euro - Liberia Logging Forestry for wood and 
fibre 
[2009] Concluded (Contract 
signed); unknown 
253.670 ha [intended]; 
253.670 ha [contract] 
Lease/Concession 





[2007] Concluded (Contract 
signed); [2012] Startup phase 
(no production) 
30.000 ha [intended]; 30.000 
ha [contract] 
Lease/Concession 
Italy Fri-El Green Power Nigeria Fri- El Ethiopia 
Farming and 
Processing 
Agriculture, Biofuels [2009] Concluded (Contract 
signed); [2008] In operation 
(production) 
100.000 ha [intended]; 
11.292 ha [contract] 
Lease/Concession 
Italy Gruppo Api 
Gruppo Industriale 
Maccaferri 
Mozambique SAB Mozambique/ 
Inveragro 
Agriculture, Biofuels [2010] Concluded (Contract 
signed); [2013] Project 
abandoned 
40.000 ha [intended]; 6.300 
ha [contract]; 310 ha [in 
production 2010] 
Lease/Concession 
Italy Malavasi Logging Liberia Ej & J Investment 
Corporation 
Forestry for wood and 
fibre 
[2008] Concluded (Contract 
signed); [2010] In operation 
(production) 
57.202 ha [intended]; 57.202 
ha [contract] 
Lease/Concession 




Agriculture, Biofuels [2008] Concluded (Contract 
signed); [2014] In operation 
(production) 
15.000 ha [intended]; 15.000 
ha [contract] 
Lease/Concession 
Italy Nuove Iniziative 
Industriali srl 
Guinea Guinee Energia S.A. Agriculture, Biofuels, 
Non-food agricultural 
commodities 
[2010] Concluded (Contract 
signed); [2013] Project not 
started 
710.000 ha [intended]; 
74.504 ha [contract] 
Lease/Concession 
Italy Nuove Iniziative 
Industriali srl 
Senegal Senergie S.A. Agriculture, Biofuels [2010] Concluded (Contract 
signed); [2011] In operation 
(production) 
50.000 ha [intended]; 50.000 
ha [contract] 
Lease/Concession 
Italy Nuove Iniziative 
Industriali srl 
Ethiopia O.B.M. Ethio 
Renewable Energy 
Agriculture, Biofuels Concluded (Contract signed); In 
operation (production) 
40.000 ha [intended]; 40.000 
ha [contract] 
Lease/Concession 
Italy Picollo Renato Ethiopia Unknown Agriculture [2005] Concluded (Contract 
signed); [2006] In operation 
(production) 
unknown [intended]; 500 ha 
[contract] 
Lease/Concession 
Italy Sogein Mozambique South African Oils Agriculture, Food crops [2011] Concluded (Contract 
signed); unknown current status 
1.000 ha [intended]; 1.000 
ha [contract] 
Lease/Concession 
Italy Tempieri Financial Senegal Senhuile Agriculture, Biofuels, [2012] Concluded (Contract 
signed); [2014] In operation 
26.500 ha [intended]; 25.000 
ha [contract]; 2.000 ha [in 
Lease/Concession 
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Group Food crops (production) production 2015] 
Italy Tozzi Renewable 
Energy 
Madagascar Tozzi Green Agriculture, Biofuels, 
Food crops 
[2012] Concluded (Contract 
signed); [2012] In operation 
(production) 
100.000 ha [intended]; 6.558 
ha [contract]; 3.500 ha [in 
production 2014] 
Lease/Concession 
Portugal Américo Amorim 
group 
Mozambique Agromoz Agriculture, Food crops, 
Non-food agricultural 
commodities 
[2014] Concluded (Contract 
signed); [2014] In operation 
(production) 
9.000 ha [intended]; 9.000 
ha [contract]; 1.600 ha [in 
production 2014] 
Lease/Concession 
Portugal Atlantica Group  Angola AfriAgro Agriculture, Biofuels Agriculture Concluded (Contract 
signed); unknown current status 






Mozambique Companhia Industrial 
do Monapo 
Agriculture, Food crops [2010] Intended (Under 
negotiation); unknown current 
status 
2.000 ha [intended]; 
unknown [contract] 
Unknown 
Portugal Galp Energia Mozambique Galp Buzi Agriculture, Biofuels, 
Food crops 
[2004] Concluded (Contract 
signed); [2004] Startup phase 
(no production) 
30.000 ha [intended]; 15.000 
ha [contract] 
Unknown 
Portugal Galp Energia 
Companhia do Buzi, 
SARL 
Mozambique MocamGalp Agriculture, Biofuels [2010] Concluded (Contract 
signed); Startup phase (no 
production) 
unknown [intended]; 10.000 
ha [contract]; 200 ha [in 
production] 
Unknown 
Portugal Gleinol Angola Unknown Agriculture, Biofuels Concluded (Contract signed); 
unknown current status 
unknown [intended]; 13.000 
ha [contract] 
Unknown 
Portugal Grupo Espirito 
Santo 
Paraguay Ganadera Corina 
Campos y Haciendas 
SA 
Agriculture, Livestock [2012] Concluded (Contract 
signed); [2013] In operation 
(production) 
unknown ha [intended]; 
12.732 ha [contract] 
Outright purchase 
Portugal Grupo Portucel 
Soporcel 
Mozambique Portucel Moçambique 
Lda 
Forestry for wood and 
fibre 
[2009] Concluded (Contract 
signed); [2012] Startup phase 
(no production) 
unknown [intended]; 
173.327 ha [contract] 
Unknown 
Portugal Grupo Portucel 
Soporcel 
Mozambique Portucel Moçambique 
Lda 
Forestry for wood and 
fibre, Renewable energy 
[2011] Concluded (Contract 
signed); [2012] Startup phase 
(no production) 
212.000 ha [intended]; 
182.886 ha [contract]; 2.000 
ha [in production 2013] 
Lease/Concession 
Portugal Horta Boa Mozambique Unknown Agriculture, Food crops [2008] Concluded (Contract 
signed); [2014] In operation 
(production) 
350 ha [intended]; 350 ha 
[contract] 
Lease/Concession 
Portugal Indivest Mozambique Unknown Agriculture, Food crops [2014] Concluded (Contract 
signed); [2014] Project not 
50.000 ha [intended]; 30.000 Lease/Concession 
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started ha [contract] 
Portugal José Adelino 
Nogueira Aires 
Alves 
Mozambique Agro Alfa S.A.R.L Agriculture, 
Agriunspecified 
[2013] Concluded (Contract 
signed); In operation 
(production) 
2.650 ha [intended]; 650 ha 
[contract] 
Lease/Concession 




[2010] Concluded (Contract 
signed); Startup phase (no 
production) 
40.000 ha [intended]; 10.000 
ha [contract] 
Lease/Concession 
Portugal Quifel Holdings Mozambique Partrouge 
Moçambique Lda 
Agriculture, Food crops Intended (Under negotiation); 
unknown current status 
5.000 ha [intended]; 
unknown [contract] 
Lease/Concession 
Portugal SGC Energia Mozambique Enerterra Agriculture, Biofuels [2009] Concluded (Contract 
signed); [2013] Project 
abandoned 
unknown [intended]; 18.508 
ha [contract] 
Unknown 










[2010] Concluded (Contract 
signed); unknown current status 
15.000 ha [intended]; 15.000 
ha [contract] 
Lease/Concession 
Portugual Galp Energia Brazil Belém Bioenergia 
Brasil S.A 
Agriculture, Biofuels [2011] Concluded (Contract 
signed); [2011] In operation 
(production) 
60.000 ha [intended]; 8.500 
ha [contract]; 3.144 ha [in 
production 2011] 
Lease/Concession 
Spain Abengoa SA Philippines Unknown Agriculture, Biofuels [2007] Intended (Under 
negotiation); [2007] Project not 
started 
50.000 ha [intended]; 
unknown [contract] 
Unknown 
Spain Acciona Energia 
Mexico (filial de 
Acciona Energia, 
Espana) 
Mexico Unknown Renewable energy [2009] Concluded (Contract 
signed); In operation 
(production) 
unknown [intended]; 2.500 
ha [contract] 
Lease/Concession 
Spain Aceites Borges 
Olivo Noble S.A. 
Chile Unknown Agriculture, Food crops Concluded (Contract signed); In 
operation (production) 





Brazil Unknown Tourism Intended (Under negotiation); 
unknown current status 
3.100 ha [intended]; 
unknown [contract] 
Unknown 
Spain Agrogeba Guinea-Bissau Unknown Agriculture, Food crops [2010] Concluded (Contract 
signed); In operation 
(production) 
unknown [intended]; 1.214 
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Spain Biocongo Global 
Trading 
Congo Unknown Agriculture, Biofuels [2012] Concluded (Contract 
signed);  unknown current status 
60.000 ha [intended]; 60.000 
ha [contract] 
Lease/Concession 
Spain Cie Automotive S.A. Philippines Unknown Agriculture, Biofuels [2007] Intended (Under 
negotiation); unknown current 
status 
100.000 ha [intended]; 
unknown [contract] 
Unknown 
Spain Cie Automotive S.A. Guatemala Unknown (Bionor 
Group) 
Agriculture, Biofuels [2007] Concluded (Contract 
signed); [2007] Startup phase 
(no production) 
unknown [intended]; 473 ha 
[contract] 
Outright purchase 
Spain Grupo Corona Colombia Madeflex S.A.  Forestry for wood and 
fibre 
Concluded (Contract signed); In 
operation (production) 
unknown [intended]; 4.000 
ha [contract] 
Exploitation License 
Spain Grupo Pescanova Nicaragua Río Real Empresa de 
Camarón S.A. 
Agriculture [2006] Concluded (Contract 
signed); In operation 
(production) 
unknown [intended]; 498 ha 
[contract] 
Lease/Concession 
Spain Grupo Torres Chile Unknown Agriculture, Food crops Concluded (Contract signed); In 
operation (production) 
unknown [intended]; 800 ha 
[contract] 
Outright purchase 
Spain Infinita Renovable 
Isolux Corsán 
Group 
Argentina Infinita Renovable Agriculture, Biofuels [2007] Concluded (Contract 
signed); In operation 
(production) 
unknown [intended]; 50.000 
ha [contract] 
Outright purchase 
Spain J. García-Carrión Ghana Unknown Agriculture, Food crops Concluded (Contract signed); 
Project not started 
10.000 ha [intended]; 10.000 
ha [contract] 
Unknown 






Intended (Under negotiation); 
unknown current status 
200.000 ha [intended]; 
unknown [contract] 
Lease/Concession 
Spain Poligrow Colombia Poligrow Agriculture, Biofuels [2013] Concluded (Contract 
signed); [2013] In operation 
(production) 




Spain SanLucar Fruit Sl South Africa Sanlucar South Africa 
Citrus (Pty) Ltd 
Agriculture, Food crops [2012] Concluded (Contract 
signed); [2012] In operation 
(production) 
3.000 ha [intended]; 608 ha 
[contract];  
Outright purchase 
Spain SanLucar Fruit Sl Tunisia SanLucar Tunisia Agriculture, Food crops [2008] Concluded (Contract 
signed); [2008] In operation 
(production) 
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Spain Sovena Group Morocco Soprolives Agriculture, Food crops [2006] Concluded (Contract 
signed); [2007] In operation 
(production) 
unknown [intended]; 1.011 




WESTERN EUROPE (110 Deals) 
  
Austria Energea GmbH India Unknown (Naturol 
BioEnergy Ltd) 
Agriculture, Biofuels, 
Food crops, Non-food 
agricultural 
commodities 
[2005] Intended (Under 
negotiation); [2012] In operation 
(production) 
120.000 ha [intended]; 
unknown [contract] ; 1.000 
ha [in production 2008] 
Unknown 
Austria Mima Holding 
GmbH 
Ethiopia Unknown Agriculture, Non-food 
agricultural 
commodities 
[2007] Concluded (Contract 
signed); In operation 
(production) 
unknown [intended]; 20.000 
ha [contract] 
Unknown 
Belgium FELISA Tanzania Unknown Agriculture, Food crops [2008] Concluded (Contract 
signed); [2014] In operation 
(production) 
5.000 ha [intended]; 4.258 
ha [contract]; 100 ha [in 
production 2014] 
Outright purchase 
Belgium Group Sopex Democratic 





Agriculture, Food crops, 
Agriunspecified 
[2005] Concluded (Contract 
signed); [2006] In operation 
(production) 
2.500 ha [intended]; 2.500 
ha [contract]; 1.400 ha [in 
production 2015] 
 Lease/Concession 
Belgium La région de 
Bruxelles la Capitale 
Democratic 
Republic of the 
Congo 
Unknown Forestry for carbon 
sequestration/REDD, 
Conservation 
Intended (Under negotiation); 
unknown current status 
109.000 ha [intended]; 
unknown [contract] 
Lease/Concession 
Belgium Nocafex Democratic 
Republic of the 
Congo 




Concluded (Contract signed); In 
operation (production) 
37.800 ha [intended]; 37.800 
ha [contract]; 4.500 ha [in 
production] 
Lease/Concession 




[2011] Concluded (Contract 
signed); In operation 
(production) 
16.000 ha [intended]; 16.000 
ha [contract]; 16.000 ha [in 
production 2011] 
Lease/Concession 
Belgium Siat Nigeria Presco Plc Agriculture, 
Agriunspecified 
[2002] Concluded (Contract 
signed); In operation 
(production) 
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Belgium Siat Côte d'Ivoire Compagnie Hévéicole 




[2007] Concluded (Contract 
signed); [2007] In operation 
(production) 
13.700 ha [intended]; 7.700 
ha [contract] 
Lease/Concession 





[2004] Concluded (Contract 
signed); [2004] In operation 
(production) 
119.400 ha [intended]; 
119.400 ha [contract]; 
17.300 ha [in production] 
Unknown 
Belgium Siat Côte d'Ivoire Compagnie Hévéicole 
de Prikro (CHP) 
Agriculture, Food crops, 
Non-food agricultural 
commodities 
[2013] Concluded (Contract 
signed); [2014] Project not 
started 
unknown [intended]; 5.000 
ha [contract] 
Lease/Concession 




[2014] Intended (Under 
negotiation); unknown current 
status 
17.000 ha [intended]; 
unknown [contract] 
Lease/Concession 
Belgium SIPEF Côte d'Ivoire Plantation J. Eglin SA Agriculture, Food crops, 
Non-food agricultural 
commodities 
[2003] Concluded (Contract 
signed); In operation 
(production) 
1.762 ha [intended]; 1.440 
ha [contract] 
Unknown 




Concluded (Contract signed); In 
operation (production) 
unknown [intended]; 22.952 
ha [contract]; 9.495 ha [in 
production 2014] 
Unknown 




Concluded (Contract signed); In 
operation (production) 
unknown [intended]; 2.362 
ha [contract]; 2.098 ha [in 
production 2014] 
Unknown 




[2005] Concluded (Contract 
signed); In operation 
(production) 
unknown [intended]; 1.199 
ha [contract]; 1.135 ha [in 
production 2012] 
Lease/Concession 




[2010] Concluded (Contract 
signed); In operation 
(production) 
unknown ha [intended]; 
3.187 ha [contract]; 1.116 ha 
[in production 2014] 
Unknown 
Belgium SIPEF Indonesia PT Citra Sawit Mandiri Agriculture, 
Agriunspecified 
[2007] Concluded (Contract 
signed); In operation 
(production) 
unknown [intended]; 3.947 
ha [contract]; 1.346 ha [in 
production 2014] 
Unknown 
Belgium SIPEF Indonesia PT Agro Kati Lama Agriculture, [2011] Concluded (Contract unknown [intended]; 7.568 Unknown 
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Agriunspecified signed); Startup phase (no 
production) 
ha [contract]; 736 ha [in 
production 2014] 
Belgium SIPEF Indonesia PT Agro Muara Rupit Agriculture, 
Agriunspecified 
[2014] Intended (Under 
negotiation); unknown current 
status 
12.309 ha [intended]; 
unknown [contract] 
Unknown 
Belgium SIPEF Indonesia PT Agro Rawas Ulu Agriculture, 
Agriunspecified 
[2011] Concluded (Contract 
signed); In operation 
(production) 
unknown [intended]; 9.000 
ha [contract]; 240 ha [in 
production 2014] 
Unknown 
Belgium  Hubert Gosse 
(Belgium, Private 
company) 
Argentina Hubert Gosse Tourism Concluded (Contract signed); 
unknown current status 
unknown [intended]; 11.000 
ha [contract] 
Outright purchase 
France Agro Energy 
Développement 
Burkina Faso Unknown Agriculture, Biofuels [2007] Concluded (Contract 
signed); unknown current status 
200.000 ha [intended]; 
200.000 ha [contract] 
Lease/Concession 
France Agro Energy 
Développement 
Mali Unknown Agriculture, Biofuels [2007] Concluded (Contract 
signed); unknown current status 
30.000 ha [intended]; 30.000 
ha [contract] 
Lease/Concession 
France Agro Energy 
Développement 
Guinea Unknown Agriculture, Biofuels [2007] Concluded (Contract 
signed); unknown current status 
100.000 ha [intended]; 
100.000 ha [contract] 
Lease/Concession 
France Agro Energy 
Développement 
Mali Unknown Agriculture, Food crops [2007] Intended (Under 
negotiation); unknown current 
status 
2.605 ha [intended]; 
unknown [contract] 
Unknown 
France AgroGeneration Argentina AgerAustral S.A Agriculture, Food crops [2012] Concluded (Contract 
signed); [2010] In operation 
(production) 




France AgroGeneration Argentina AgerAustral and La 
Suerte Agro 
Agriculture, Food crops [2012] Concluded (Contract 
signed); unknown current status 
unknown [intended]; 16.000 
ha [contract] 
Lease/Concession 
France Areva S.A. India Unknown (Nuclear 
Power Corporation of 
India Ltd) 
Industry [2015] Concluded (Contract 
signed); Project not started 
1.000 ha [intended]; 938 ha 
[contract] 
Unknown 
France Castel Winery Plc Ethiopia BGI Ethiopia Agriculture, Food crops [2008] Concluded (Contract 
signed); [2011] In operation 
(production) 
unknown [intended]; 450 ha 
[contract]; 120 ha [in 
production 2008] 
Lease/Concession 
France CityStar Cambodia Unknown Other, Tourism Concluded (Contract signed); 
[2013] Startup phase (no 
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production) 
France Compagnie fruitière  Senegal Grands Domaines du 
Sénégal (GDS) 
Agriculture, Food crops [2003] Concluded (Contract 
signed); In operation 
(production) 
371 ha [intended]; 300 ha 
[contract]; 200 ha [in 
production] 
Lease/Concession 
France Compagnie fruitière  Ghana Golden Exotics 
Limited (GEL) 
Agriculture, Food crops [2003] Concluded (Contract 
signed); [2012] In operation 
(production) 
4.700 ha [intended]; 3.500 
ha [contract]; 1.200 ha [in 
production 2012] 
Lease/Concession 
France Compagnie fruitière  Cameroon Plantations du Haut 
Penja (PHP) 
Agriculture, Food crops [2014] Concluded (Contract 
signed); [2014] Project not 
started 




Agricole de St. 
Louis 
Senegal Unknown Agriculture, Food crops [2013] Intended (Under 
negotiation); unknown current 
status 
4.500 ha [intended]; 
unknown [contract] 
Lease/Concession 
France Danone Grouü 
Orbeo SAS 
Senegal Unknown Forestry for carbon 
sequestration/REDD, 
Conservation 
[2011] Concluded (Contract 
signed); [2009] In operation 
(production) 
10.000 ha [intended]; 10.000 
ha [contract]; 10.000 ha [in 
production 2012] 
Lease/Concession 
France DRT Madagascar SMCTR Société 
Malgache de Collecte 
et de Transformation 
de la Résine 
Forestunspecified, 
Forestry 
[2007] Concluded (Contract 
signed); [2007] In operation 
(production) 
15.000 ha [intended]; 10.000 
ha [contract] 
Lease/Concession 




Intended (Under negotiation); 
unknown current status 
18.000 ha [intended]; 
unknown [contract] 
Unknown 
France Michelin Nigeria Rubber Estates 




[2006] Concluded (Contract 
signed); In operation 
(production) 
12.000 ha [intended]; 12.000 
ha [contract] 
Lease/Concession 





[2008] Concluded (Contract 
signed); [2008] In operation 
(production) 
35.000 ha [intended]; 35.000 
ha [contract]; 4.500 ha [in 
production 2012] 
Lease/Concession 
France Pergam Finance Uruguay Unknown Agriculture, Food crops, 
Livestock 
[2008] Concluded (Contract 
signed); In operation 
(production) 
unknown [intended];  6.561 
ha [contract] 
Outright purchase 
France Pergam Finance Uruguay Unknown Agriculture, Food crops, [2006] Concluded (Contract unknown [intended]; 6.939 Outright purchase 
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Livestock signed); unknown current status ha [contract] 
France Pergam Finance Uruguay Unknown Agriculture, Food crops, 
Livestock 
[2007] Concluded (Contract 
signed); In operation 
(production) 
unknown [intended]; 6.261 
ha [contract] 
Outright purchase 
France Pergam Finance Uruguay Unknown Agriculture, Food crops, 
Livestock 
[2006] Concluded (Contract 
signed); In operation 
(production) 
unknown [intended]; 3.504 
ha [contract] 
Outright purchase 
France Somdiaa Côte d'Ivoire SUCAF CI Agriculture, Food crops [2010] Concluded (Contract 
signed); [2010] In operation 
(production) 
14.600 ha [intended]; 14.600 
ha [contract]; 14.600 ha [in 
production 2012] 
Unknown 
France Somdiaa Gabon Sucaf Gabon Agriculture, Food crops [2010] Concluded (Contract 
signed); [2010] In operation 
(production) 
4.400 ha [intended]; 4.400 
ha [contract]; 4.400 ha [in 
production 2010] 
Unknown 
France Somdiaa Central African 
Republic 
SUCAF RCA Agriculture, Food crops [2003] Concluded (Contract 
signed); [2003] In operation 
(production) 
5.317 ha [intended]; 5.317 
ha [contract] 
Unknown 






[2013] Concluded (Contract 
signed); [2013] Startup phase 
(no production) 
65.000 ha [intended]; 45.000 
ha [contract] 
Lease/Concession 
France Talleyrand Tunisia Talleyrand Tunisie Agriculture, Food crops Concluded (Contract signed); 
unknown current status 
15.000 ha [intended]; 2.700 
ha [contract] 
Lease/Concession 
France Vicat Group Senegal Sococim Senegal Agriculture, Biofuels [2007] Concluded (Contract 
signed); [2012] Project 
abandoned 
11.000 ha [intended]; 150 ha 







Pictet Private Equity 
Investors 
Indonesia Unknown Agriculture, Biofuels, 
Food crops, Non-food 
agricultural 
commodities 
Concluded (Contract signed); In 
operation (production) 
unknown [intended]; 58.000 







Pictet Private Equity 
Investors 
Paraguay CalyxAgro Agriculture, Food crops, 
Conservation 
[2008] Concluded (Contract 
signed); [2008] In operation 
(production) 










Pictet Private Equity 
Investors 
Argentina CalyxAgro Agriculture, Food crops [2013] Concluded (Contract 
signed); [2013] In operation 
(production) 







Pictet Private Equity 
Investors 
Argentina CalyxAgro Agriculture, Food crops, 
Livestock 
[2013] Concluded (Contract 
signed); [2013] In operation 
(production) 







Pictet Private Equity 
Investors 
Argentina CalyxAgro Agriculture, Food crops, 
Livestock 
[2013] Concluded (Contract 
signed); [2013] In operation 
(production) 







Pictet Private Equity 
Investors 
Uruguay CalyxAgro Agriculture, Food crops, 
Livestock 
[2008] Concluded (Contract 
signed); [2008] In operation 
(production) 







Pictet Private Equity 
Investors 
Uruguay CalyxAgro Agriculture, Food crops, 
Livestock 
Concluded (Contract signed); In 
operation (production) 







Pictet Private Equity 
Investors 
Uruguay CalyxAgro Agriculture, Food crops, 
Livestock 
[2009] Concluded (Contract 
signed); [2009] In operation 
(production) 







Pictet Private Equity 
Investors 
Uruguay CalyxAgro Agriculture, Food crops, 
Livestock 
Concluded (Contract signed); In 
operation (production) 







Pictet Private Equity 
Investors 
Brazil CalyxAgro Agriculture Concluded (Contract signed); 
[2013] In operation (production) 







Pictet Private Equity 
Investors 
Brazil CalyxAgro Agriculture, Food crops Concluded (Contract signed); 
[2009] In operation (production) 
unknown [intended]; 10.853 
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Pictet Private Equity 
Investors 
Brazil CalyxAgro Agriculture, Food crops [2008] Concluded (Contract 
signed); [2008] In operation 
(production) 
unknown [intended]; 8.758 
ha [contract]; 6.745 ha [in 
production 2008] 
Outright purchase 
Germany Amatheon Agri 
Holding N.V. 
Zambia Amatheon Agri 
Zambia Limited 
Agriculture, Food crops, 
Livestock 
[2011] Concluded (Contract 
signed); [2013] In operation 
(production) 
60.000 ha [intended]; 38.760 
ha [contract] 
Lease/Concession 
Germany Amatheon Agri 
Holding N.V. 
Zambia Katonga Farm Ltd Agriculture, Food crops [2015] Concluded (Contract 
signed); [2015] Project not 
started 
2.700 ha [intended]; 2.700 
ha [contract] 
Lease/Concession 
Germany Amatheon Agri 
Holding N.V. 
Uganda Amatheon Agri 
Uganda Limited 
(AAUL) 
Agriculture, Food crops, 
Agriunspecified 
[2013] Concluded (Contract 
signed); [2014] In operation 
(production) 
6.030 ha [intended]; 6.030 
ha [contract]; 1.700 ha [in 
production 2015] 
Lease/Concession 
Germany Amatheon Agri 
Holding N.V. 
Zimbabwe Amatheon Agri 
Zimbabwe 
Agriculture, Food crops, 
Livestock, 
Agriunspecified 
[2013] Concluded (Contract 
signed); [2014] In operation 
(production) 
900 ha [intended]; 900 ha 
[contract]; 500 ha [in 
production 2014] 
Lease/Concession 
Germany DWS GALOF Tanzania Unknown Agriculture, Food crops, 
Livestock 
Concluded (Contract signed); In 
operation (production) 
5.000 ha [intended]; 5.000 
ha [contract] 
Lease/Concession 
Germany Elaion AG Mozambique Elaion Africa Limitada 
(Ltd.) 
Forestry for wood and 
fibre 
[2007] Concluded (Contract 
signed); [2010] Project 
abandoned 
1.000 ha [intended]; 1.000 
ha [contract] 
Unknown 
Germany Flora EcoPower 
Holding AG 
Acazis AG 
Thailand Unknown Agriculture, Biofuels [2008] Intended (Under 
negotiation); unknown current 
status 
120.000 ha [intended];  
unknown [contract]; 46.000 
ha [in production 2008] 
Unknown 
Germany GEXSI Madagascar Platinum Madagascar 
SARL 
Agriculture, Biofuels [2013] Intended (Under 
negotiation); In operation 
(production) 
15.000 ha [intended]; 
unknown [contract]; 150 ha 
[in production 2012] 
Lease/Concession 
Germany Jatro Solutions Madagascar JatroGreen S.A.R.L. Agriculture, Biofuels [2007] Concluded (Contract 
signed); In operation 
(production) 
3.000 ha [intended]; 3.000 
ha [contract]; 420 ha [in 
production 2012] 
Unknown 




[2009] Concluded (Contract 
signed); [2012] Startup phase 
(no production) 
191.103 ha [intended]; 
191.103 ha [contract]; 8 ha 
[in production 2012] 
Unknown 
Germany Neumann Kaffee Uganda Kaweri Coffee Agriculture, Food crops [2001] Concluded (Contract 
signed); In operation 
2.510 ha [intended]; 2.511 
ha [contract]; 1.801 ha [in 
Lease/Concession 
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Group Plantation Ltd. (production) production] 
Germany Symboil AG Ghana Symboil Ghana Ltd Agriculture, Biofuels, 
Food crops 
[2007] Concluded (Contract 
signed); [2007] Startup phase 
(no production) 
13.500 ha [intended]; 7.000 
ha [contract] 
Lease/Concession 
Germany Unknown Ghana Gold Coast Fruits Ltd Agriculture, Food crops [2005] Concluded (Contract 
signed); [2007] In operation 
(production) 
500 ha [intended]; 500 ha 
[contract]; 400 ha [in 
production 2010] 
Lease/Concession 
Germany YONEC GmbH & Co. 
Naturenergie KG 
Ghana Biotic Oil Company 
Ltd 




Concluded (Contract signed); 
unknown current status 
1.000 ha [intended]; 1.000 
ha [contract] 
Lease/Concession 
Germany  BHB GmbH 
Projektmanagment 
Sierra Leone Vedico Mange Bureh 
Farm Ltd. 
Agriculture, Food crops [2008] Concluded (Contract 
signed); [2008] Startup phase 
(no production) 







Ethiopia Acazis Agro-Industry Agriculture, Biofuels, 
Food crops 
[2007] Concluded (Contract 
signed); [2012] In operation 
(production) 
56.000 ha [intended]; 3.800 
ha [contract]; 1.000 ha [in 
production 2012] 
Lease/Concession 
Luxembourg Adecoagro S.A. Argentina Unknown (El Tejar SA) Agriculture, Food crops Concluded (Contract signed); 
unknown current status 
unknown [intended]; 10.877 
ha [contract] 
Outright purchase 
Luxembourg Adecoagro S.A. Argentina Unknown (El Tejar SA) Agriculture, Food crops Concluded (Contract signed); In 
operation (production) 
unknown [intended]; 15.451 
ha [contract] 
Outright purchase 
Luxembourg Adecoagro S.A. Argentina Unknown (El Tejar SA) Agriculture, Food crops Concluded (Contract signed); In 
operation (production) 
unknown [intended]; 5.236 
ha [contract] 
Outright purchase 
Luxembourg Adecoagro S.A. Argentina Simoneta S.A. Agriculture, 
Agriunspecified 
[2011] Concluded (Contract 
signed); In operation 
(production) 





Peru Camposol S.A. Agriculture, Food crops [2006] Concluded (Contract 
signed); [2006] Startup phase 
(no production) 





Peru Camposol S.A. Agriculture, Food crops [2003] Concluded (Contract 
signed); [2003] In operation 
(production) 
unknown [intended]; 3.200 








[2011] Concluded (Contract 
signed); [2013] In operation 
30.000 ha [intended]; 9.300 
ha [contract]; 3.125 ha [in 
Lease/Concession 
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Leone Ltd.  commodities, 
Agriunspecified 
(production) production 2013] 





[2007] Concluded (Contract 
signed); [2007] In operation 
(production) 
8.000 ha [intended]; 8.000 
ha [contract]; 4.297 ha [in 
production 2013] 
Lease/Concession 
Luxembourg SOCFIN Democratic 
Republic of the 
Congo 
Brabanta SPRI Agriculture, 
Agriunspecified 
[2007] Concluded (Contract 
signed); Project not started 
28.261 ha [intended]; 28.261 
ha [contract] 
Lease/Concession 




Concluded (Contract signed); 
[2011] Startup phase (no 
production) 
22.000 ha [intended]; 22.000 
ha [contract] 
Lease/Concession 
Luxembourg SOCFIN Cambodia Socfin-KCD Agriculture, Non-food 
agricultural 
commodities 
[2010] Concluded (Contract 
signed); [2008] In operation 
(production) 
10.58 ha [intended]; 26.978 
ha [contract]; 4.062 ha [in 
production 2012] 
Outright purchase 






[2010] Concluded (Contract 
signed); [2011] In operation 
(production) 
5.000 ha [intended]; 5.000 
ha [contract] 
Lease/Concession 




[2014] Concluded (Contract 
signed); [2014] Project not 
started 
11.400 ha [intended]; 11.400 
ha [contract] 
Outright purchase 
Netherlands Afriflora Ethiopia Sher Ethiopia PLC Agriculture, Non-food 
agricultural 
commodities 
[2005] Concluded (Contract 
signed); In operation 
(production) 
1.000 ha [intended]; 500 ha 
[contract] 
Lease/Concession 
Netherlands Bioking  Senegal Unknown Agriculture, Biofuels [2006] Concluded (Contract 
signed); [2008] Project 
abandoned 
60.000 ha [intended; 3.000 
ha [contract] 
Unknown 
Netherlands Bioshape Holding Tanzania BioShape Tanzania 
Ltd 
Agriculture, Biofuels [2005] Concluded (Contract 
signed); [2010] Project 
abandoned 
81.000 ha [intended]; 34.000 







(Monrovia) Power Inc 
Renewable energy [2009] Concluded (Contract 
signed); [2013] Project 
abandoned 
250.000 ha [intended]; 
250.000 ha [contract] 
Exploitation license 
109 
Policy Department, Directorate-General for External Policies 
 
Netherlands BXR Group Mozambique Hoyo Hoyo Agriculture, Biofuels, 
Food crops 
[2009] Concluded (Contract 
signed); [2013] In operation 
(production) 
23.000 ha [intended]; 10.000 
ha [contract]; 800 ha [in 
production 2013] 
Lease/Concession 
Netherlands BXR Group Malawi Malawi Mangoes 
Limited 
Agriculture, Food crops Concluded (Contract signed); 
[2013] In operation (production) 
3.434 ha [intended]; 434 ha 
[contract] 
Lease/Concession 





Sierra Leone Unknown Agriculture, Food crops Concluded (Contract signed); 
[2010] In operation (production) 
450 ha [intended]; 200 ha 
[contract]; 50 ha [in 
production 2010] 
Unknown 
Netherlands Dutch Jatropha 
Consortium 
Mozambique Niqel Lda Agriculture, Biofuels [2008] Concluded (Contract 
signed); In operation 
(production) 
50.000 ha [intended]; 7.500 
ha [contract] 
Unknown 
Netherlands FACE Foundation Senegal Unknown Forestry for carbon 
sequestration/REDD, 
Conservation 
[2012] Intended (Under 
negotiation); unknown current 
status 
1.000 ha [intended]; 
unknown [contract] 
Unknown 







Forestry for wood and 
fibre 
[2007] Concluded (Contract 
signed); unknown current status 
unknown [intended]; 40.000 
ha [contract] 
Outright purchase 
Netherlands Floresteca Holding 
N.V.  
Brazil Unknown Forestry for wood and 
fibre 
Concluded (Contract signed); In 
operation (production) 
unknown [intended]; 37.000 
ha [contract] 
Unknown 
Netherlands Forest Returns Brazil Unknown Forestunspecified, 
Forestry 
[2007] Concluded (Contract 
signed); [2007] In operation 
(production) 
unknown [intended]; 7.000 
ha [contract] 
Unknown 
Netherlands Forest Returns Costa Rica Unknown Agriculture, Food crops, 
Forestry, Tourism, 
Conservation 
[2004] Concluded (Contract 
signed); [2004] In operation 
(production) 
unknown [intended]; 1.114 
ha [contract] 
Outright purchase 
Netherlands Form International 
Ltd. 
Ghana Form Ghana Ltd. Forestry for wood and 
fibre and for carbon 
sequestration/REDD 
[2007] Concluded (Contract 
signed); [2013] In operation 
(production) 
20.000 ha [intended]; 3.500 






Ethiopia GADCO Enterprise Plc Agriculture, Food crops [2005] Concluded (Contract 
signed); In operation 
(production) 
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Netherlands Green Capital Costa Rica Unknown Forestry for wood and 
fibre 
Concluded (Contract signed); In 
operation (production) 
unknown [intended]; 267 ha 
[contract] 
Unknown 




Other [2011] Concluded (Contract 
signed); [2014] In operation 
(production) 
unknown [intended]; 2.572 
ha [contract]; 341 ha [in 
production 2014] 
Lease/Concession 
Netherlands K.I. Samen B.V. Tanzania Unknown (Holland 
Dairies) 
Agriculture, Livestock [2009] Concluded (Contract 
signed); [2012] In operation 
(production) 
1.000 ha [intended]; 1.000 
ha [contract]; 1.000 ha [in 
production 2012] 
Lease/Concession 
Netherlands Kooy Bioflow B.V. Ethiopia Unknown (Kooy 
Bioflow B.V., Mekiya 
Agri Mechanization 
Service PLC) 
Agriculture, Biofuels Concluded (Contract signed); 
unknown current status 
50.000 ha [intended]; 200 ha 
[contract]; 200 ha [in 
production 2008] 
Lease/Concession 
Netherlands KP&P BV Africa Kenya Lake Turkana Wind 
Power Ltd 
Renewable Energy [2009] Concluded (Contract 
signed); [2014] Project not 
started 
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Annex 4: Legal Sources for the Extraterritorial Obligations of the EU 
and EU Member States 
This Annex thematically lists the juridical references that underpin the arguments developed in Chapter 
4.2 (“Extraterritorial human rights obligation of the EU and EU Member States”). The references below 
refer to the Maastricht Principles on Extraterritorial Obligations of States in the Area of Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights (ETO Principles) and to other legal sources. 
CHAPTERS OF JURIDICAL REFERENCES 
A. Human rights obligations in the context of intergovernmental organisations  
B. Do no harm 
a) Respect obligations 
b) Impact assessments/due diligence 
C. International agreements and cooperation 
a) Human rights compliance of international agreements 
b) Enabling international environment 
c) International cooperation  
D. Protect obligations 
a) Regulation of non-state actors 
b) Regulation of state-controlled DFIs 
E. Remedy 
A. Human rights obligations in the context of intergovernmental 
organisations 
1. Principles and Objectives referred to in Title V, Chapter 1, para 1 & 2 of the TEU 
The principles and objectives referred to include democracy, the rule of law, the universality and 
indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of 
equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law. 
2. Statement by European Commission and High Representative (2011) 
“EU external action has to comply with the rights contained in the EU Charter… as well as with the rights 
guaranteed by the European Convention on Human Rights.”  
3. European Parliament Resolution of 22 October 2009 on the institution aspects of setting up 
the European External Action Service (2009/2133(INI)) 
The European Parliament “[recalls] that the EEAS must guarantee full application of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights in all aspects of the Union's external action in accordance with the spirit and purpose 
of the Lisbon Treaty” (§5). 
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As a member of an international organisation, the State remains responsible for its own conduct in 
relation to its human rights obligations within its territory and extra territorially. A State that transfers 
competences to, or participates in, an international organisation must take all reasonable steps to ensure 
that the relevant organisation acts consistently with the international human rights obligations of that 
State. 
For a comprehensive analysis of States’ extraterritorial obligations in the context of intergovernmental 
organisations, see ETO Consortium (2014) “Extraterritorial Obligations in the Context of International 
Financial Institutions”. Available at: http://www.etoconsortium.org/nc/en/main-navigation/ library 
/documents/?tx_drblob_pi1[downloadUid]=131 (accessed on 14 April 2016); The European Union and 
Human Rights: An International Law Perspective, Tawhida Ahmed and Israel de Jesús Butler, The European 
Journal of International Law, Vol. 17 no.4, 2006, p. 781. 
5. ETO Principle 16: Obligations of international organisations 
The present Principles apply to States without excluding their applicability to the human rights 
obligations of international organisations under, inter alia, general international law and international 
agreements to which they are parties.  
6. General Comment No. 2: International Technical Assistance Measures, CESCR, E/1990/23 
(1990), para. 9 
A matter which has been of particular concern to the Committee in the examination of the reports of 
States parties is the adverse impact of the debt burden and of the relevant adjustment measures on the 
enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights in many countries. The Committee recognizes that 
adjustment programmes will often be unavoidable and that these will frequently involve a major 
element of austerity. Under such circumstances, however, endeavours to protect the most basic 
economic, social and cultural rights become more, rather than less, urgent. States parties to the 
Covenant, as well as the relevant United Nations agencies, should thus make a particular effort to ensure 
that such protection is, to the maximum extent possible, built-in to programmes and policies designed to 
promote adjustment. Such an approach, which is sometimes referred to as "adjustment with a human 
face" or as promoting "the human dimension of development" requires that the goal of protecting the 
rights of the poor and vulnerable should become a basic objective of economic adjustment. Similarly, 
international measures to deal with the debt crisis should take full account of the need to protect 
economic, social and cultural rights through, inter alia, international cooperation. In many situations, this 
might point to the need for major debt relief initiatives.  
7. General Comment No. 14: The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health, CESCR, 
E/C.12/2000/4 (2000), para. 39) 
To comply with their international obligations in relation to article 12, States parties have to respect the 
enjoyment of the right to health in other countries, and to prevent third parties from violating the right in 
other countries, if they are able to influence these third parties by way of legal or political means, in 
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and applicable international law. Depending on the 
availability of resources, States should facilitate access to essential health facilities, goods and services in 
other countries, wherever possible, and provide the necessary aid when required. States parties should 
ensure that the right to health is given due attention in international agreements and, to that end, should 
consider the development of further legal instruments. In relation to the conclusion of other international 
agreements, States parties should take steps to ensure that these instruments do not adversely impact 
upon the right to health. Similarly, States parties have an obligation to ensure that their actions as 
members of international organizations take due account of the right to health. Accordingly, States 
parties which are members of international financial institutions, notably the International Monetary 
Fund, the World Bank, and regional development banks, should pay greater attention to the protection 
of the right to health in influencing the lending policies, credit agreements and international measures of 
these institutions.  
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8. General Comment No. 15: The Right to Water, CESCR, E/C.12/2002/11 (2003), para. 36 
States parties should ensure that their actions as members of international organizations take due 
account of the right to water. Accordingly, States parties that are members of international financial 
institutions, notably the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and regional development banks, 
should take steps to ensure that the right to water is taken into account in their lending policies, credit 
agreements and other international measures.  
9. Maastricht Principles on Extraterritorial Obligations of States in the area of Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, Maastricht, Netherlands (September 2011) 
The Maastricht Principles are available at http://www.etoconsortium.org/en/main-navigation/ 
library/maastricht-principles/ (accessed on 14 April 2016). 
10. UN Charter, Article 56 
All Members pledge themselves to take joint and separate action in co-operation with the Organization 
for the achievement of the purposes set forth in Article 55. 
11. UDHR, Article 22 
Everyone, as a member of society, has the right to social security and is entitled to realization, through 
national effort and international co-operation and in accordance with the organization and resources of 
each State, of the economic, social and cultural rights indispensable for his dignity and the free 
development of his personality. 
12. ICESCR, Article 2(1) 
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps, individually and through international 
assistance and co-operation, especially economic and technical, to the maximum of its available 
resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the 
present Covenant by all appropriate means, including particularly the adoption of legislative measures. 
13. Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Article 32 
1. States Parties recognize the importance of international cooperation and its promotion, in 
support of national efforts for the realization of the purpose and objectives of the present 
Convention, and will undertake appropriate and effective measures in this regard, 
between and among States and, as appropriate, in partnership with relevant international 
and regional organizations and civil society, in particular organizations of persons with 
disabilities. Such measures could include, inter alia:  
(a) Ensuring that international cooperation, including international development 
programmes, is inclusive of and accessible to persons with disabilities;  
(b) Facilitating and supporting capacity-building, including through the exchange 
and sharing of information, experiences, training programmes and best practices;  
(c) Facilitating cooperation in research and access to scientific and technical 
knowledge;  
(d) Providing, as appropriate, technical and economic assistance, including by 
facilitating access to and sharing of accessible and assistive technologies, and 
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2. The provisions of this article are without prejudice to the obligations of each State Party 
to fulfil its obligations under the present Convention.  
14. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, Article 9(1) 
States Parties shall afford one another the greatest measure of assistance in connection with criminal 
proceedings brought in respect of any of the offences referred to in article 4, including the supply of all 
evidence at their disposal necessary for the proceedings. 
15. International Convention for the Protection of all Persons from Enforced Disappearance, 
Annex, Article 15 
States Parties shall cooperate with each other and shall afford one another the greatest measure of 
mutual assistance with a view to assisting victims of enforced disappearance, and in searching for, 
locating and releasing disappeared persons and, in the event of death, in exhuming and identifying them 
and returning their remains. 
16. Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child in Armed Conflict and on the 
Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography, Annex I, Article 10 
1. States Parties shall take all necessary steps to strengthen international cooperation by 
multilateral, regional and bilateral arrangements for the prevention, detection, 
investigation, prosecution and punishment of those responsible for acts involving the 
sale of children, child prostitution, child pornography and child sex tourism. States Parties 
shall also promote international cooperation and coordination between their authorities, 
national and international non-governmental organizations and international 
organizations.  
2. States Parties shall promote international cooperation to assist child victims in their 
physical and psychological recovery, social reintegration and repatriation.  
3. States Parties shall promote the strengthening of international cooperation in order to 
address the root causes, such as poverty and underdevelopment, contributing to the 
vulnerability of children to the sale of children, child prostitution, child pornography, and 
child sex tourism.  
4. States Parties in a position to do so shall provide financial, technical or other assistance 
through existing multilateral, regional, bilateral or other programmes.  
17. Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child in Armed Conflict and on the 
Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography, Annex II, Article 10 
The Optional Protocols to the Convention on the Rights of the Child outline States’ extraterritorial 
obligations to international cooperation. States have an obligation to cooperate to prevent and punish 
child prostitution, child pornography, the sale of children and the involvement of children in armed 
conflict. 
18. Maastricht Principles on Extraterritorial Obligations of States in the area of Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, Maastricht, Netherlands (September 2011) 
The Principles have been adopted on September 28, 2011 by leading experts in international law and 
human rights; they can be accessed at: http://www.etoconsortium.org/nc/en/main-navigation/ 
library/maastricht-principles/ (see above). See also O. De Schutter, A. Eide, A. Khalfan, M. Orellana, M. 
Salomon, I. Seiderman (2012) for the official commentary to the Principles, available at 
http://www.icj.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/HRQMaastricht-Maastricht-Principles-on-ETO.pdf  
115 
Policy Department, Directorate-General for External Policies 
 
B. Do no harm 
a) Respect obligations 
19. ETO Principle 13: Obligation to avoid causing harm 
States must desist from acts and omissions that create a real risk of nullifying or impairing the enjoyment 
of economic, social and cultural rights extraterritorially. The responsibility of States is engaged where 
such nullification or impairment is a foreseeable result of their conduct. Uncertainty about potential 
impacts does not constitute justification for such conduct. 
20. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1996, p. 
226, para. 29 
The Court recognizes that the environment is under daily threat and that the use of nuclear weapons 
could constitute a catastrophe for the environment. The Court also recognizes that the environment is 
not an abstraction but represents the living space, the quality of life and the very health of human beings, 
including generations unborn. The existence of the general obligation of States to ensure that activities 
within their jurisdiction and control respect the environment of other States or of areas beyond national 
control is now part of the corpus of international law relating to the environment.  
21. ETO Principle 20: Direct interference 
All States have the obligation to refrain from conduct, which nullifies or impairs the enjoyment and 
exercise of economic, social and cultural rights of persons outside their territories.  
22. ETO Principle 21: Indirect interference 
States must refrain from any conduct which: 
a) Impairs the ability of another State or international organisation to comply with that 
State’s or that international organisation’s obligations as regards economic, social and 
cultural rights; or 
b) Aids, assists, directs, controls or coerces another State or international organisation to 
breach that State’s or that international organisation’s obligations as regards economic, 
social and cultural rights, where the former States do so with knowledge of the 
circumstances of the act. 
23. UN Charter Article 74 
Members of the United Nations also agree that their policy in respect of the territories to which this 
Chapter applies, no less than in respect of their metropolitan areas, must be based on the general 
principle of good-neighbourliness, due account being taken of the interests and well-being of the rest of 
the world, in social, economic, and commercial matters. 
24. Concluding Observations CESCR on Belgium, UN Doc.E/C.12/bel/co/4 (2013), para. 22 
The Committee is concerned by reports that the State party’s policy for promoting agrofuels, in particular 
its new Agrofuels Act of 17 July 2013, is likely to encourage largescale cultivation of these products in 
third countries where Belgian firms operate and could lead to negative consequences for local farmers 
(art. 11).  
The Committee recommends that the State party systematically conduct human rights impact 
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impact on the economic, social and cultural rights of local communities in third countries 
where Belgian firms working in this field operate. 
25. CEDAW, General Recommendation No. 34 on the Rights of Rural Women, para. 13 
States parties should regulate the activities of domestic non-State actors within their jurisdiction, 
including when they operate extraterritorially. GR 28 (2010) on the core obligations of States parties 
under article 2, reaffirms the requirement under article 2(e) to eliminate discrimination by any public or 
private actor, which extends to acts of national corporations operating extraterritorially. States parties 
should uphold extraterritorial obligations with respect to rural women, inter alia, by: not interfering, 
directly or indirectly, with the enjoyment of their rights; taking regulatory measures to prevent any actor 
under their jurisdiction, including private individuals, companies and public entities, from infringing or 
abusing the rights of rural women outside their territory; and, ensuring that international cooperation 
and development assistance, whether bilateral or multilateral, advance the rights of rural women outside 
their territory. Appropriate and effective remedies should be available to affected rural women when a 
State party has violated its extraterritorial obligations. 
26. International Law Commission, Report of the Fifty-Third Session, Responsibility of States 
for Internationally Wrongful Acts, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001), arts. 16-18. 
This document can be accessed at: 
http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/ 9_6_2001.pdf (commentaries on pp. 65-
70). 
Article 16: Aid or assistance in the commission of an internationally wrongful act 
A State which aids or assists another State in the commission of an internationally wrongful act by the 
latter is internationally responsible for doing so if: 
a) That State does so with knowledge of the circumstances of the internationally wrongful 
act; and 
b) The act would be internationally wrongful if committed by that State. 
Article 17: Direction and control exercised over the commission of an internationally wrongful act 
A State which directs and controls another State in the commission of an internationally wrongful act by 
the latter is internationally responsible for that act if: 
a) That State does so with knowledge of the circumstances of the internationally wrongful 
act; and 
b) The act would be internationally wrongful if committed by that State. 
Article 18: Coercion of another State 
A State which coerces another State to commit an act is internationally responsible for that act if: 
a) The act would, but for the coercion, be an internationally wrongful act of the coerced 
State; and 
b) The coercing State does so with knowledge of the circumstances of the act. 
b) Impact assessments/due diligence 
27. Guiding principles on human rights impact assessments of trade and investment 
agreements 
The former UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, Olivier De Schutter, has developed guidelines for 
States on how to conduct HRIAs in the context of international trade and investment agreements that 
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can provide useful guidance to the EU in the design and implementation of such assessments. See De 
Schutter (2011): Guiding principles on human rights impact assessments of trade and investment 
agreements. A/HRC/19/59/Add.5. Available at: http://www.ohchr.org/ 
Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/Regular Session/Session19/A-HRC-19-59-Add5_en.pdf  
28. ETO Principle 14: Impact assessment and prevention 
States must conduct prior assessment, with public participation, of the risks and potential extraterritorial 
impacts of their laws, policies and practices on the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights. The 
results of the assessment must be made public. The assessment must also be undertaken to inform the 
measures that States must adopt to prevent violations or ensure their cessation as well as to ensure 
effective remedies.  
29. Concluding Observations CESCR on Austria (E/C.12/AUT/CO/4), Norway (E/C.12/NOR/CO/5) 
(2013) 
CESCR Concluding Observations on Austria 
11. The Committee is deeply concerned that the State party’s official development assistance provides 
support to projects that have reportedly resulted in violations of economic, social and cultural rights in 
recipient countries. It is further concerned that the State party’s agriculture and trade policies, which 
promote the export of subsidized agricultural products to developing countries, undermine the 
enjoyment of the right to an adequate standard of living and the right to food in the receiving countries 
(arts. 2 and 11).  
The Committee calls upon the State party to adopt a human rights-based approach to its 
policies on official development assistance and on agriculture and trade, by:  
(a) Undertaking a systematic and independent human rights impact assessment prior to 
making funding decisions;  
(b) Establishing an effective monitoring mechanism to regularly assess the human rights 
impact of its policies and projects in the receiving countries and to take remedial 
measures; and  
(c) Ensuring that there is an accessible complaint mechanism if violations of economic, 
social and cultural rights occur in the receiving countries.  
12. The Committee is concerned at the lack of oversight over Austrian companies operating abroad with 
regard to the negative impact of their activities on the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights 
in host countries (art. 2). 
The Committee urges the State party to ensure that all economic, social and cultural rights are 
fully respected and rights holders adequately protected in the context of corporate activities, 
including by establishing appropriate laws and regulations, together with monitoring, 
investigation and accountability procedures to set and enforce standards for the performance 
of corporations, as underlined in the Committee’s statement on the obligations of States 
parties regarding the corporate sector and economic, social and cultural rights (E/2012/22, 
annex VI, section A). 
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6. The Committee is concerned that the various steps taken by the State party in the context of the social 
responsibility of the Government Pension Fund Global have not included the institutionalization of 
systematic human rights impact assessments of its investments.  
The Committee recommends that the State party ensure that investments by the Norges Bank 
Investment Management in foreign companies operating in third countries are subject to a 
comprehensive human rights impact assessment (prior to and during the investment). The 
Committee also recommends that the State party adopt policies and other measures to 
prevent human rights contraventions abroad by corporations that have their main offices 
under the jurisdiction of the State party, without infringing the sovereignty or diminishing the 
obligations of the host States under the Covenant. The Committee draws the attention of the 
State party to its statement on the obligations of State parties regarding the corporate sector 
and economic, social and cultural rights (E/2012/22, annex VI, section A). 
30. Large-scale land acquisitions and leases: A set of minimum principles and measures to 
address the human rights challenge 
Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right to food, Olivier De Schutter (A/HRC/13/33/Add.2), 2009. 
The report accessed at: http://www.srfood.org/images/stories/pdf/officialreports/20100305_a-hrc-13-33-
add2_land-principles_en.pdf  
31. General Comment No. 34: Article 19: Freedoms of Opinion and Expression, U.N. Human 
Rights Committee., 102nd Sess., para. 18-19. U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/34 (2011) 
Right of access to information 
18. Article 19, paragraph 2 embraces a right of access to information held by public bodies. Such 
information includes records held by a public body, regardless of the form in which the information is 
stored, its source and the date of production. Public bodies are as indicated in paragraph 7of this general 
comment. The designation of such bodies may also include other entities when such entities are carrying 
out public functions. As has already been noted, taken together with article 25 of the Covenant, the right 
of access to information includes a right whereby the media has access to information on public affairs 
and the right of the general public to receive media output. Elements of the right of access to information 
are also addressed elsewhere in the Covenant. As the Committee observed in its general comment No. 
16, regarding article 17 of the Covenant, every individual should have the right to ascertain in an 
intelligible form, whether, and if so, what personal data is stored in automatic data files, and for what 
purposes. Every individual should also be able to ascertain which public authorities or private individuals 
or bodies control or may control his or her files. If such files contain incorrect personal data or have been 
collected or processed contrary to the provisions of the law, every individual should have the right to 
have his or her records rectified. Pursuant to article 10 of the Covenant, a prisoner does not lose the 
entitlement to access to his medical records. The Committee, in general comment No. 32 on article 14, set 
out the various entitlements to in formation that are held by those accused of a criminal offence. 
Pursuant to the provisions of article 2, persons should be in receipt of information regarding their 
Covenant rights in general. Under article 27, a State party’s decision-making that may substantively 
compromise the way of life and culture of a minority group should be undertaken in a process of 
information-sharing and consultation with affected communities. 
19. To give effect to the right of access to information, States parties should proactively put in the public 
domain Government information of public interest. States parties should make every effort to ensure 
easy, prompt, effective and practical access to such information. States parties should also enact the 
necessary procedures, whereby one may gain access to information, such as by means of freedom of 
information legislation. The procedures should provide for the timely processing of requests for 
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information according to clear rules that are compatible with the Covenant. Fees for requests for 
information should not be such as to constitute an unreasonable impediment to access to information. 
Authorities should provide reasons for any refusal to provide access to information. Arrangements should 
be put in place for appeals from refusals to provide access to information as well as in cases of failure to 
respond to requests.  
32. Társáság a Szabadságjogokért v. Hungary, Appl. No. 37374/05, para. 26, 35 (2009) 
26. The Court has consistently recognised that the public has a right to receive information of general 
interest. Its case-law in this field has been developed in relation to press freedom which serves to impart 
information and ideas on such matters (see Observer and Guardian v. the United Kingdom, 26 November 
1991, § 59, Series A no. 216, and Thorgeir Thorgeirson v. Iceland, 25 June 1992, § 63, Series A no. 239). In 
this connection, the most careful scrutiny on the part of the Court is called for when the measures taken 
by the national authority are capable of discouraging the participation of the press, one of society’s 
“watchdogs”, in the public debate on matters of legitimate public concern (see Bladet Tromsø and 
Stensaas v. Norway [GC], no. 21980/93, § 64, ECHR 1999-III, and Jersild v. Denmark, 23 September 1994, § 
35, Series A no. 298), even measures which merely make access to information more cumbersome. 
Available at: http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i%3D001-92171#{%22itemid%22:[%22001-92171%22]}  
33. Other legal sources with regard to the requirement of a prior environmental assessment 
The requirement of a prior environmental assessment is also enshrined in 
• The Convention on Biological Diversity, 
• The UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, and 
• The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. 
C. International agreements and cooperation 
a) Human rights compliance of international agreements 
34. ETO Principle 17: International agreements 
The present Principles apply to States without excluding their applicability to the human rights 
obligations of international organisations under, inter alia, general international law and international 
agreements to which they are parties. 
35. Other recent pronouncements or court decisions on the obligation that international 
agreements must be consistent with States’ human rights obligations 
• CESCR Concluding Observations Canada (E/C.12/CAN/CO/6), General Comments 22 
(E/C.12/GC/22) 
• CEDAW General Recommendation on Rural Women (CEDAW/C/GC/34) 
• Bosphorus v. Ireland, App. No. 45036/98 2005 Eur. Ct. H.R. at para. 154 
• Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser.C), 
Report No. 146, para. 140 (29 Mar. 2006) 
b) Enabling international environment  
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States must take deliberate, concrete and targeted steps, separately, and jointly through international 
cooperation, to create an international enabling environment conducive to the universal fulfilment of 
economic, social and cultural rights, including in matters relating to bilateral and multilateral trade, 
investment, taxation, finance, environmental protection, and development cooperation.  
The compliance with this obligation is to be achieved through, inter alia:  
a) Elaboration, interpretation, application and regular review of multilateral and bilateral 
agreements as well as international standards;  
b) Measures and policies by each State in respect of its foreign relations, including actions within 
international organisations, and its domestic measures and policies that can contribute to the 
fulfilment of economic, social and cultural rights extraterritorially.  
37. De Schutter et Al. (2012), Commentary to the Maastricht Principles on Extraterritorial 
Obligations of States in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, p. 24. 
When Member States transfer competences to the EU, such as in the area of trade and investment, they 
must make sure that agreements negotiated and implemented by the EU are compliant with their human 
rights obligations and must oppose agreements/ provisions that present a real risk to the enjoyment of 
human rights in third countries. 
38. General Comment No. 3: The Nature of States Parties Obligations, CESCR, E/1991/23 (1991), 
para. 2 
1. Article 2 is of particular importance to a full understanding of the Covenant and must be seen as 
having a dynamic relationship with all of the other provisions of the Covenant. It describes the nature of 
the general legal obligations undertaken by States parties to the Covenant. Those obligations include 
both what may be termed (following the work of the International Law Commission) obligations of 
conduct and obligations of result. While great emphasis has sometimes been placed on the difference 
between the formulations used in this provision and that contained in the equivalent article 2 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, it is not always recognized that there are also 
significant similarities. In particular, while the Covenant provides for progressive realization and 
acknowledges the constraints due to the limits of available resources, it also imposes various obligations, 
which are of immediate effect. Of these, two are of particular importance in understanding the precise 
nature of States parties’ obligations. One of these, which is dealt with in a separate general comment, and 
which is to be considered by the Committee at its sixth session, is the “undertaking to guarantee” that 
relevant rights “will be exercised without discrimination...”] 
2. The other is the undertaking in article 2 (1) “to take steps”, which in itself, is not qualified or limited by 
other considerations. The full meaning of the phrase can also be gauged by noting some of the different 
language versions. In English the undertaking is “to take steps”, in French it is “to act” (“s’engage à agir”) 
and in Spanish it is “to adopt measures” (“a adoptar medidas”). Thus while the full realization of the 
relevant rights may be achieved progressively, steps towards that goal must be taken within a reasonably 
short time after the Covenant’s entry into force for the States concerned. Such steps should be deliberate, 
concrete and targeted as clearly as possible towards meeting the obligations recognized in the Covenant.  
39. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 28 
Everyone is entitled to a social and international order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in this 
Declaration can be fully realized. 
40. Declaration on Right to Development, A/RES/41/128, (1986), art 3(1) 
States have the primary responsibility for the creation of national and international conditions favourable 
to the realization of the right to development. 
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c) International cooperation 
41. General Comment No. 3: The Nature of States Parties Obligations, CESCR, 5th Sess., para. 
12, U.N. Doc. E/1991/23 (1991) 
Similarly, the Committee underlines the fact that even in times of severe resources constraints whether 
caused by a process of adjustment, of economic recession, or by other factors the vulnerable members of 
society can and indeed must be protected by the adoption of relatively low-cost targeted programmes. 
In support of this approach the Committee takes note of the analysis prepared by UNICEF entitled 
“Adjustment with a human face: protecting the vulnerable and promoting growth, the analysis by UNDP 
in its Human Development Report 1990 and the analysis by the World Bank in the World Development 
Report 1990. 
42. Concluding Observations on Austria, CESCR, 2013, UN Doc. E/C.12/AUT/CO/4 
Accessed at: https://www.bka.gv.at/DocView.axd?CobId=54260 
43. ETO Principle 32: Principles and priorities in cooperation 
In fulfilling economic, social and cultural rights extraterritorially, States must: 
a. Prioritize the realisation of the rights of disadvantaged, marginalized and vulnerable groups; 
b. Prioritize core obligations to realize minimum essential levels of economic, social and cultural 
rights, and move as expeditiously and effectively as possible towards the full realization of 
economic, social and cultural rights; 
c. Observe international human rights standards, including the right to self-determination and the 
right to participate in decision-making, as well as the principles of non-discrimination and 
equality, including gender equality, transparency, and accountability; and 
d. Avoid any retrogressive measures or else discharge their burden to demonstrate that such 
measures are duly justified by reference to the full range of human rights obligations, and are 
only taken after a comprehensive examination of alternatives.  
D. Protect obligations 
a) Regulation of non-state actors 
44. ETO Principle 24: Obligation to regulate 
All States must take necessary measures to ensure that non-State actors which they are in a position to 
regulate, as set out in Principle 25, such as private individuals and organisations, and transnational 
corporations and other business enterprises, do not nullify or impair the enjoyment of economic, social 
and cultural rights. These include administrative, legislative, investigative, adjudicatory and other 
measures. All other States have a duty to refrain from nullifying or impairing the discharge of this 
obligation to protect.  
45. General Comment No. 14: The Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health, CESCR, 
22nd Sess., U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2000/4, para. 31 (2000) 
The progressive realization of the right to health over a period of time should not be interpreted as 
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States parties have a specific and continuing obligation to move as expeditiously and effectively as 
possible towards the full realization of article 12. 
46. Statement on the Obligations of States Parties Regarding the Corporate Sector and 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, CESCR, para. 5, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2011/1 (2011) 
Protecting rights means that States Parties effectively safeguard rights holders against infringements of 
their economic, social and cultural rights involving corporate actors, by establishing appropriate laws and 
regulations, together with monitoring, investigation and accountability procedures to set and enforce 
standards for the performance of corporations. As the Committee has repeatedly explained, non-
compliance with this obligation can come about through action or inaction. It is of the utmost 
importance that States parties ensure access to effective remedies to victims of corporate abuse of 
economic, social and cultural rights, through judicial, administrative, legislative or other appropriate 
means. States parties should also take steps to prevent human rights contraventions abroad by 
corporations which have their main offices under their jurisdiction, without infringing the sovereignty or 
diminishing the obligations of the host States under the Covenant. For example, in its general comment 
No. 15 (2002) on the right to water, the Committee states “steps should be taken by States Parties to 
prevent their own citizens and companies from violating the right to water of individuals and 
communities in other countries”. It also emphasizes that “where States Parties can take steps to influence 
other third parties to respect the right, through legal or political means, such steps should be taken in 
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and applicable international law.” In its general 
comment No. 18 (2005) on the right to work, the Committee underlines that private enterprises, both 
national and multinational, “have a particular role to play in job creation, hiring policies and non-
discriminatory access to work. They should conduct their activities on the basis of legislation, 
administrative measures, codes of conduct and other appropriate measures promoting respect for the 
right to work, agreed between the government and civil society.” In its general comment No. 19 on the 
right to social security, the Committee underscores that “States Parties should extraterritorially protect 
the right to social security by preventing their own citizens and national entities from violating this right 
in other countries”. 
47. Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 9 of the Convention: 
Concluding Observations, CERD, 70th Sess., para 17, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/CAN/CO/18 (2007) 
The Committee notes with concern the reports of adverse effects of economic activities connected with 
the exploitation of natural resources in countries outside Canada by transnational corporations 
registered in Canada on the right to land, health, living environment and the way of life of indigenous 
peoples living in these regions (arts 2. 1(d)d), 4 (a) and 5(e)).  
In light of article 2.1 (d) and article 4 (a) and (b) of the Convention and of its general 
recommendation no. 23 (1997) on the rights of indigenous peoples, the Committee encourages 
the State party to take appropriate legislative or administrative measures to prevent acts of 
transnational corporations registered in Canada which negatively impact on the enjoyment of 
rights of indigenous peoples in territories outside Canada. In particular, the Committee 
recommends that the State party explore ways to hold transnational corporations registered in 
Canada accountable. The Committee requests the State party to include in its next periodic 
report information on the effects of activities of transnational corporations registered in 
Canada on indigenous peoples abroad and on any measures taken in this regard. 
48. General Comment No. 22: The Right to Sexual and Reproductive Health, CESCR, 57th Sess., 
U.N. Doc. E/C.12/GC/22, para. 60 (2016) 
States must effectively monitor and regulate specific sectors, such as private health care providers, health 
insurance companies, educational and child-care institutions, institutional care facilities, refugee camps, 
prisons and other detention centres, to ensure that they do not undermine or violate individuals’ 
enjoyment of the right to sexual and reproductive health. States have an obligation to ensure that private 
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health insurance companies do not refuse to cover sexual and reproductive health services. Furthermore, 
States also have an extraterritorial obligation to ensure that the transnational corporations, such as 
pharmaceutical companies operating globally, do not violate the right to sexual and reproductive health 
of people in other countries, for example through non-consensual testing of contraceptives or medical 
experiments.  
49. General Comment No. 23: The Right to just and favourable conditions of work, CESCR, 57th 
Sess., U.N. Doc. E/C.12/GC/23, para. 70 (2016) 
States parties should take measures, including legislative measures, to clarify that their nationals as well 
as enterprises domiciled in their territory and/or jurisdiction are required to respect the right throughout 
their operations extra-territorially. This responsibility is particularly important in States with advanced 
labour law systems as home-country enterprises can help to improve standards for working conditions in 
host countries. Similarly, in conflict and post-conflict situations, States parties can have an important 
regulatory and enforcement role and support individuals and enterprises to identify, prevent and 
mitigate risks to just and favourable conditions of work through their operations. States parties should 
introduce appropriate measures to ensure that non-State actors domiciled in the State party are 
accountable for violations of the right to just and favourable conditions of work extra-territorially and 
that victims have access to a remedy. States parties should also provide guidance to employers and 
enterprises on how to respect the right extra-territorially.  
50. General Comment No. 16 on State obligations regarding the impact of the business sector 
on children’s rights, CRC, 62nd Sess., U.N. Doc. CRC/C/GC/16 (2013), para. 38- 46 
38. Business enterprises increasingly operate on a global scale through complex networks of subsidiaries, 
contractors, suppliers and joint ventures. Their impact on children’s rights, whether positive or negative, 
is rarely the result of the action or omission of a single business unit, whether it is the parent company, 
subsidiary, contractor, supplier or others. Instead, it may involve a link or participation between 
businesses units located in different jurisdictions. For example, suppliers may be involved in the use of 
child labour, subsidiaries may be engaged in land dispossession and contractors or licensees may be 
involved in the marketing of goods and services that are harmful to children. There are particular 
difficulties for States in discharging their obligations to respect, protect and fulfil the rights of the child in 
this context owing, among other reasons, to the fact that business enterprises are often legally separate 
entities located in different jurisdictions even when they operate as an economic unit which has its 
centre of activity, registration and/or domicile in one country (the home State) and is operational in 
another (the host State).   
39. Under the Convention, States have the obligation to respect and ensure children’s rights within their 
jurisdiction. The Convention does not limit a State’s jurisdiction to “territory”. In accordance with 
international law, the Committee has previously urged States to protect the rights of children who may 
be beyond their territorial borders. It has also emphasized that State obligations under the Convention 
and the Optional Protocols thereto apply to each child within a State’s territory and to all children subject 
to a State’s jurisdiction. 
40. Extraterritorial obligations are also explicitly referred to in the Optional Protocol on the sale of 
children, child prostitution and child pornography. Article 3, paragraph 1, provides that each State shall 
ensure that, as a minimum, offences under it are fully covered by its criminal or penal law, whether such 
offences are committed domestically or transnationally. Under article 3, paragraph 4, of Optional Protocol 
on the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography, liability for these offences, whether 
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This approach is consistent with other human rights treaties and instruments that impose obligations on 
States to establish criminal jurisdiction over nationals in relation to areas such as complicity in torture, 
enforced disappearance and apartheid, no matter where the abuse and the act constituting complicity is 
committed.  
41. States have obligations to engage in international cooperation for the realization of children’s rights 
beyond their territorial boundaries. The preamble and the provisions of the Convention consistently refer 
to the “importance of international cooperation for improving the living conditions of children in every 
country, in particular in the developing countries”. General comment No. 5 emphasizes “implementation 
of the Convention is a cooperative exercise for the States of the world”. As such, the full realization of 
children’s rights under the Convention is in part a function of how States interact. Furthermore, the 
Committee highlights that the Convention has been nearly universally ratified; thus realization of its 
provisions should be of major and equal concern to both host and home States of business enterprises.   
42. Host States have the primary responsibility to respect, protect and fulfil children’s rights in their 
jurisdiction. They must ensure that all business enterprises, including transnational corporations 
operating within their borders, are adequately regulated within a legal and institutional framework that 
ensures that they do not adversely impact on the rights of the child and/or aid and abet violations in 
foreign jurisdictions.   
43. Home States also have obligations, arising under the Convention and the Optional Protocols thereto, 
to respect, protect and fulfil children’s rights in the context of businesses’ extraterritorial activities and 
operations, provided that there is a reasonable link between the State and the conduct concerned. A 
reasonable link exists when a business enterprise has its centre of activity, is registered or domiciled or 
has its main place of business or substantial business activities in the State concerned. When adopting 
measures to meet this obligation, States must not violate the Charter of the United Nations and general 
international law nor diminish the obligations of the host State under the Convention. 
44. States should enable access to effective judicial and non-judicial mechanisms to provide remedy for 
children and their families whose rights have been violated by business enterprises extraterritorially 
when there is a reasonable link between the State and the conduct concerned. Furthermore, States 
should provide international assistance and cooperation with investigations and enforcement of 
proceedings in other States.   
45. Measures to prevent the infringement of children’s rights by business enterprises when they are 
operating abroad include: 
a. Making access to public finance and other forms of public support, such as insurance, conditional 
on a business carrying out a process to identify, prevent or mitigate any negative impacts on 
children’s rights in their overseas operations;  
b. Taking into account the prior record of business enterprises on children’s rights when deciding 
on the provision of public finance and other forms of official support;  
c. Ensuring that State agencies with a significant role regarding business, such as export credit 
agencies, take steps to identify, prevent and mitigate any adverse impacts the projects they 
support might have on children’s rights before offering support to businesses operating abroad 
and stipulate that such agencies will not support activities that are likely to cause or contribute to 
children’s rights abuses.  
46. Both home and host States should establish institutional and legal frameworks that enable businesses 
to respect children’s rights across their global operations. Home States should ensure that there are 
effective mechanisms in place so that the government agencies and institutions with responsibility for 
implementation of the Convention and the Optional Protocols thereto coordinate effectively with those 
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responsible for trade and investment abroad. They should also build capacity so that development 
assistance agencies and overseas missions that are responsible for promoting trade can integrate 
business issues into bilateral human rights dialogues, including children’s rights, with foreign 
Governments. States that adhere to the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises should support 
their national contact points in providing mediation and conciliation for matters that arise 
extraterritorially by ensuring that they are adequately resourced, independent and mandated to work to 
ensure respect for children’s rights in the context of business issues. Recommendations issued by bodies 
such as the OECD national contact points should be given adequate effect. 
51. Concluding observations on the sixth periodic report of Canada, CESCR, 57th Sess., U.N. 
Doc. E/C.12/CAN/CO/6, para. 16 (2016) 
The Committee recommends that the State party strengthen its legislation governing the conduct of 
corporations registered or domiciled in the State party in their activities abroad, including by requiring 
those corporations to conduct human rights impact assessments prior to making investment decisions. It 
also recommends that the State party introduce effective mechanisms to investigate complaints filed 
against those corporations, and adopt the legislative measures necessary to facilitate access to justice 
before domestic courts by victims of the conduct of those corporations. The Committee further 
recommends that the State party ensure that trade and investment agreements negotiated by Canada 
recognize the primacy of its international human rights obligations over investors’ interests, so that the 
introduction of investor-State dispute settlement procedures shall not create obstacles to the full 
realization of Covenant rights. 
52. Concluding observations on the combined eighth and ninth periodic reports of Sweden, 
CEDAW, 63rd Sess., U.N. Doc. CEDAW/C/SWE/CO/8-9, para. 35 (2016) 
The Committee recommends that the State party intensify its efforts to ensure equal opportunities for 
women in the labour market, including traditionally male-dominated sectors, such as information 
technologies and science, create more opportunities for women to gain access to full-time employment, 
increase the incentives for men to use their right to parental leave and take specific and proactive 
measures to eliminate occupational segregation and to reduce the gender pay gap. The State party 
should take into account the needs of disadvantaged groups of women and consider the use of 
temporary special measures, such as financial incentives, in this regard. The Committee recommends that 
the State party ratify the International Labour Organization Convention no. 189 (2010) concerning decent 
work for domestic workers. It further recommends that the State party uphold its due diligence 
obligations to ensure that companies under […] its jurisdiction or control respect, protect and fulfil 
women’s human rights when operating abroad. 
53. ETO Principle 25c: Bases for Protection 
States must adopt and enforce measures to protect economic, social and cultural rights through legal 
and other means, including diplomatic means, in each of the following circumstances: 
c. As regards business enterprises, where the corporation, or its parent or controlling company, has its 
centre of activity, is registered or domiciled, or has its main place of business or substantial business 
activities, in the State concerned [.] 
54. Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 402 (2) (1987) 
“[A] state has jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to […] (2) the activities, interests, status, or 
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55. ETO Principle 26: Position to influence 
States that are in a position to influence the conduct of non-State actors even if they are not in a position 
to regulate such conduct, such as through their public procurement system or international diplomacy, 
should exercise such influence, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and general 
international law, in order to protect economic, social and cultural rights. 
56. General Comment No 15 on the Right to Water, CESCR, 29th session, 2003, UN Doc. 
E/C.12/2002/11, para. 33 
Steps should be taken by States parties to prevent their own citizens and companies from violating the 
right to water of individuals and communities in other countries. Where States parties can take steps to 
influence other third parties to respect the right, through legal or political means, such steps should be 
taken in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations Charter and applicable international law. 
57. ETO Principle 27: Obligation to cooperate 
All States must cooperate to ensure that non-State actors do not impair the enjoyment of the economic, 
social and cultural rights of any persons. This obligation includes measures to prevent human rights 
abuses by non-State actors, to hold them to account for any such abuses, and to ensure an effective 
remedy for those affected. 
b) Regulation of state-controlled DFIs 
58. ETO Principle 12a: Attribution of State responsibility for the conduct of non-State actors 
State responsibility extends to: 
a) Acts and omissions of non-State actors acting on the instructions or under the direction 
or control of the State. 
E. Remedy 
59. ETO Principle 37: General obligation to provide effective remedy 
States must ensure the enjoyment of the right to a prompt, accessible and effective remedy before an 
independent authority, including, where necessary, recourse to a judicial authority, for violations of 
economic, social and cultural rights. Where the harm resulting from an alleged violation has occurred on 
the territory of a State other than a State in which the harmful conduct took place, any State concerned 
must provide remedies to the victim.  
To give effect to this obligation, States should: 
a) Seek cooperation and assistance from other concerned States where necessary to ensure 
a remedy; 
b) Ensure remedies are available for groups as well as individuals;  
c) Ensure the participation of victims in the determination of appropriate remedies;  
d) Ensure access to remedies, both judicial and non-judicial, at the national and international 
levels; and 
e) Accept the right of individual complaints and develop judicial remedies at the 
international level. 
60. ETO Principle 38: Effective remedies and reparation 
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Remedies, to be effective, must be capable of leading to a prompt, thorough and impartial investigation; 
cessation of the violation if it is on-going; and adequate reparation, including, as necessary, restitution, 
compensation, satisfaction, rehabilitation and guarantees of non-repetition. To avoid irreparable harm, 
interim measures must be available and States must respect the indication of interim measures by a 
competent judicial or quasi-judicial body. Victims have the right to truth about the facts and 
circumstances surrounding the violations, which should also be disclosed to the public, provided that it 
causes no further harm to the victim. 
61. Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Article 8) 
Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the 
fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or by law. 
62. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Article 2 (3)) 
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes:  
a) To ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as herein recognized are violated 
shall have an effective remedy, notwithstanding that the violation has been committed 
by persons acting in an official capacity;  
b) To ensure that any person claiming such a remedy shall have his right thereto 
determined by competent judicial, administrative or legislative authorities, or by any 
other competent authority provided for by the legal system of the State, and to develop 
the possibilities of judicial remedy;  
c) To ensure that the competent authorities shall enforce such remedies when granted.  
63. Convention against Torture and other Forms of Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment (Articles 13 and 14) 
Article 13  
Each State Party shall ensure that any individual who alleges he has been subjected to torture in any 
territory under its jurisdiction has the right to complain to, and to have his case promptly and impartially 
examined by, its competent authorities. Steps shall be taken to ensure that the complainant and 
witnesses are protected against all ill treatment or intimidation as a consequence of his complaint or any 
evidence given. 
Article 14 
1. Each State Party shall ensure in its legal system that the victim of an act of torture obtains redress 
and has an enforceable right to fair and adequate compensation, including the means for as full 
rehabilitation as possible. In the event of the death of the victim as a result of an act of torture, 
his dependants shall be entitled to compensation.  
2. Nothing in this article shall affect any right of the victim or other persons to compensation, which 
may exist under national law.  
64. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Article 6) 
States Parties shall assure to everyone within their jurisdiction effective protection and remedies, through 
the competent national tribunals and other State institutions, against any acts of racial discrimination 
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right to seek from such tribunals just and adequate reparation or satisfaction for any damage suffered as 
a result of such discrimination. 
65. Convention on the Rights of the Child (Article 39) 
States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to promote physical and psychological recovery and 
social reintegration of a child victim of: any form of neglect, exploitation, or abuse; torture or any other 
form of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; or armed conflicts. Such recovery and 
reintegration shall take place in an environment, which fosters the health, self-respect and dignity of the 
child. 
66. European Convention on Human Rights (Articles 5 (5), 13 and 41) 
Article 5: Right to liberty and security 
5. Everyone who has been the victim of arrest or detention in contravention of the provisions of this 
Article shall have an enforceable right to compensation. 
Article 13: Right to an effective remedy 
Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this Convention are violated shall have an effective 
remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons 
acting in an official capacity. 
Article 14: Prohibition of discrimination 
The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured without 
discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, 
national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status. 
67. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU (Article 47) 
Article 47: Right to an effective remedy and to a fair trial 
Everyone whose rights and freedoms guaranteed by the law of the Union are violated has the right to an 
effective remedy before a tribunal in compliance with the conditions laid down in this Article. 
Everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and 
impartial tribunal previously established by law. Everyone shall have the possibility of being advised, 
defended and represented. Legal aid shall be made available to those who lack sufficient resources in so 
far as such aid is necessary to ensure effective access to justice 
68. Vienna Declaration and Program of Action (Article 27) 
Every State should provide an effective framework of remedies to redress human rights grievances or 
violations. The administration of justice, including law enforcement and prosecutorial agencies and, 
especially, an independent judiciary and legal profession in full conformity with applicable standards 
contained in international human rights instruments, are essential to the full and non-discriminatory 
realization of human rights and indispensable to the processes of democracy and sustainable 
development. In this context, institutions concerned with the administration of justice should be properly 
funded, and an increased level of both technical and financial assistance should be provided by the 
international community. It is incumbent upon the United Nations to make use of special programmes of 
advisory services on a priority basis for the achievement of a strong and independent administration of 
justice. 
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69. Concluding observations on the fourth periodic report of Austria, E/C.12/AUT/CO/4 (2013), 
para. 11-12 
11. The Committee is deeply concerned that the State party’s official development assistance provides 
support to projects that have reportedly resulted in violations of economic, social and cultural rights in 
recipient countries. It is further concerned that the State party’s agriculture and trade policies, which 
promote the export of subsidized agricultural products to developing countries, undermine the 
enjoyment of the right to an adequate standard of living and the right to food in the receiving countries 
(arts. 2 and 11).  
The Committee calls upon the State party to adopt a human rights-based approach to its policies 
on official development assistance and on agriculture and trade, by:  
(a) Undertaking a systematic and independent human rights impact assessment prior to making 
funding decisions;  
(b) Establishing an effective monitoring mechanism to regularly assess the human rights impact 
of its policies and projects in the receiving countries and to take remedial measures; and  
(c) Ensuring that there is an accessible complaint mechanism if violations of economic, social and 
cultural rights occur in the receiving countries.  
12. The Committee is concerned at the lack of oversight over Austrian companies operating abroad with 
regard to the negative impact of their activities on the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights 
in host countries (art. 2). 
The Committee urges the State party to ensure that all economic, social and cultural rights are 
fully respected and rights holders adequately protected in the context of corporate activities, 
including by establishing appropriate laws and regulations, together with monitoring, 
investigation and accountability procedures to set and enforce standards for the performance of 
corporations, as underlined in the Committee’s statement on the obligations of States parties 
regarding the corporate sector and economic, social and cultural rights (E/2012/22, annex VI, 
section A). 
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